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 i 
Abstract 
 
This project is a comparative case study of five Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) that emerged in the seven central neighborhoods of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland, Oregon in the late 1980s. Of the five organizations that 
began at that time, only two exist currently. Analyzing how and why these 
organizations rose and fell, merged and failed, struggled and survived in a compressed 
time frame and geographic area will elucidate the different paths that each 
organization chose in a neighborhood that changed from derelict to gentrified. 
Drawing on the overlapping bodies of literature that cover low-income and affordable 
housing development, CDC structure and evolution, and neighborhood revitalization, 
this study will highlight issues of local government participation in the expansion of 
CDCs and a changing community context. The choices that organizations made, or 
were compelled to make, in response to these particularly local conditions contribute 
either to their fortitude or their demise. This case study is intended to fill in gaps in the 
existing CDC and gentrification literature and to contribute an understanding of 
survival strategies for CDCs in an intensely competitive environment.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 Since the 1960s, Community Development Corporations (CDCs) have 
endeavored to challenge neighborhood blight, advocate for local residents, and since 
1972, when President Nixon declared a moratorium on the construction of new public 
housing units, compensate for the federal government’s diminishing role in the 
production and management of low-income and affordable housing. Often grass roots, 
CDCs are non-profit organizations that sponsor community organizing, housing and 
economic development programs as vehicles for neighborhood improvement. Low-
income rental and for-sale housing development, economic development, community 
organizing, job training, home buying and education programs are some of the 
activities that CDCs engage in. However, of the programs, only housing development 
is a geographically fixed activity, so that it has the most lasting effect on a 
neighborhood. CDCs are generally supported by grants from local governments and 
philanthropic foundations, with their most visible assets in the community being units 
of low-income housing. 
 During the 1990s, the role of CDCs in urban redevelopment projects reached 
its pinnacle. Well-funded and thriving on the energy of renewed interest in urban life, 
CDCs nationwide were able to develop successful affordable housing and economic 
revitalization strategies in blighted urban neighborhoods (and more rarely in suburban 
and rural areas). The combination of federal legislation, specifically the National 
Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA) that mandated CDC participation in the 
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expenditure of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and Home Investment 
Partnerships (HOME) funding (the main source of federal dollars for economic and 
housing development projects at that time), as well as the rise of philanthropic 
foundations (the Enterprise Foundation created by The Rouse Company and the Local 
Incentives Support Corporation [LISC] created by the Ford Foundation were the 
largest partners) bolstered CDC development savvy and participation in revitalizing 
urban neighborhoods. With the federal government providing funding and 
philanthropic foundations providing technical assistance and leveraging additional 
funds, CDCs around the US embarked on ambitious development projects that focused 
on the creation of affordable housing units, job creation, and neighborhood 
stabilization. However, by the middle and end of the 1990’s, many organizations, 
especially newer ones, faced economic, organizational, and political challenges that 
forced them to rethink how they operated. The economic challenges included 
decreased federal and foundation funding, greater competition from the private sector 
for development projects due to an easing of credit restrictions, and booming housing 
markets (Walker, 2002: 24). The organizational challenges included staffing, 
leadership, and asset management, and political challenges included waning support 
and changing neighborhoods, especially those that were affected by gentrification 
(Walker, 2002: 4; Hoereth, 1998: 9).  
The City of Portland, Oregon has a strong group of CDCs that emerged in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s; these operations work in different neighborhoods 
throughout the city and the surrounding suburbs. In 1990, the seven central 
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neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (see map, Appendix I) were poor, 
home to Portland’s largest concentration of African Americans, and blighted. These 
neighborhoods have seen a particularly dramatic ebb and flow of CDCs, neighborhood 
gentrification, and changes in racial composition since that time. The five 
organizations noted in this study have made significant contributions to neighborhood 
organizing, housing and economic development programs that in turn helped to lay the 
groundwork for private investment that ultimately changed the physical, social, and 
economic composition of that area. Of the original five, though, only two 
organizations currently exist. Analyzing how and why these organizations rose and 
fell, merged and failed, struggled and survived in an environment of increased 
financial accountability and competition between organizations, decreased federal 
funding, and gentrifying and racially changing neighborhoods is the purpose of this 
dissertation. Both qualitative and quantitative data will be utilized to understand the 
Portland-specificity of the phenomena and how the experiences of these CDCs can 
augment the current models of growth, change, and decline, both at the organizational 
and strategic levels. Specific questions that arise from this broad inquiry include: How 
did local policy makers and project funders guide the growth and development of the 
organizations? What was the role of the changing neighborhood, especially with 
regard to racial composition? In order to answer these questions, it is important to 
understand how these organizations evolved along with their relationships to local 
government, local and national funders, and the neighborhoods in which they 
operated, or have failed. 
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CDCs were first recognized as a viable means for community redevelopment 
in the 1960s, when urban decline and blight were accelerating. Through the 1970s and 
1980s, CDCs became embedded within their communities and were on the forefront of 
revitalization efforts, especially as larger government-funded efforts declined in the 
1980s (Walker, 2002:6). However, most early efforts had little substantive impacts on 
neighborhood vitality (Rusk, 1999; Walker, 2002). As these organizations were 
incorporated into the mainstream funding and redevelopment efforts in the 1990s, 
many urban areas had were concurrently undergoing vast changes. Urban economies, 
including Portland’s, had shifted from an industrial base to an information base. Urban 
neighborhoods were becoming popular places to live, and gentrification of previously 
derelict areas was happening in cities across the US. 
 
CDC Roles 
The multiple layers of explanations for the evolution of CDCs in Inner 
North/Northeast Portland are derived from the intertwining of CDC purpose and 
structure, federal policy changes that have supported the expansion of the roles of 
CDCs, the rise of philanthropic foundation participation in the support of CDCs, the 
specific neighborhood histories where these organizations operated, and the local 
policy initiatives and responses to the situation in Inner North/Northeast Portland.  
These factors define the particular role of each organization, a role that has changed 
significantly over time. 
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CDCs perform a variety of community organizing and community 
development activities. From low-income housing development (both new 
construction and rehabilitation) to job training programs, neighborhood watches to 
storefront improvements, CDC activities can involve the empowerment of 
neighborhood residents and the attraction of outside investors (Capraro, 2004). 
Housing development is an inherent part of CDC community development activities 
because “it is the sphere of activity in which it seemed most likely that they could 
demonstrate clear successes and thereby gain credibility and access to additional 
resources, both financial and intangible” (Vidal, 1996: 162). Because housing blight is 
a common occurrence in low-income neighborhoods and re/development can be an 
empowering process, it is a good fit for organizations that are trying to make a 
difference in their neighborhoods. It is a potential win-win situation for the 
organizations (as providers of housing), the neighborhoods (as safer and more 
desirable places to live), and the local government (as stewards of federal funding, 
protectors of public safety, and collectors of local taxes).  Because of their status as 
advocates, organizers, and landlords, CDCs must balance the needs and demands of 
tenants, neighbors and funders. It is this balancing act that often determines CDC 
success.  
Another potential dilemma that arises with a CDC focus on revitalization is the 
spurring of private investment in their neighborhoods. While Rusk’s (1999) study of 
CDC housing production in the 1980s showed no visible positive impact on 
neighborhood housing values, but the role of CDCs and their housing production in 
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the 1990s had yet to be fully clarified. In many cases, CDC involvement encouraged 
private investment in neighborhoods that had been previously redlined (Newman and 
Ashton, 2004; Walker, 2002). With this outside investment, issues of blight were no 
longer paramount for CDCs; those of gentrification and displacement were. The 
emergent dilemma for CDCs involves new neighborhood priorities that may no longer 
be the same as they had been. New neighbors may not welcome the existence and 
expansion of low-income rental housing. With improved neighborhoods, CDCs were 
also now in competition with private investors for developable land and vacant and 
abandoned housing units, if there were any left. This competition introduced a new 
challenge for CDCs, one that often put them out of business (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 
2003). 
 
Evolution of Federal Funding and Policies and CDCs 
 CDCs primarily take advantage of supply-side, project development funding 
through a public intermediary. As most CDCs take on housing development projects, 
their relationship with local government becomes critical to their survival. Local 
governments are the primary conduit for federal housing dollars which can, in turn, 
affect access to bank loans and grants from philanthropic foundations. Each of these 
relationships has evolved with federal policy changes. The most significant of these 
changes include the changing of the federal tax code in 1986 and bolstered CDC use 
of Community Development Block Grant Funds and HOME funds in the 1990s 
(O’Regan & Quigley, 2000). Since the Nixon Administration’s moratorium on the 
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construction of new public housing projects in 1972, the federal government has 
played a lesser role in the development and management of low-income and 
affordable housing (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987: 57-58; Walker, 2002:6). The large 
federal programs since 1972 have encouraged public-private development 
partnerships, where public entities partner with non-profit or private developers. In 
this scenario, the private or non-profit sector developers take on more direct 
ownership, while the federal government, via the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), assumes a regulatory and funding position. Examples of these 
funding policies that encouraged public-private partnerships include the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) from the Nixon Administration, the Urban 
Development Action Grant (UDAG), the cornerstone of the Carter Administration’s 
Urban Policy, and HOPE VI, the Clinton Administration’s policy for the 
redevelopment of public housing projects into more mixed income communities that 
create more positive contributions to neighborhoods and cities (Leamann, 1994; 
Schwartz, 2006). CDBG was a broad, flexible funding program that supplanted in part 
the federal spending on public housing projects. CDBG funding, while fewer overall 
dollars, gave local jurisdictions greater latitude in the types of development options, 
rather than exclusively housing development.  Although still allocated, CDBG funds 
have diminished over time as more specific funding like the HOME program has 
increased. UDAG (1978-1989) offered private and non-profit firms public resources to 
invest heavily in a specific economic development program or geographic area. These 
resources include eminent domain for site assembly, as well as funding for the 
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rebuilding of the public realm of development and gap financing for the buildings 
themselves (Schwartz, 2006). HOPE VI (1992-present) offers local housing 
authorities, in partnership with private and non-profit developers, flexible funding that 
can be used to leverage additional funds to replace blighted public housing projects 
with mixed income communities (Dreier & Atlas, 1996). 
Concurrent with the earlier federal funding program shifts was the legislation 
that sought to ameliorate decades of “redlining” and disinvestment in African 
American and other low-income neighborhoods. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA – 1975) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA-1977) were 
requirements for banks to make loans in neighborhoods where they held deposits and 
to provide documentation of such actions to the public. If banks did not comply with 
these regulations, the government would not allow them to open new branches (Frater 
interview: 2). These laws spurred bank lending, albeit begrudgingly in the beginning, 
in areas previously disinvested. Banks, though, did welcome CDCs and their public 
sector partners to facilitate risk sharing and to reduce exposure in the development of 
projects “in marginal neighborhoods where property values and resident incomes 
cannot support debt” (Vidal, 1996: 157). However, enforcement of these lending laws 
was somewhat lax; it was not until 1989 that the “federal government initiated any 
action on the basis of a CRA evaluation” (Squires, 1992). 
The hallmark of the Reagan Administration’s efforts to engage the private 
sector in the development of low-income housing was the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC), created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The purpose of the LIHTC 
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was to spur the private sector to participate in low-income housing production by 
creating incentive (tax credits on federal liabilities for ten years) for capital investment 
(Oregon Department of Housing and Community Services: 1). The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) allots each state a certain dollar value of tax credits based on the per 
capita income of the state (McNamara interview: 15; Oregon Department of Housing 
and Community Services: 1). The state governments distribute the credits to projects, 
often on a competitive basis (Oregon Department of Housing and Community 
Services: 3). Housing developers apply for and are awarded the credits based on 
certain project criteria. The credits are in turn syndicated by entities like Enterprise 
Social Investment Corporation (ESIC), a subsidiary of The Enterprise Foundation, and 
sold to investors who use the credits to offset personal income taxes; the proceeds of 
these sales provide the basis for project equity. This equity is used to fill the gap 
between loan amounts and actual project costs. As this is a free market based program, 
the value of the credits can fluctuate. When the economy is growing, and private 
investors need tax credits to offset income, the value of the credits increases to a ratio 
greater than 1:1. When the economy slows down and recedes, the value of the credits 
declines to less than 1:1, because fewer people need them to offset income. The 
overhauling of the tax system in 1986 caused a temporary hiccup in the production of 
low-income housing as developers scrambled to realign development projects with the 
new criteria and funding requirements. The use of the LIHTC also opened the door for 
more non-profit participation for use in mid-size developments. 
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The National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA), or Cranston Gonzales Act was 
passed in 1990. This act included a new type of affordable housing development 
funding, the HOME program, and represented a significant policy shift that would 
ensure the role of CDCs in local community development efforts by designating that 
15% of all CDBG and/or HOME funds would be set aside for “experienced 
Community Housing Development Organizations (CHDOs)” (HUD, 1997). For the 
purposes of its funding, HUD clearly defined that a CHDO was to be a community 
based organization for the purposes of its funding. The criteria for defining community 
based include: one-third of its governing board's membership for residents of low-
income neighborhoods, other low-income community residents, or elected 
representatives of low-income neighborhood organizations as evidenced by the 
organization’s by-laws, charter, or Articles of Incorporation (HUD, 1997). The 
inclusion of CDCs in the allocation of such funds institutionalized their participation 
in neighborhood revitalization efforts.  
 During the 1990s, new federal public housing policy included the initiation of 
the HOPE VI program that would dominate HUD’s housing efforts for the next 
several years. With a number of public housing projects having deteriorated to a point 
where they were considered hazards to the residents and neighbors, HUD sought to 
tear down a number of high-rise projects and replace those units with smaller scale 
developments. HOPE VI is the program designed to repurpose dangerous and 
outmoded public housing projects into well-designed, mixed income neighborhoods 
and developments and to divest Housing Authorities of the sole responsibility for 
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housing the poorest of the poor (Schwartz, 2006). Housing Authorities accomplished 
this by working in partnership with local non-profits to take advantage of multiple 
sources of project funding. Some of the most notorious projects included the Robert 
Taylor Homes and Cabrini Green in Chicago and the former Pruitt-Igoe site in St 
Louis. In Portland, the redevelopment of Columbia Villa into New Columbia and Iris 
Court into Humboldt Gardens are examples of such endeavors.  
 In an effort to preserve existing affordable housing units, HUD created the 
Low Income Housing Preservation Resident and Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) in 
1992 to preserve apartment complexes that had been developed in the 1970s with 20 
year subsidized mortgages. As the subsidies were about to expire, many owners were 
looking to sell the apartment complexes; HUD created “steps an owner of a property 
must take in order to sell it or end HUD's affordability restrictions, provided incentives 
to owners to stay in HUD's programs, and gave advantages to tenants and nonprofits 
in purchasing buildings should the owner choose to sell” (Shelterforce Online, 1997). 
Each apartment complex or Single Asset Entity (SAE) was an independent corporation 
with its own governing board, and the sponsoring CDC was merely a fiscal agent that 
did not even realize a fee from their role in management of the units. Had the 
sponsoring CDC been able to incorporate the income from these complexes into their 
portfolios, much of it from stable HUD sources, their balance sheets would have had 
very different numbers.25 
                                                
25 Unit based Section 8 vouchers ensured that the housing units would have a stable cash flow, albeit 
with additional paperwork and inspections. This fact made the complexes very attractive investments 
with stable populations. Most of the LIHPRHA apartments had Section 8 vouchers attached to the units, 
rather than the tenants. The income from these vouchers was based on HUD’s determination of a Fair 
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Philanthropic Foundations and CDCs 
 As CDCs grew in number and sophistication in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
so, too, did the funding and foundation support systems that sponsored them. Prior to 
the late 1980s, CDC funding was inconsistent; however, with the Ford Foundation’s 
expansion of the Local Incentives Support Corporation (LISC) to the West coast in 
1984 and the advent of the Enterprise Foundation in 1982, a nationwide “community 
development infrastructure” was established to disseminate both funding and technical 
assistance to community organizations (Hoereth, 1998: 15; www.LISC.org). The LISC 
and Enterprise networks were responsible for the allocation of money from the 
National Community Development Initiative (NCDI), a consortium of public and 
private funders that “played a key role in catalyzing CDC gains over the 1990s” 
(Walker, 2002:1). This infrastructure grew in size and complexity with the 
introduction of local intermediaries who would offer additional opportunities to 
leverage the NCDI funds (Walker, 2002: 60).  
 In the late 1980s, the Oregon Community Foundation (OCF), a clearinghouse 
for small local philanthropic foundations, had been involved in “building 
neighborhood associates, neighborhood spirit, and community economic 
development” through a grant from the Mott Foundation, but the political pressure to 
deal with (mostly) crime issues in Inner North/Northeast Portland called for a more 
focused, albeit community based, solution (Sohl interview: 3). While CDCs had 
                                                                                                                                       
Market Rent (FMR). Under the Section 8 program, tenants pay no more than 30% of their income for 
rent and utilities, and HUD pays the difference between that amount and the FMR.   
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“flowered” on the East Coast, Portland was slow to nurture the model, in part due to 
the fact that urban disinvestment levels and fiscal crises were not as dire in Portland as 
they were in other, often older cities (Hoereth, 1998: 1). In the late 1980s, though, the 
Ford Foundation had begun to establish local partnerships (via LISC) and to “partner 
with community foundations” (McNamara interview: 4). In 1989, the OCF won a 
planning grant from the Ford Foundation to complete “an assessment of community 
development needs in Portland.” The results of this assessment included the 
recommendation that OCF “create a local intermediary that would support CDCs at all 
maturity levels” (Hoereth, 1998:21). As a result of local political pressure (brought to 
a head by Dee Lane’s “Blueprint for a Slum” expose in The Oregonian) and the 
$500,000 commitment from the Ford Foundation, OCF created the Neighborhood 
Partnership Fund (NPF) in 1990 “to develop a support infrastructure for CDCs by 
channeling resources from foundations, corporations and government to local CDCs” 
(Hoereth, 1998: 1).  
 This funding was part of a broader national effort by philanthropic foundations 
to revitalize blighted urban areas. In conjunction with the federal focus on funding 
CDCs for housing development, increased support from philanthropic foundations 
catalyzed CDC growth and maturation (Glickman & Servon, 1998; Silver, 2004). 
Several large corporate foundations banded together to form the National Community 
Development Initiative (NCDI), a $62.5 million fund created in 1991 by a consortium 
of seven foundations and the Prudential Insurance Company that contributed 
significantly to the growth and direction of the national CDC industry (Gittell and 
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Wilder, 1999; Andrews interview: 2).26 With its funds disseminated through LISC and 
the Enterprise Foundation, NCDI filled part of the void created when federal support 
for any kind of housing production had been severely curtailed by the Reagan 
administration and shifted the focus to smaller, community based efforts. With the 
limitations in federal funding, state and local entities had to be more creative in their 
approaches to the development of subsidized housing. In this era of “strategic 
initiatives” rather than blanket programs, cities were encouraged to “leverage private 
investment,” such as foundation grants (Wollner, Provo, and Schablisky, 2003: 21). 
While reflective of differing perspectives, both the Ford and Enterprise Foundations 
sought to empower CDCs and increase their housing production through technical 
assistance, direct funding, and the syndication of tax credits (from the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act) to provide project equity (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987).27 
Born out of James Rouse’s commitment to low-income housing and supply 
side economics, The Enterprise Foundation (Enterprise), now Enterprise Community 
Partners, focused on housing production activities and sought to bridge the gap 
between public investment and private enterprise. Since its creation in 1982, 
Enterprise has given organizations core-operating support and assisted with the 
production of units of low and moderate income housing through technical assistance, 
tax credit syndication, lobbying efforts, and direct funding throughout the country. 
                                                
26 These funders included the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Ford Foundation (Allen & Luckett Interview: 
13). 
27 LISC was born out of the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Project in 1979 and acts as a “bank” for 
local CDCs that worked to leverage additional funds and demand accountability from groups. 
Enterprise reflected a more nuts and bolts, hands-on approach (and dollars) to development with its 
Rehab Work Group that offered tips to groups on ways to get the most housing units for dollars 
invested (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987: 75-81). 
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With its counterpart, LISC, Enterprise has a presence in many major cities in the US, 
as well as rural areas.  One of the main goals of this organization is to strengthen the 
potential of public private partnerships, an idea that has been encouraged by federal 
policies and led to the growth of CDCs as housing developers. 
When NPF began in 1990, Ed McNamara, who had been the Executive 
Director of REACH CDC, was hired to run the entity and to build a local CDC 
industry, in many ways based on his successes at REACH.28 It was the goal of NPF’s 
“programs to ensure that all of Portland’s low-income neighborhoods are served by 
effective CDCs” (NPF, 1994: 1).  As part of industry creation, McNamara set out to 
empower not only individual organizations, but also to create a technical assistance 
and policy advisory group (McNamara interview: 5).29 In order to coalesce the 
organizational part of the industry, McNamara established a hierarchy for groups from 
emerging to mature CDCs, and set up a series of training sessions for the board and 
staff of the emerging ones. At the time, there were many fledgling organizations that 
were interested in expanding their influence in their neighborhoods. The organizations 
included not only neighborhood associations, but also cultural and church based 
groups as well. These organizations applied through a competitive funding process 
and, if accepted, would commit to 6 months of weekend training sessions that would 
culminate with the organizations having a mission statement, by-laws, a business plan 
with which to operate more effectively, and a better understanding of housing 
development and finance (Hoereth, 1998: 21; McNamara interview: 7). Once the 
                                                
28 In 1990, REACH was considered one of the two viable CDCs in Portland. It continues to play a 
significant role in Portland’s CDC community. 
29 See p. 18 for a discussion of the timing of the creation of NPF. 
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groups completed the training sessions, they were given a small grant for operating 
expenses to move forward (McNamara interview: 7). The mature organizations were 
required to complete a “pretty extensive self-assessment” that included an examination 
of processes and systems by both board and staff to ensure that each group was seeing 
the organization in the same way (Hoereth, 1998: 23; McNamara interview: 8). 
There was some controversy surrounding the choice of groups, and the 
apparent “heavy-handedness” with which these opportunities were created and 
administered. Especially controversial was the necessity for a geographic target for the 
organizations. Housing Our Families did not make it into the first round of trainings 
because McNamara did not consider it a community organization. Kay Sohl argued 
that it was a “community of women,” but McNamara adhered to his geographically 
oriented definition of a CDC (Sohl interview: 4). As a result of their initial exclusion, 
the women of HOF chose the Boise and Eliot but continued to insist on establishing 
their own kind of identity within these parameters (Schleiger interview: 3).  
The result of the NPF training sessions was a group of seventeen organizations 
(16 were eventually funded), including the five that are the subject of this dissertation, 
that were evolving concurrently (Hoereth, 1998: 8).30 Each organization realized 
operating support from NPF, with additional support from other local foundations like 
the Meyer Memorial Trust, the Collins Foundation, the Herbert Templeton 
Foundation, and the Ralph Smith Foundation (Hoereth, 1998: 17). By 1994, though, 
                                                
30 The 16 organizations were: Franciscan Enterprise, Hacienda CDC, Inner Westside CDC, Housing 
Our Families, REACH, Portland Habitat for Humanity, Sabin CDC, ROSE CDC, Portsmouth CRC 
(later Peninsula CDC), Northeast CDC (NECDC), Network Behavioral Healthcare, Central City 
Concern, Northwest Housing Alternatives, Human Solutions, Low Income Housing for Native 
Americans of Portland, Oregon, and Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI). 
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NPF was working with 10 CDCs and sought to focus on these groups, as opposed to 
encouraging even more new groups, and create funding alliances, so that it was not the 
sole source of support (NPF, 1994: 5). NPF staff expected that the higher levels of 
funding to “emerging” organizations would decrease over time, as organizations built 
additional funding sources (NPF, 1994: 9, 12). This expectation would prove to be the 
basis for a series of misunderstandings between NPF and the CDCs that led to 
dramatic changes in the industry.  
Another key institution that was created in conjunction with the growth of 
Portland’s CDC industry is the Housing Development Center (HDC). Originally 
created by NPF to offer the fledgling organizations technical assistance for project 
development and construction management services, HDC is a non-profit technical 
assistance consultant group that played a key role in expanding “the internal capacity 
(of the CDCS) to manage single and multi-family housing development” and the role 
of neighborhood construction contractors in the development process (White and 
Swanson, 1993; Hoereth, 1998: 20). As the industry has evolved and development 
projects are scarcer, HDC shifted its focus to asset management strategies by 
supporting the efforts of CDCs to share information and develop effective property 
management policies. This group formalized into the Property and Asset Management 
Working Group (PAMWG), as CDCs shifted into a more mature stage of 
development. Its purpose is to address “the multiple and often conflicting expectations 
for affordable housing” in order to stabilize and sustain CDC housing portfolios 
(PAMWG, 2007).  
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As the CDC industry began to grow, the Enterprise Foundation established a 
Portland office in 1995, a part of its larger effort to enhance local partnerships around 
the country. When Enterprise opened its Portland office under the auspices of Rey 
Ramsey, who was later President of the Enterprise Foundation, its responsibilities 
included the management of the NPF development fund and the management of the 
NPF Development Capital Revolving Loan Fund, as well as being the local conduit 
for significant funding through NCDI (Hoereth, 1998: 19). However, this funding 
source diminished towards the close of the decade, just as Portland’s CDC industry 
had begun to mature, and Enterprise’s development role had shifted from 
“revitalization strategies to an affordable housing strategy” (Hoereth, 1998: 20). The 
“CDC industry was changing (quickly), and these issues on the ground were different 
than when CDCs started” (Andrews interview: 3). Keeping pace with changing 
organizational needs was one of the greatest challenges for philanthropic foundations. 
 
Local Policy and Funding  
 Portland, Oregon is a relatively young city whose economy relies on a 
combination of hi tech, transportation and distribution of goods, metal fabrication and 
equipment manufacturing, medical and service industries. Surrounded by a regional 
Urban Growth Boundary, Portland has a compact downtown area surrounded by 
distinctive neighborhoods. It is a fairly homogeneous city whose minority populations 
in 2000 combined to equal less than 22% of the overall population 
(http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en).  Portland is also the 
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largest city in the US that retains the commission form of city government. In many 
ways, it is the form of city government that facilitates city council’s ability to focus on 
particular issues. In the commission form of government, adopted by voters in 1913 as 
part of a wave of structural change in response to corruption that was endemic in the 
ward systems of older cities, the mayor and commissioners have both legislative and 
executive powers (City Club of Portland, 2007). In addition to legislating policy and 
setting the city’s budget, the mayor and commissioners are each responsible for the 
oversight of particular aspects of Portland’s essential services: transportation, 
planning, housing, water, fire and police, parks and recreation, to name a few.  
The Albina neighborhoods had been in the focus of intermittent local and 
federal revitalization efforts since relatively small-scale riots of the 1960s. The 
outcomes of each of these efforts were lackluster, due to uneven levels of participation 
and plan implementation, so that when conditions in the neighborhoods deteriorated 
because of the advent of crack cocaine and incursion of gangs in the late 1980s and the 
Albina Community Plan was initiated, the planning process glibly stressed 
“revitalization through a plan that is based on the shared objectives of those concerned 
with this part of Portland” (Bureau of Planning, 1989: 1). The document spelled out 
new zoning overlays, design standards, transportation connections, and a vision for a 
renewed Albina (Bureau of Planning, 1992). The community meetings included 
hundreds of residents and business owners, and the outcomes promoted revitalization 
but failed to address root issues that surrounded race and poverty (McLennan 
interview: 13; Long interview: 15).  While some community groups feared that 
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gentrification was very possible in the Albina neighborhoods, many residents could 
not fathom that this was even possible (McLennan interview: 12; Rudman interview: 
11; Schleiger interview: 7). Given this disparity of views and competing interests, 
though, the plans focus on revitalization tried to accommodate a broad range of views 
and was as much a community-organizing tool as planning document (McLennan 
interview: 12). This effort was complicated by “the hope of many in the community, 
as well as the Planning Bureau, that the plan may be completed in a shorter period of 
time (than the 3 years allotted) ” (Bureau of Planning, 1989: 2). Critical to plan 
implementation was the role of neighborhood CDCs, because of their local roots and 
perceived effectiveness for addressing neighborhood problems.  
At this point, though, BHCD had a working relationship with a limited number 
of CDCs, although several were in nascent stages, and had been unable to spend their 
federal development funding allocation within its three-year time limitation (Hoereth, 
1998: 4; McLennan interview: 1). With the clock running out, BHCD worked with 
NPF to foster as many organizations as possible in order to spend the federal funding 
(McLennan interview: 2). The combination of political will to address the issues, 
readily involved neighbors, and fledgling organizations was critical to the 
development of organizations that had the exuberance to take on the dilemmas of 
poverty and disinvestment in such a short period of time. 
 Just after the passage of the Albina Community Plan and as NPF’s training 
sessions were getting off the ground in 1992, Gretchen Kafoury was elected City 
Commissioner on a housing platform. A former County Commissioner, Kafoury 
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became a tireless advocate of affordable housing during her time in office. With 
Portland’s government structure that allowed “politicians to forge allegiances to issues 
rather than neighborhoods,” Kafoury was able to capitalize on her passion and to 
channel funds into the Bureau of Housing and Community Development and focus on 
Inner North/Northeast Portland (Hoereth, 1998: 15). This resulted in the political will 
necessary to jump start revitalization efforts outlined in the Albina Community Plan 
and set them in motion (Baker, 1992). Kafoury’s two most significant 
accomplishments while in office were housing related: the creation of Portland 
Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) to acquire the housing portfolio from the 
bankrupt Dominion Capital and the establishment of the Housing Investment Fund 
created from general fund moneys to develop affordable housing (Kafoury, 1995).31 
City Council adopted the ordinance that created The Housing Investment Fund in 
1994; the purpose of the Fund was to “assure the development of 50,000 new housing 
units by 2015”, and it was administered by the newly formed Livable Cities Housing 
Council whose members included public, private, and non-profit developers (Hunter, 
1995; Livable Cities Housing Council, 1995). It was a one time $30 million set aside 
to offset a loss of federal funding at a critical time in the City’s growth spurt of the 
1990s and encouraged the growth of several of the small, recently established CDCs 
(Hoereth, 1998:16; Kafoury, 1994). 
The Portland Development Commission (PDC) was also a key player in the 
evolution of CDCs. While BHCD administered the funds for the operating support of 
the organizations, PDC administered the funds for project development that included 
                                                
31 The creation of PCRI is detailed in Ch. 8. 
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low interest loans, federal CDBG and HOME funds, and the Housing Investment 
Fund. PDC’s main purpose was the administration of Portland’s Urban Renewal 
Areas. Two critical points are associated with this situation: 1.) PDC was charged with 
improving the City’s neighborhoods and tax base, so that the role of affordable 
housing was somewhat tangential to its purpose, and 2.) the scale of the programs that 
most of the CDCs undertook was much smaller than the scale of other PDC projects 
and did not fit easily within the agency (Krause interview: 12; Lokan interview: 1). 
 
The Merger of Public and Philanthropic Policies 
Towards the middle of the 1990s, some CDCs relied on NPF and BHCD for 
more than 80% of their total operating costs (Hoereth, 1998: 21). This reliance 
developed into the appearance of entitlement by CDCs; organizations felt that because 
NPF had been instrumental in their creation, it should be instrumental in their 
operating support (Andrews interview: 5). However, both NPF and BHCD were 
experiencing a decline in funding from their respective primary sources and had the 
expectation that the CDCs formed in the early 1990s would be more self-sufficient by 
this point, and that it was time to “fish or cut bait” (Walker, 2002: 52; McLennan 
interview: 3). NPF revised its goals to fund no more than 10 CDCs at once (NPF, 
1994). It was time to streamline funding and to encourage greater efficiency from the 
organizations. In addition, The Enterprise Foundation’s main source of funding, 
NCDI, was becoming uncertain (and in some cases requiring local matches – an 
additional way to leverage additional dollars), and “it became clear… that the 
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organizations were the means to an end, not the end” and it was necessary to shrink 
the number of organizations involved (Andrews interview: 8).  
The creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development Support 
Collaborative (PNDSC) in 1997 was a first step in streamlining the industry.32 NPF 
and BHCD formalized what had been an unofficial partnership with the creation of 
PNDSC.  This “rationalization” of procedures was a reflection of national trends, as 
larger philanthropic foundations sought to “strategically allocate funds  ...  to increase 
the quality and effectiveness of asset and property management and to encourage an 
economy of scale by increasing the number of units that each CDC managed through 
the merger of CDCs” (Farnum, 2003: 8; Walker, 2002:41). PNDSC’s stated purpose 
was “the reconciliation of individual Collaborative member’s (sic) funding priorities 
and policies” (NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 2). PNDSC encompassed both 
BHCD’s nonprofit operating support and NPF’s core operating support (Hoereth: 16; 
NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 4). In doing so, CDCs had one source of funding, 
one set of associated reporting requirements, albeit a more political and more 
constrained source of funding (NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 4). With reduced 
funding and more direct competition between organizations, it was inevitable that 
there would be attrition within the CDC industry.  
At this time, too, BHCD began to steer its funding towards housing (and often 
larger multi-family housing projects) for very low income and formerly homeless 
individuals; this both preceded and evolved from the City of Portland’s 10 Year Plan 
to End Homelessness in 2004 (Kafoury, 1997, 1998). The implications of this funding 
                                                
32 See Chapter 9 for details on further industry rationalization. 
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priority shift were two-fold for CDCs. The fact that rental income from the units 
would be less as incomes were lower or non-existent changed how project financing 
was done: it became more complicated and relied on more sources. As CDCs were 
housing people of lesser means in neighborhoods of greater means, there was a greater 
economic gap between the tenants of CDC owned housing and their neighbors – and 
greater potential for cries of NIMBY (Stewart interview: 17).  
 The close relationship between BHCD, NPF, and the Enterprise Foundation 
created a very tight circle in which Portland’s CDCs operated. It was this closeness 
that focused CDC activities on housing and focused them geographically. Several 
CDC Executive Directors were surprised with the calls for accountability, as the 
federal and philanthropic funding began to dry up (Dursch interview: 13). In many 
cases, the organizations had not matured enough to be self sufficient, and, while 
PNDSC staff may have expected industry attrition, the Executive Directors were 
expecting more time to establish themselves (Farnum, 2003: 9). 
 
Neighborhood History  
 The geographic context for this study is the seven neighborhoods of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland that compose the bulk of the Albina District (see Appendix 
I).33 Originally a small city across the river from the City of Portland, Albina was 
consolidated with the City of Portland in 1891 but retained its thriving commercial 
district at the intersections of N. Vancouver and N. Williams Avenues and N. Knott St 
(Comprehensive Planning Workshop, 1990). 
                                                
33 The individual neighborhoods are Boise, Eliot, Humboldt, King, Sabin, Vernon, and Piedmont.  
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Portland’s black population has always been relatively small. Early black 
residents tended to live near Union Station, as it was the main source of employment 
(McElderry, 2001). As industrial jobs, often associated with the development of Swan 
Island, became more attainable, the black population shifted into the Lower Eliot 
neighborhood at the southern end of the City of Albina. The black population 
expanded northward, into the Boise and King Neighborhoods, so that much of Albina 
became the heart of Portland’s small African American community. Until the 1940s, 
the state of Oregon had a primarily resource based economy. With the advent of 
World War II, entrepreneur Henry Kaiser located one of his major shipyards on Swan 
Island and created a company town, Vanport, just outside the city limits of Portland. 
Because he feared that workers would not stay without adequate housing, he 
“circumvented the Housing Authority of Portland” and constructed housing in 
Vanport using federal funds, (McElderry, 2001). Kaiser deliberately recruited workers 
from places as far away as Texas and Arkansas to work in his shipyards  - he needed a 
large workforce and took advantage of the “depression-scarred unskilled workers” of 
the South, the majority of whom were black (Soskin, 2000). As a result of this influx, 
Portland’s black population increased substantially, much of it located across the river 
in Vancouver, Washington or in the Albina neighborhoods just south of Vanport 
(McElderry, 2001). As a result of the influx of black families into Portland’s 
neighborhoods, they were “redlined” according to the federal standards by major 
lending institutions (Abbott, 2001; Lane, 1990a). When the Columbia River flooded 
and destroyed the city of Vanport in 1948, a significant number of black families were 
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displaced and forced, for the most part, to relocate into the Albina neighborhoods, due 
to steering by real estate agents (Abbott, 2001; Gibson, 2007). 
Portland had historically been a highly segregated city by both design and 
default. In the 1920s, Oregon was home to an active Ku Klux Klan membership that 
fueled racial tensions, especially as Portland’s black population grew with the advent 
of Kaiser’s shipyards and integrated work force (Bevan, 2004). Subsequently, 
discrimination and small size forced Portland’s black community to have a  “self-
contained system of social and business life” (Gibson, 2007; Comprehensive Planning 
Workshop, 1990).  
While Portland’s African American population has never been more than 8% 
of the overall population, and racial tensions were prevalent. Real estate steering 
facilitated the segregation process; at one point, almost 80% of the population was 
concentrated in the Albina neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland as a 
result of these practices (McElderry, 2001). Because “housing is at the heart of racial 
tensions,” this concentration of black families in a relatively small area was Portland’s 
solution to maintaining a segregated city (Abbott, 2001). These segregated 
neighborhoods had, in turn, suffered the greatest amount of disinvestment, as 
evidenced by the fact that the greatest number of vacant and abandoned buildings was 
located there (Vacant and Abandoned Building Task Force, 1988). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Albina neighborhoods saw a series of Federal 
Highway, large institutional development, and Urban Renewal projects that both 
created walls around them and tore them apart from the inside. In the 1950s, the 
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construction of Interstate 5 cut off the mostly black Boise and Eliot neighborhoods 
from the mostly white and more affluent Overlook neighborhood. In the 1960s, the 
land at the south end of Albina was cleared for the construction of the Memorial 
Coliseum, and a significant number of homes were lost. In the late 1960s, under the 
federal Urban Renewal Program, Emmanuel Hospital, in anticipation of the 
construction of a Veteran’s Hospital, cleared 76 acres that had been the commercial 
core of Albina. However, the hospital project never came to fruition, and the land lay 
fallow for decades, a slap in the face to those whose homes were lost and businesses 
displaced. It has only been partially occupied to date (Abbott, 2001; Gibson, 2007). 
These dissections of the Albina neighborhoods further reinforced and compressed the 
“mentally established boundaries” that had clearly demarcated the African American 
community (McElderry, 2001).  
The Community Action and Model Cities programs of the 1960s sought to 
mitigate some of the ill will and mistrust of government created by the large clearance 
activities of the federal government, but their most visible benefit to the 
neighborhoods was the fostering of Black leadership within the communities (Gibson, 
2007). The Albina Youth Opportunity School, where the Boise Neighborhood 
meetings are held to this day, was created at that time and remains a pillar of the 
community. With a grant from the City “to invest in housing and neighborhood 
improvements,” the Albina Neighborhood Improvement Plan was responsible for the 
rehabilitation of 300 homes and the creation of Unthank Park, now home to the non-
profit, Self-Enhancement Inc. Black leaders, brought together by the negative impacts 
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of Urban Renewal, were also able to resist the Central Albina Plan that would have 
cleared the triangle South of Fremont Street between Interstate and Martin Luther 
King Blvd (Gibson, 2007).  
In the 1980s, a statewide recession magnified the problems of crime and 
poverty that had been brewing in Albina. Gang violence and the advent of crack 
cocaine negated any previous efforts to stabilize the neighborhoods, with the growing 
number of vacant and abandoned buildings fueling the decline. Homeowners in Albina 
had long been denied conventional financing because of bank redlining, and the 
growing number of absentee landlords, coupled with continued decline in home 
values, led to an overall decline in population (Gibson, 2007).  
The “redlining” of Albina continued well into the 1990s.  Discriminatory 
lending practices by local banks were exposed by the Portland Organizing Project’s 
efforts to ensure compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  Banks 
were making loans in the Albina neighborhoods at “one-sixth the rate of loans made to 
residents of other parts of the city” (Lane, 1990a). The dearth of lending in racially 
mixed neighborhoods, while by no means unique to Portland, contributed to declining 
property values, and lenders were subsequently unwilling to assume the sole risk and 
make small loans (less than $30,000)  (Brown and Bennington, 1993; Lane and 
Mayes, 1990; Squires, 2002). 
Despite the bleak outlook, the Albina neighborhoods were an area still small 
enough, and with poverty issues manageable enough, that a community based 
redevelopment effort would work. Since the large-scale efforts of the Urban Renewal 
 29 
projects had served to reinforce racial boundaries and government mistrust and to 
create more strife within the neighborhoods, local officials saw the need for smaller 
revitalization efforts that would encourage neighborhood input, and, hopefully, 
neighborhood ownership (Abbott, 2001). CDCs were an “enchanting and intoxicating 
model” for community development (Emmons interview: 4).  Because of the scale of 
the issues and geography to be addressed, CDCs were considered a viable means of 
attaining multiple ends: economic development, affordable housing, and, ultimately, 
revitalized neighborhoods, (Abbott, 2001). 
In 1988, then-City Commissioner Richard Bogle led an effort through the 
Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Force to tackle the housing problems with a 
three-pronged approach: increased City inspections for code compliance, funding for 
rehabilitation, and the use of non-profits to revitalize the structures (Vacant and 
Abandoned Buildings Task Force, 1988). Given that the largest number of vacant and 
abandoned houses were located in the King neighborhood, and the surrounding 
neighborhoods had abandonment rates greater than 10%, the resultant interventions 
were targeted on the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Sweet 
interview: 5).34 The Bureau of Buildings monitored these neighborhoods closely and 
worked actively with Multnomah County to force landlords to bring their buildings up 
to code or to have liens placed on the properties (Sweet interview: 2). These precise 
interventions relied on community participation and awareness and were an integral 
part of the efforts of Hope and Hard Work – a group that met weekly to share 
                                                
34 28.6% of all abandoned single-family houses in the City of Portland were located in the Boise, Eliot, 
King, Humboldt, Sabin, Vernon and Woodlawn neighborhoods (Vacant and Abandoned Buildings Task 
Force, 1988). 
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information and to establish lines of communication between neighbors, the police, 
and the City bureaus (Morgan interview: 2; Pequeño interview: 3; Sweet interview: 7).  
In September 1990, though, investigative reporters Dee Lane and Steve Mayes 
from The Oregonian broke a story about lending fraud in North and Northeast 
Portland.35 Entitled “Blueprint for a Slum,” this series of articles outlined the 
fraudulent practices of Dominion Capital, a private real estate investment firm that 
offered mortgages to those who could not qualify for them in areas in which very few 
loans were extended. The fraudulent activities included appraisals that were inflated, 
fake deeds and title reports, and questionable land contracts with hidden payments 
(Lane and Mayes, 1990). The result of the investigation was an indictment of the 
company’s owners, Cyril T. Worm and Geoffrey Edmonds, and more than 400 
homeowners and renters left not knowing who owned their homes, ones that were 
often in substandard condition. This story shed light on the need for immediate action 
in the neighborhoods that had suffered from disinvestment, and whose residents were 
particularly susceptible to fraudulent real estate practices because conventional means 
were not available. As a result of this article, the community rallied and demanded 
action. One of City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury’s first tasks when she was 
elected in 1992 was to address housing issues in Inner North/Northeast Portland 
(Kafoury interview: 4). 
In the 1990’s, the Portland area began to see substantial economic growth. 
With that growth, housing prices citywide began to rise. As the prices in Inner 
                                                
35 See Chapter 8, Case 5: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, for a more detailed explanation 
of this article.  
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North/Northeast Portland had been the most lowest in the region in the early 1990s, 
they had the steepest increases, as much as 50% between 1990 and 1995, and signaled 
a new challenge for community groups: gentrification (Kafoury, 1995; Appendix H- 
RMLS Data). It is the gentrification of the Albina neighborhoods that proved one of 
the most challenging issues for CDCs, as it influenced organizational goals and 
growth, opportunities and management.   
 32 
CHAPTER 2. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
 It is the intent of this research to broaden the scholarship that addresses the 
growth and development of CDCs, as much of the focus of the research to date has 
been on mature or larger organizations, especially those struggling neighborhoods. 
The key issues addressed are: 
• CDC Role as Neighborhood Revitalizer, Developer and Organizer 
• Organizational Capacity Building 
• Organizational Measures of Success with a focus on local policy and 
neighborhood contexts 
Drawing on both academic and practitioner- oriented literature, this study seeks to 
deepen our understanding of the evolution of organizations as many of the support 
systems and contexts have changed in the past 20 years.  
 CDC Role as Neighborhood Revitalizer, Developer and Organizer. What 
defines a Community Development Corporation (CDC)?  A CDC is a locally based 
organization, usually geographically defined, that “maintains close ties to one or more 
low-income neighborhoods and works to improve the physical, social and economic 
conditions in their service areas” (Cowan,et al,1999: 325). Lubove (1996: 117) 
describes CDCs as an “all-purpose neighborhood advocate with development 
capacity” that are answerable neither to voters nor to shareholders, so that they have 
the “capacity to innovate, experiment, subsidize or penalize”. CDCs are formed and 
controlled by community stakeholders and their mission is to revitalize “poor or at-
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risk communities, including many communities of color” (Vidal, 1996: 149; Peirce 
and Steinbach, 1987). Smock (2004) has cited CDCs’ “asset-based” approach to 
rebuild their communities. The risk with this approach is that the organization often 
separates itself from its initial mission and a dependence on government funding to 
sustain itself (Smock, 2004). 
 CDCs are broad enterprises, but “housing was a favored CDC area of work. It 
was visible and faster for produce and less complex than commercial or industrial 
development. But it was also a form of “strategic intervention with desirable ripple 
effects” (Lubove, 1996:172). Boards of directors that can either be appointed or 
elected by a membership generally lead CDCs; often, the organizations have small 
staffs that perform multiple tasks. During the 1980s, many neighborhoods banded 
together to form CDCs to address specific problems, such as a drug house in the 
neighborhood or poor school performance, and to reverse the decline of urban 
neighborhoods, a result of decreased federal funding for urban areas (Keating, et al, 
1996: 60). These organizations have taken on an entrepreneurial character, and, with 
continued reductions in federal funding during the latter 1990s, nearly 2,000 
organizations served and continue to serve both urban and rural communities 
throughout the country by century’s end (Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 342). With the idea 
of entrepreneurship came the idea of community control, smaller scale intervention, 
and a more incremental approach to the persistent problems of neighborhood blight. 
CDCs, though, have evolved into sophisticated operations that develop and manage 
housing, provide tenant services, and organize local communities so that they walk a 
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thin line between advocate and political organizer, and preservationist and 
neighborhood developer. Bratt (1997) has noted that organizing and development can 
be complementary activities that have been shown to be successful through the mid-
1990s. She acknowledges the potential conflict but argues that the potentially 
contradictory position of CDC as landlord/organizer is one that does not have to be 
adversarial, if proper safeguards are put into place. One of the drawbacks to separating 
the community planning/organizing aspects of an organization from the development 
aspects is that participants do not see planning ideas through to fruition and fully 
realize the social, political, and economic implications of their initial ideas.  
Within these characterizations of CDCs and their approaches to community 
development, though, lies a great deal of latitude (Bratt, 1997). The approach that 
organizations take towards building partnerships with public and private funding 
sources and defining themselves as advocates, developers, or both depends on whether 
the organization takes a grass roots approach and draws much of its strength from its 
neighborhood base or takes a more business-like approach and draws its strength from 
its expertise in obtaining funding dollars and producing housing. Balancing these 
approaches and appropriate timing is critical to CDC survival.  
Organizational Capacity Building. As key players in the “neighborhood-movement 
alternative,” CDCs fill a growing gap in the local and national leadership response to 
problems of urban blight and disinvestment (Keating, et al, 1996: 60). “With the 
demise of deep-subsidy federal production programs, developing affordable housing 
in poor inner-city communities has become financially unattractive to most for-profit 
 35 
developers” (Vidal, 1996:153). In the 1990s, policy makers and funders displayed a 
“tacit acceptance of federal devolution and ascendancy” of CDCs as the main 
providers of low income and affordable housing (Gittell and Wilder, 1999). CDCs, 
depending on local needs, develop, preserve, and endeavor to “bring back to life” 
neighborhoods where private investment can and will not (Peirce and Steinbach, 
1987). With the support of federal and local policy makers and funders, CDCs “have 
the ability to operate in complex environments where others cannot and a willingness 
to do projects that others will not because the projects are too small or too risky” 
(Vidal, 1996: 153). Their impacts occurred (and continue to occur) in the realm of 
housing and a number of other project based activities – this focus had its detractors 
who feared a more “technocratic approach” that would undermine true community 
development and empowerment (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987:32).  
 In assuming these multi-faceted roles, organizations grew in both size and 
complexity, and scholars and funders sought to clarify what constituted a sustainable 
path. From organizations that succeeded and failed, they developed a series of best 
practices that served as a model for organizational development. The cornerstone of 
this inquiry was to define organizational capacity  - “what do CDCs ‘do’ and how do 
they do it?” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 497). “Capacity extends beyond housing 
production;” it is “built from within and without … and involves the development of 
physical and financial assets of community organizations and the neighborhoods they 
serve” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 502). Because of the great variety of CDCs and 
their individual endeavors, Glickman and Servon do not specifically define capacity 
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building, but they identify five components (resource, organizational, programmatic, 
networking and political capacities) that they feel are essential for organizations to 
thrive.  
Figure 2-1 
 Diagram of Interaction of Components of CDC Capacity 
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      Source: Glickman and Servon, 1998: 505 
Glickman and Servon’s diagram (Figure 2-1) that shows interdependencies 
between the components and the major and minor relationships that demonstrate the 
multiple allegiances that CDCs must concurrently nurture. Organizational flexibility is 
key to maintaining equilibrium between social, political, and economic capital. For 
example, dependence on a sole source of funding can disproportionately enlarge 
programmatic and organizational capacities at the cost of networking and political 
capacities.  
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Resource capacity is defined as the ability to acquire resources from grants, 
loans and other mechanisms. This includes not only the ability of an organization to 
attract the funds, but also to manage and maintain them. Organizational capacity refers 
to the day-to-day operations of the organization, its effectiveness at raising and 
maintaining funding, its staff skills and tasks accomplished. Programmatic capacity 
addresses the number and type of services that an organization offers, whether it is 
affordable rental housing, after school childcare, youth programs, or educational 
programs. Network capacity refers to the organization’s ability to work with 
institutions both inside and outside of its service area, from neighborhood businesses 
to other CDCs to philanthropic foundations. Political capacity is an organization’s 
ability “to credibly represent its residents and to advocate effectively on their behalf in 
a larger political arena” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 504). 
These core competencies, and the balance thereof, establish a framework for 
organizational growth and expansion, or success. It is essential to maintain a balance 
among these components of capacity, as an imbalance can undermine an 
organization’s intentions and overall stability and to maintain the connections between 
clients, neighborhood, funders, and policy makers – the very definition of social 
capital36. In addition, each of these components is subject to external influences, and, 
when this occurs, the impact “reverberates to other components” (Glickman and 
Servon, 1998: 532; Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 343). 
                                                
36 Definition of social capital: The stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual 
understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind members of human networks and 
communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusack, 2001: 4). 
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Programmatic capacity is the ability for organizations to prioritize and 
complete activities efficiently which leads to credibility with both funders and their 
respective neighborhoods (Twelvetrees, 1996: 114). Having tangible outcomes to 
which neighbors, politicians, and bankers can point allows CDCs access to greater 
funding opportunities as they establish a track record. While these successes are 
generally in the development realm, at least initially, they give hope that larger social 
problems can be solved (Vidal, 1996). The flip side of this idea of success and 
efficiency is that if an organization either fails to complete a project in a timely 
manner or fails to manage an apartment complex well once it has been completed, the 
CDC is vulnerable to criticism as well.  
For CDCs that engaged in organizing and advocacy efforts, the creation of 
political capital “ensured legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of community 
residents and local policy makers and funders” (Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 344). This 
political capital, closely related to networking ability and the garnering of resources, is 
particularly important in the case of Portland, because of the strength of the 
neighborhood associations’ voices in city government (Chaskin, 2003: 171). The 
political capital that CDCs create is a constantly evolving attribute – and can either 
support or impede development efforts. While Stoecker (1997) has called for the 
separation of organizing and development activities (and to redefine CDCs as we 
generally understand them) to make more effective, and perhaps confrontational, 
advocacy organizations, these activities can reinforce the effectiveness of each other. 
Bratt argues that dividing CDCs into separate advocacy and development entities 
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would undermine many of the efforts that the organizations have made, and that the 
contradictions between capital and community are outweighed by the organizational 
contributions to the communities in which they operate (Bratt, 1997).  
CDCs have multiple levels of constituency – those for whom they advocate 
and those on whom they rely for political and economic support. Tenants and 
neighborhood residents are a primary source of networking or social capital, while 
funders and policy makers are a source of financial capital that is closely associated 
with political capital. CDCs also rely on local governments and philanthropic 
organizations for “financial, technical, and political resources” (Vidal, 1992: 129). In 
fact, CDCs rely on local funders for “more than one half of their unearned income” 
(Vidal, 1992: 126). With this degree of reliance on local intermediaries, it is not 
surprising that there is tension between the intermediaries and the CDCs. “CDCs 
believe they are autonomous organizations that serve locally identified needs and as 
such should not be dictated to by intermediaries and funders. Yet intermediaries and 
funders have their own interests to consider, and it is reasonable for them to set 
conditions for receipt of their funding” (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 2003a: 35). When the 
organizations were dependent on government sources of funding, they tended to be 
more conciliatory, rather than advocacy oriented (Kirkland, 2008). CDC reliance on a 
limited number of funders can upset the balance of components of capacity, as the 
organizations yield to pressure to make changes to their modes of operation (Rohe, 
Bratt, & Biswas, 2003a: 34). 
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Consistently, authors point to the need for board and staff to have a level of 
technical expertise needed to carry out complex development deals, while maintaining 
an advocacy position. Bratt (1989) describes an ethical dilemma that can occur when 
CDC staff become immersed in the complexities of project development and neglect 
the neighborhood - this can lead to a loss of political capital, especially when the 
demographics of the neighborhood are changing. The other side to this dilemma is that 
staff need to have a basic skill set to manage projects, complete program reports 
required by lenders and funders, to be able to interact with “the folks downtown,” and 
to manage other employees when necessary (Twelvetrees, 1996: 128). The balancing 
of advocacy and project development work is key to maintaining community 
connections (Bratt, 1996). How can an organization that is intentionally a grass roots 
effort take on development projects that require a substantial level of expertise? Each 
organization has had to adapt its principles, its target area and market, and its 
relationship to the surrounding neighborhood to ensure its survival. In doing so, CDC 
activities have the potential to “induce other market actors to invest in residential and 
commercial real estate” (Galster, Levy, Sawyer, Temkin, and Walker 2005: 8). At the 
same time, the organizations risk “becoming out of touch with community residents” 
(Bratt, 1996: 182). With accumulated development success, organizations can reach an 
appropriate scale “to be a landlord.” This status can both distance a CDC from its 
constituents as the board and staff become more skill-based and distance the 
organization from its constituents by creating a power relationship (landlord-tenant) 
that is not necessarily about community building (Bratt, 1996). The realities of 
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property management require a different set of skills than those required for property 
development.  This potentially adversarial landlord-tenant relationship is one that is 
created by the fact that CDCs need to meet the “double bottom line” (Bratt, 1996: 
182). 
Coupled with the creation of political capital are the networking skills of the 
individual organizations. Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas (2003b) point to the need for 
support groups (policy makers, funders, technical assistance providers) to assign a 
value to these skills. However, the benefits of networking can be undermined by the 
competition for scarce funding resources when there is a saturation of small 
geographic areas by a number of CDCs with similar missions, capacities, and 
outlooks. Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ research cites neighborhood saturation of CDCs as 
one of the main reasons for mergers; the case study they use is that of the merger of 
Housing Our Families and Franciscan Enterprises to form Albina CDC. The need for 
mergers is stimulated by the duplication of activities and overhead. Prompted by 
funders and local policy makers, mergers of CDC organizations and assets are long 
and painful processes.37  
Organizational Measures of Success with a focus on local policy and neighborhood 
contexts. The factors that influence the likelihood of success can be divided into two 
broad categories: contextual factors and organizational factors (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 
2003). In the 1990s, capacity and success were terms that often overlapped. The 
                                                
37 In the case of Albina CDC, the merger did not solve the original structural and operational problems, 
and ultimately led to the demise of the merged organization in 2006; the failed process changed City 
policy with respect to organizational funding and regulation. 
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components of capacity that Glickman and Servon use roughly correlate to Gittell and 
Wilder’s (1999) Critical Factors that Influence Success (See Appendix F: Literature 
Points for Comparison). These factors include funding (Resource Capacity), 
organizational size (Programmatic Capacity), mission, organizational competency 
(Organizational Capacity), and political capital (Political Capacity). This transition 
from an understanding of capacity to defining success has engendered much debate. 
Models of CDC success and failure, and growth, change, and decline have been the 
subjects of much research. Defining success for CDCs is tricky because the original 
intent of the organization is often muddied by its ongoing activities, and the conditions 
under which it operates. The organizational factors that outline success include board 
and staff capacity, leadership stability, and the ability to prioritize and complete 
activities efficiently. Funding is included as an organizational factor because, in this 
case, the authors refer to an organization’s ability to garner and sustain both core 
operating support and project financing, attributes that could also be described as 
organizational competency (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a; Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 
344). Authors place different emphases on the characteristics and roles of a CDC: as a 
neighborhood benefactor or as an individual development organization, or both. 
Within this context, organizational failure and neighborhood success can go hand in 
hand (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a). 
Twelvetrees (1996: 9) characterizes a successful CDC as an organization that 
can not only survive, but also meet its own goals, with three main points: 
1. The undercapitalization of projects is widespread and is one of the 
greatest challenges for CDCs. 
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2. Economic self-sufficiency is unrealistic. 
3. Small scale impacts are important, as they often lead to larger impacts  
 
These points de-emphasize the role of local policy and funding apparatuses, but do 
probe the issues that are important to smaller CDCs, especially in their early years.  
 Most of the research concerning success and/or failure, though, is devoted to 
“mature” CDCs. Mature CDCs have more measurable benchmarks (housing 
production, organizational size, grant funded dollars, etc) than emerging ones (Gittell 
and Wilder, 1999; Vidal, 1992; Frisch and Servon, 2006). “Mature” is often conflated 
with “larger,” as organizations that have attained “scale” are considered mature. 
Attaining scale refers to the growth process that an organization has undergone over a 
period of time. It includes the development of a substantial housing portfolio, 
programmatic and administrative efficiencies, and financial self-sufficiency (Walsh 
and Zdenek, 2007).  
The issue of organizational scale, meaning the balance of the size of the 
organization, breadth of activities, and number of housing units produced, emerges as 
a key consideration in current research. Vidal (1996: 155) has noted that the idea of 
attaining “scale,” where enough units, generally between 800 and 1,000, have been 
produced, and tenant and outreach programs pay for themselves, can be a measure of 
success. However, because of the changes in funding sources, amounts, and 
allocations, organizational success is not assured (McLennan interview: 20-21). 
Vidal’s concern (1996) with the rates of expansion of CDCs underscores the 
perpetuation of living “from grant to grant” that creates tenuous working conditions 
for staff and uncertainty for neighborhoods. Walsh and Zdenek (2007), citing the 
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collapse of several very large organizations, allow that “large and small community 
development groups can both play essential roles in the production of affordable 
housing by playing to their strengths.” For nascent and emerging CDCs, starting with 
housing reduces the difficulty of raising needed financing and increases the likelihood 
that early activities will be successful (Vidal, 1996: 155). Once the CDC’s ability to 
succeed with housing development is established, attention shifts to getting CDC 
production to scale. However, whether an organization can effectively manage the 
units that it already has developed or concurrently relies too much on the developer 
fees to create more units has always been a stumbling point in attaining scale (Rohe, 
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003b). In “an era of shrinking resources,” the question of 
organizational size is now under scrutiny, as the role of both large and small CDCs in 
the production of affordable housing is essential. Larger organizations have the 
technical expertise, while smaller organizations have a more intimate knowledge of 
the neighborhoods where they operate, and the transition between the two 
organizational scales requires careful planning, resource allocation, and time (Walsh 
and Zdenek, 2007).  
 Vidal (1996) notes that success for mature CDCs is a product of organizational 
size, prioritization of activities, programmatic and project experience, leadership 
stability, and clarity of strategies. Gittell and Wilder (1999), on the other hand, 
prioritize mission, organizational competency, political capital, and funding as a 
means for success that are measured by (mature) CDC contributions to residents’ 
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access to financial resources, physical resources, human resources, economic 
opportunities, and political power and influence.  
A number of local intermediaries have mounted capacity-building programs 
that seek to make CDCs better managed and technically stronger (Vidal, 1996:155). 
This push to increase capacity implies a predetermined goal of revitalization, whereby 
CDC investment will be augmented by private investment.38 It increases the role of 
housing development within organizations and puts pressure on the organizations to 
comply with funder priorities in order to maintain these financial relationships. This 
leads to an emphasis on professionalism and efficiency, generally quantified by bricks 
and mortar programs, as a measurement of success (Leavitt, 2003). Cowan, Rohe, and 
Baku (2000) base their entire assessment of factors that influence the performance of 
CDCs on effectiveness and efficiency, with the caveat that CDCs do not have 
adequate resources in many cases to halt neighborhood decline. This notion reinforces 
Rusk’s (1999) metaphor that most foundation support helps poor people run up a 
down escalator; some programs function so well that they succeed in getting people to 
the top, but most will fall short and return to the bottom of the escalator. CDC 
redevelopment, especially housing focused redevelopment, does not address the root 
issues of poverty. 
Gittell and Wilder (1999: 345) define overall CDC success as the improvement 
of community residents’ access to financial resources, physical resources, human 
resources, economic opportunities, and political power; they see more “successful 
                                                
38 This strategy of leveraging private investment with public funds has become more commonplace as 
both federal and philanthropic funding opportunities have decreased. 
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organizations (as those that) tend to limit their activities that are of high priority for 
community residents and are most likely to produce tangible results in a relatively 
short time frame.” This definition of success implies that community success and 
organizational success can be different, as the community vision changes. When inner 
city housing markets heated up in the 1990s, creating and maintaining such a vision 
became much more challenging. Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas (2003a) also note that some 
CDCs cease to exist because they put themselves out of business by attracting private 
investment into their neighborhoods, thereby making themselves obsolete. The greater 
community has been revitalized, but not without risk, as the future of CDC produced 
rental apartments may be left in limbo with the sponsoring organization’s demise. 
Organizations often have little, if any, control over the contextual factors that 
influence their growth and success. These factors include the external political, policy, 
and community forces that affect the livelihood of CDCs. The overlap in the different 
authors’ perceptions of contextual factors points to the importance of resources and 
funding, political capital, and networking between CDCs as external forces that CDCs 
must address in order to maintain equilibrium.  
The role of resources and funding as contributors to CDC success or failure is 
not as straightforward as it initially sounds. Because resources always fall short of 
community needs, there is an inherent need for both project-based and ongoing 
operating funding (Vidal, 1996; Twelvetrees, 1996). In addition, a variety of 
organizational funding sources, rather than specific project based sources, ensure a 
more stable cash flow. In some cases, organizations are pressured to take on certain 
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development projects that are either a particular eyesore in the neighborhood or to take 
advantage of a particular type of funding (Rohe and Bratt, 2003). This political 
pressure can compromise an organization’s ability to sustain itself by causing it to 
grow too quickly with an emphasis on one particular aspect of the organization or to 
neglect other issues and programs. When coupled with the potentially differing 
agendas of funders, the likelihood of flexibility in financial allocations (one that could 
potentially benefit both organizations and neighborhoods) is minimized (Rohe, Bratt, 
& Biswas, 2003). 
“Evaluations must not only study CDCs, they must also study the communities 
in which CDCs work” (Frisch and Servon, 2006: 101). The symbiotic relationship 
between organization and community is defined by the organizations need for social 
capital in its capacity building. Central to this relationship, too, is the evolution of the 
organizations themselves – how do they change with the transformation of the 
surrounding neighborhoods?  
An elucidation of the role of CDCs in the life cycle of the neighborhoods is 
necessary to understand how the neighborhoods changed socially and economically – 
how did these organizations contribute to the changes that surrounded them? Hoover 
and Vernon’s (1959) Neighborhood Lifecycle Theory describes the economic stages 
from inception, to decline, to redevelopment and ascendancy. Based on his multi-city 
research, Rusk dismissed the ability of CDCs to have any direct impact on stemming 
neighborhood decline, and very much doubted organizations’ ability to affect 
neighborhood-scale positive change in a redevelopment stage (Rusk, 1999). 
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Zielenbach (2000) has noted, subsequently, that community organizations cannot 
single handedly revitalize neighborhoods because they do not have access to the 
money required, but that, in a neighborhood with strong stability, they can contribute 
to a more positive outcome. 
The mechanics of how a CDC and its neighborhood interact depend on a 
number of unique factors. Vidal (1996) noted that clearly defined neighborhoods 
develop more CDCs because of the underlying political support for those 
neighborhood structures. In addition, Chaskin (2003: 169) states that the relationship 
between the neighborhood organization and the local CDC needs to be mutually 
beneficial; CDCs are dependent, at least initially, on their neighborhood organizations 
for political support, especially if a neighborhood association is involved in a larger 
political arena  (Johnson, 2004).  These relationships between CDC and neighborhood 
organization can be complicated ones, as organizations that are borne out of a local 
advocacy effort can have goals that are not sustainable as neighborhoods change.  
The emphasis on geographic boundaries constitutes an orderly approach to 
community development, one that emphasizes the physical development of a 
neighborhood, rather than advocacy – a central debate in CDC scholarship. This 
conflict between the development and advocacy sides of an organization is further 
complicated if neighborhoods experience revitalization or gentrification (Leavitt, 
2003). In their role as housing developers, CDCs fill part of the development vacuum 
in neighborhoods suffering from disinvestment, as CDC activities include the 
renovation and development of housing and an encouragement of local economic 
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development. Smith (1996), in his explication of gentrification on a local level, 
describes a disinvested neighborhood as one where the private sector does not 
perceive enough of a rent-gap to make an investment.39 When conditions are ripe, 
owners and developers invest to create either owner occupied, rental or for sale 
properties. Of these types of gentrifiers, CDCs were a hybrid of the owner-occupier 
and landlord developers: ones who intended to stay in the neighborhood but had more 
access to capital, at least while other private developers did not. Brown-Saracino’s  
(2010) description of the “social preservationist” gentrifier could be applied to CDCs. 
The organizations contribute to the stock of affordable housing, celebrate long time 
residents, and assist with investment in local businesses. However, since these groups 
are often composed of outsiders, especially as the organizations grow and become 
more sophisticated, local residents can get suspicious. 
CDC activities also get caught up in class issues within a neighborhood, 
especially as it is gentrifying. By providing and maintaining housing whose 
affordability is mandated by its funding sources, and creating jobs and educational 
opportunities for low-income individuals where few had existed prior to their 
intervention, CDCs have played a critical role in lessening the displacement of 
residents associated with gentrification, so that it is a positive experience for low-
income residents of those neighborhoods (Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2009). However, in 
neighborhoods where most of the housing was previously affordable to low-income 
                                                
39 The rent-gap occurs when property values have been devalued to a point where they will be eligible 
for redevelopment with a satisfactory return for private developers (Smith, 1996). As CDCs have a 
more complex “bottom line” to meet, they see lower property values in relationship to lower rents, 
rather than greater profits.  
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residents, the emergence of designated affordable housing, as opposed to de facto 
affordable housing, created a new set of class divisions. This can lead to a severing of 
critical community ties, “marginalization, isolation, (and) alienation” (Kirkland, 2008: 
20; Freeman and Branconi, 2004). Zukin has noted that gentrification is typified by 
shifts in taste and amenities that are embodied in local restaurants and retail offerings 
– cultural shifts that represent the new, rather than the old neighborhood. When taken 
in conjunction with the cultural shifts produced by gentrification noted by Zukin, the 
divisions can produce a stark disregard for “those that came before” (Brown-Saracino, 
2009:5; Zukin, 1987).  
A CDCs role in a gentrifying or gentrified neighborhood is one of an even 
more delicate balancing act. In many gentrifying areas, neighborhood associations are 
often composed of wealthier homeowners, while CDCs represent their more 
impoverished rental populations. The political distance between these two groups can 
be huge – and further magnifies the need for CDCs to emphasize their broader 
organizing activities to minimize the “us v. them” mentality (Van Meter, 2004). The 
role of a CDC in this scenario must change from developer to community builder in 
order to alleviate some of the conflicts associated with the gentrification process. 
There are four key internal and external factors that affect this ability: 1.) community 
cohesiveness, 2.) community collaborations, 3.) community building and organizing 
and 4.) an articulated response to gentrification (Hill and Pozzo, 2005). However, 
addressing all four successfully on a scale that actually has an impact is the true test of 
a CDCs leadership within its neighborhood. 
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This role as gentrification mediator will demand that CDCs search for more 
than just development dollars to sustain themselves and branch out with new 
advocacy, education, and training programs that will not only benefit the community 
at large, but also serve to mitigate a combative mentality. This argument reinforces 
Bratt’s (1997) case that the housing and organizing activities need to be maintained 
under one umbrella, in spite of the fact that “public support for community 
development corporations as community developers as opposed to affordable-housing 
developers seems harder and harder to come by” (Van Meter, 2004).  
 
Relevance of the Literature to this Research 
CDCs have been well analyzed in the literature; however, a case study of the 
CDCs in the Albina neighborhoods is an opportunity to study the evolution of CDCs 
in a small geographic area that also changed dramatically in 20 years, two conditions 
that represent an amalgamation of the organizational development and neighborhood 
change literatures. The CDC literature that parses out organizational development 
establishes an overlap between factors that contribute to success and to capacity 
building. For the purposes of this study, do these factors apply here? If so, how? If not, 
why not? What are the CDC contributions to neighborhood change? Are there 
additional factors that have not yet been addressed that need to be taken into account? 
These questions form the theoretical basis for the inquiry and guide the case study 
research to seek out why this is a unique case.  
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CDC relationships to neighborhood change could be described as symbiotic. 
While organizations lay the groundwork for potential change, whether that change 
actually occurs is beyond the control of the organization. However, if a neighborhood 
does change, it will most certainly affect how a CDC operates. This pivotal notion 
leads to the theoretical question: how do organizations adjust to the changes that 
surround them, and what does it mean to the character of the organizations – their 
missions, their board and staff compositions, and their organizational priorities? 
Understanding how the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland either adapted to or 
resisted both the neighborhood changes (intensive competition from private 
developers, new neighbors, increased development costs) and funding changes (a 
contraction of both public and philanthropic dollars, a shift in federal policies) lends a 
new dimension to the understanding of organizational development. Each organization 
has followed a specific path, or trajectory, in its evolution. These trajectories are the 
compilation of both internal and external factors and conditions that are described in 
the literature. Accordingly, some of these paths have allowed for greater resiliency in 
the face of increased competition, higher development and operational costs, shifts in 
funding and financing, and a different kind of neighborhood leadership role. The 
factors that this research considers key to understanding this changing role are the 
social, economic, and physical resources that the organizations begin with, the speed 
at which the organizations developed properties and were able to manage them, the 
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role of local public and philanthropic funders, and how the organization reacted to or 
enhanced the relationships between their new and old neighbors.40  
As gentrification set into the Albina neighborhoods, its CDCs that had been 
nurtured in an environment of neighborhood decline encountered unknown territory. 
There were no models for CDCs to continue their work in improved neighborhoods. 
Studying CDCs through the lens of gentrification is a relatively recent trend, as the 
literature on gentrification has expanded significantly in the last few years. This body 
of the literature, though, does not currently include significant analysis of the role of 
CDCs in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods, and this research endeavors to fill 
some of this gap. The gentrification literature in its current state describes phases of 
the phenomenon, structural and agent related causes, and the outcomes that reinforce 
the perpetuation of the trend.  
Lastly, the timing of the evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast 
Portland is compressed. As Vidal (1996) stated, too, the CDCs in West Coast cities are 
a relatively recent occurrence when compared to older East Coast and Midwestern 
cities. Because of this, Portland’s CDCs experienced accelerated growth as funding 
and development opportunities and institutional support converged in the early 1990s. 
This context of accelerated organizational growth that was geographically constrained 
forms the framework that has guided the research. Analyzing the evolution of the 
Albina CDCs, in their compressed temporal and geographic landscape, will illuminate 
the rapidly changing role of CDCs in a gentrifying neighborhood. Where, how and for 
                                                
40 These factors are a synthesis of Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ internal and external factors, Gittell and 
Wilder’s factors that influence success, and Glickman and Servon’s components of capacity. See 
Appendix F for a matrix that details these corollaries. 
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whom the organizations can be most effective are questions posited in a way that 
considers what happens when you get the revitalization that you have been aspiring to 
and how do you respond to it. 
  
 
Research Questions 
 Understanding the evolutionary process that leads to the final research 
questions is critical to understanding the questions themselves. Initially, the evolution 
of five CDCs in a small geographic area and the role of race it that evolution were the 
central tenets of the investigation; however, after completion of several interviews in 
August and September 2007, it became apparent that these questions were embedded 
in the larger questions about the impact of neighborhood gentrification on the 
evolution of the organizations.41 Gentrification was the one topic that all interviewees 
brought up independently, and without prompting. Because gentrification is a 
phenomenon that encompasses both race and class, I chose to address this larger issue 
directly. How neighborhood change contributed to organizational evolution (and vice 
versa) became a central theme in subsequent discussions at neighborhood, 
organizational, and policy levels. The “how” and “why” questions of these interactions 
are contained within the individual case study sections. The fact that the neighborhood 
context shift played this role reinforces not only the choice of the case study format, 
                                                
41 The interviews completed at that point included public officials, philanthropic organization staff, 
long-time neighborhood residents, and CDC board and staff.  
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but also the use of both qualitative and quantitative data to reinforce these 
relationships. 
Therefore, this study utilizes both the gentrification and organizational 
development literatures and seeks to elucidate the localized relationship between the 
two. Understanding the changing roles of CDCs as their neighborhoods changed 
around them is a key point for the organizations as they develop strategic plans for 
addressing future neighborhood changes. Specifically, this study involves two 
overarching questions and their respective sub questions: 
1. How did the Albina CDCs evolve?  
A. What were the roots of these organizations? 
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational development 
trajectories? 
2. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to 
social and economic changes within their neighborhoods? As 
neighborhood revitalization became apparent, how did the 
organizations respond to it? 
 
 
1. How did the Albina CDCs evolve?  
  
 This question considers the organizational development factors that defined 
each CDC, the internal and external factors that contributed to the organization’s 
growth and change over time. Implicit in this question is, “why did the organizations 
evolve in the way that they did?” Establishing a number of critical factors that are 
consistent across each organization allows for a comparison that will establish a 
trajectory for each organization. Based on the literature that describes capacity and 
success, the resulting overlapping factors of organizational competency, development 
capacity, neighborhood relationships, and funding capacity are most relevant to this 
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study. Parsing out the different factors and comparing them across organizations will 
determine whether they have distinctive or similar trajectories (Appendix E). 
 A. What were the roots of these organizations? 
The genesis of an organization influences its mission and focus.  Whether an 
organization springs from a geographic or cultural basis, it is rooted in a purpose that 
may or may not evolve over time. As CDCs encompass both social and physical 
geographies, grassroots CDCs emerge organically from their environs, while other 
development organizations target a specific problem within a community. As 
discussed in the Literature Review, the term “community development corporation” 
encompasses organizations that act as umbrellas for a variety of community 
development efforts, from housing development to job training and economic 
development activities. However, the term begs the question of whether an 
organization’s roots were a factor in its longevity. This question, that emerged from 
the history of the organizations, asks whether it mattered to the organization’s survival 
if it was a grassroots, community based organization – was this a positive attribute or 
detrimental to the organization over the long term? In addition, did organizations 
distance themselves from their origins, in some cases their grassroots origins, as they 
evolved and became more of a business that had to meet a bottom line, rather than a 
community group whose purpose was to advance the interests of the community? 
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational development  
      trajectories?  
 
Assessing the growth patterns of the organizations, as defined by the factors of 
capacity and success, will lend itself to an understanding of the organizations’ 
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expansion and contraction – their trajectories over time. While each organization has a 
unique history, there are many accomplishments that were similar. How each 
organization leveraged these accomplishments into additional opportunities may have 
been the key to its ability to adapt to changing funding and development opportunities, 
as well as neighborhood pressures.  
2. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to social and 
economic changes within their neighborhoods? As neighborhood revitalization 
became apparent, how did the organizations respond to it? 
 
 Yin (2003) points to the necessity of understanding the context for a case study 
as part of the analysis of the case itself. Understanding the contributions that the 
organizations made to revitalization, and the subsequent impact that this revitalization 
had on each organization could be answered by first assessing the number of housing 
units developed. This redevelopment had the potential to attract subsequent public and 
private investment and to alter the internal and external perceptions of the 
neighborhoods themselves. This change in perception potentially had the power to 
alter the development landscape by attracting outside investment. Understanding the 
point at which neighborhood revitalization became gentrification, the point at which 
the private sector and market forces catalyzed the pace of incremental improvement 
that had begun with small housing and economic development projects, is critical to 
future organizational planning efforts. The accompanying demographic shift is not 
simply a perception: it defines who “belongs” in the neighborhoods. 
 These two questions have both policy and theoretical bases. These questions 
open up a series of topics related to the first main question and consider organizational 
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roots, the timing of the growth of the CDC industry in Portland and its relationship to 
the booming housing market of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and what the evolution 
of these organizations says about Portland in general, given Portland’s particular 
institutions. The policy aspects of the question have philanthropic, local and federal 
implications, while the theoretical aspects include the broader social and economic 
implications of neighborhood revitalization, its intent and outcomes.  
Establishing a relationship between the CDC trajectory and the neighborhood 
trajectory by overlaying the two concepts on a graph will illuminate the CDC role in 
the neighborhood, and whether, at any one point in time, it is one of leadership or 
support. 
 
Propositions 
The evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland was a highly structured 
and tightly controlled phenomenon (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003). Given the 
compressed timeframe of the emergence of these organizations, there was little 
opportunity for organic evolution. Taken in its context, the neighborhoods had spent 
40 years in a state of decline, while their revitalization occurred in a timeframe of less 
than 15 years. The hasty organizational development of CDCs ensured that the 
missions of the organizations would not permanently coincide with the goals of the 
neighborhoods within which they worked, while the catalyzing of the neighborhood 
revitalization process, be it intentional or a product of larger economic forces, would 
prove to be divisive on several different levels. 
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With neighborhood revitalization, it is necessary to separate out the social and 
physical aspects because while neighborhoods are fixed assets, their populations are 
not. The physical changes (derelict housing reclamation, street improvements, 
commercial redevelopment, infill housing) that have occurred in the neighborhoods of 
Inner North/Northeast Portland are striking. The social changes are equally striking: 
the racial and economic profiles of the populations between 1990 and 2000 are 
dramatically different, and while, as McElderry (2001: 137) noted, the mental 
boundaries of Portland’s black neighborhoods have not changed since the 1930s. The 
fact that the populations of these neighborhoods are whiter, wealthier, and more 
educated has transformed the social geography of the neighborhoods. From the 
neighborhood lifecycle literature, the concept of neighborhood decline and 
revitalization can be conceptualized as a trough (Figure 2-2). At the same time, CDC 
organizational growth and change can be viewed along a somewhat more linear 
trajectory; if one were to overlay these two models, it is inevitable that these lines 
cross.  That point would occur, theoretically, when the organization has exceeded its 
useful life both for the neighborhood in terms of the organizations’ relevance to the 
vitality of the neighborhood. This point will vary by organization and by 
neighborhood: in some cases it occurs where revitalization becomes gentrification and 
where neighborhood priorities are no longer aligned with organizational priorities, and 
in other cases it occurs when the organization has exhausted its funding opportunities 
and its internal social capital and can no longer contribute positively to neighborhood 
vitality. Whether the organizations began inside or outside of the neighborhood milieu, 
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they ended up outside of the lines that defined neighborhood improvement, thus 
changing the nature and relevance of the relationship of the organization with the 
neighborhood. Per the model (Figure 2-2), each organization has a particular trajectory 
relative to the neighborhood changes based on when and where it began relative to the 
condition of the neighborhood. This trajectory is based on the initial resources, and 
organizational development that is both the result of the organization’s approach to 
success and to obstacles. These obstacles can be viewed as either dramatic or 
cumulative events, and sometimes a combination of the two; a dramatic obstacle being  
Figure 2-2 
Conceptual Model of Relationships between Neighborhood 
Lifecycle and CDC Change 
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a singular internal or external event that has a substantial, and often stinging, effect of 
the organization, while cumulative obstacles include trends resulting from externalities 
over which the organization has no apparent control, and trends that result from 
organizational culture (Guajardo, 2009c). By matching up different patterns between 
the organizations, explanations for different project and funding choices, leadership 
changes, and neighborhood relationships could be developed. This, in turn, could lead 
to explanations of the changing relationships between organizations.  
 Two additional theoretical propositions grew out of the development of this 
model: 
1. Neighborhood conditions and politics and funding sources are the critical 
factors affecting CDC trajectory. If the neighborhood conditions dominate the 
organization’s work, then it is a community-based organization that shares the 
goals of new and long-term neighborhood residents. If the politics and funding 
dominate the organizations’ work, then it is not necessarily a community-
based organization and its goals and priorities are more allied with the agendas 
of its funding sources.  
2. Per Rusk’s (1999) assertion, CDCs did little to stem the downward trajectory 
of their neighborhoods, and, while the organizations’ work may have initially 
bolstered gentrification, the organizations were helpless to mitigate the effects 
of gentrification once it took hold of their neighborhoods 
 
Each of these propositions addresses the multiple contexts in which CDCs operate. It 
is the fact that these organizations are beholden to disparate entities that they cannot 
focus and expedite their redevelopment and organizing efforts.  
 The analytical structure of the neighborhood lifecycle and gentrification 
literatures provides us with a framework for the analysis of the Albina CDCs. Hoover 
and Vernon (1959) describe four essential stages of neighborhood inception, 
maturation, decline and revitalization that are commensurate with the socio-economic 
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phases of development. Downs (1981) echoes this sentiment and describes a 
“continuum” along which neighborhoods can change. From these perspectives, the 
neighborhood lifecycle can be conceptualized as a harmonic wave, with a single 
period of that wave representing the full cycle of inception, decline, and revitalization. 
  Similarly, Clay’s (1979) four stages of gentrification describe the different 
periods of gentrification, their contributing social and economic factors, as well as 
their key agents. Each of these stages represented a unique timeframe in which certain 
agents acted in certain ways, due to their understanding of risk and opportunity. With 
this approach in mind, I set up a timeline, one that will allow the parsing out of 
particular events unique to each organization. By placing the organizational and 
contextual highlights side by side, one can begin to understand the relationships 
between organizations and their funding and neighborhood contexts that evolved. 
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 CHAPTER 3.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
This dissertation is a comparative case study of the five North/Northeast 
Portland, Oregon community development corporations to understand how the 
organizations evolved, and in some cases collapsed, in the context of a gentrifying 
neighborhood. Yin (2003:13) notes that a case study investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, and the boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clearly evident. The case study approach lends itself naturally to the 
investigation of community based organizations within a changing community 
because it allows the researcher to parse out the unit of analysis from its context and 
then to reintegrate into the context to explain not only the “what” question, but also 
the “why” questions. In this case, my purpose is to explain the evolution of the 
individual organizations and their roles in and reactions to the changes in the 
surrounding neighborhoods – each of which is “highly pertinent” to the other (Yin, 
2003: 13).  
 
Research Design42 
Yin (2003:21) has noted that case study research design has five key 
components: 1.) a study’s questions; 2.) its propositions; 3.) its units of analysis; 4.) 
the logic linking the data to the propositions; and 5.) the criteria for interpreting the 
findings. With this framework, I will define the structure and approach of the study, 
                                                
42 I would like to thank Ellen Bassett for guidance with this section.  
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address specific data collection elements and issues, and lay out the logic that links the 
findings to questions addressed in the literature.  
It should also be noted that for the multiple case study design, Yin (2003: 48) 
has acknowledged that there is no methodological difference between a single and 
multiple-case studies but care should be taken to collect consistent data, and both the 
phenomena and its context should be addressed. The challenges with this are discussed 
below.  
Units of analysis.  Case study research presents a particular set of definitional 
challenges. The first challenge is to define what the case is, the second is to define it in 
its social, political and economic context. In doing so, one creates boundaries for the 
study, and a framework that enables the author to draw reliable conclusions and relate 
them to a particular theory. In this research, the primary unit of analysis is the 
individual CDC. The units of analysis were conceived of at two levels: the micro level 
of the individual organizations and the macro level of the emerging CDC industry 
because the organizations individually were quite small, but collectively their 
influence on their surrounding neighborhoods was significant, at least for a period of 
time. I chose to examine 5 organizations whose target areas were within the core of 
the Albina Neighborhoods for several reasons. The central census tracts of the King 
neighborhood had suffered extreme disinvestment; in fact, the King neighborhood had 
the highest rate of vacant and abandoned housing in the City of Portland (Vacant and 
Abandoned Buildings Task Force, 1988). The five organizations, Northeast CDC 
(NECDC), Franciscan Enterprise, Housing Our Families (HOF), Sabin CDC and 
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Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) each represented a unique 
contribution to neighborhood revitalization in terms of mission, background, and 
resources (See Appendix E). Each organization had participated in the Neighborhood 
Partnership Fund’s CDC training sessions (part of the political and social context), had 
a lifespan of at least five years and was responsible for the development of at least 60 
units of housing. There were three other organizations whose work was focused in the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland that were not considered for 
analysis; these three organizations were Genesis, Peninsula CDC, and Habitat for 
Humanity’s Portland office. Genesis only existed for three years and developed a very 
small number of housing units. Peninsula CDC formed after the initial group of CDCs 
had begun to establish themselves and was focused more in the N. Portland 
neighborhoods of Portsmouth and St Johns, on the periphery of the area of interest for 
this study. Habitat for Humanity is a unique organization. While the Portland chapter 
was initiated in the early 1990s, its board members attended the early NPF training 
sessions, and it completed a number of projects in the Albina neighborhoods, its 
funding and development structure is radically different from the organizations 
analyzed in this study. Prior to 2008, Habitat for Humanity relied on funding solely 
from private donations, its revolving loan fund, and the largesse of its parent 
organization, Habitat for Humanity International based in Americus, Georgia. As a 
result, it did not have to rely on public funds and was not subject to the increasing 
competition for those funds after the mid 1990s (Schleiger, 2010). In addition, Habitat 
relies primarily on volunteer labor to construct its houses – so that its development 
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costs do not reflect the market costs of building a unit of housing. In addition, the 
Habitat model is focused on building homes for low-income families and not the 
broader community development model that the five organizations ascribed to.  
Linking the data collected to the propositions is potentially an overwhelming 
task. Yin notes that “investigators start case studies without the foggiest notion about 
how the data is to be analyzed” and search for “tools …  hoping that familiarity with 
these devices will produce the needed analytic result” (Yin, 2003: 109-110). The first 
step in overcoming the inherent inertia created by wallowing in one’s data is to take 
command of the data and to develop a specific strategy for analyzing the case studies.  
This could be viewed as conflicting with the approach of allowing the questions and 
analytical procedures to emerge from the data collected, an approach consistent with 
“Issue Evolution” (Stake, 2005: 448). In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, 
and to keep the dissertation process moving forward, I returned to and expanded on 
the original research questions in an effort to employ Yin’s recommended strategies of 
pattern matching, explanation building, and cross-case analysis (Yin, 2003: 109). 
These strategies served to reinforce the triangulation of data to ensure validity and 
vertical and horizontal consistency within the individual case studies and the larger 
case study. 
Per the conceptual model shown in Figure 2-2, each organization has a 
particular trajectory relative to the neighborhood changes based on when and where it 
began relative to the condition of the neighborhood. This trajectory is based on the 
initial resources, and organizational development that is both the result of the 
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organization’s approach to success and to obstacles. These obstacles can be viewed as 
either dramatic or cumulative events, and sometimes a combination of the two; a 
dramatic obstacle being a singular internal or external event that has a substantial, and 
often stinging, effect of the organization, while cumulative obstacles include trends 
resulting from externalities over which the organization has no apparent control, and 
those that result from organizational culture. By matching up different patterns 
between the organizations, explanations for different project and funding choices, 
leadership changes, and neighborhood relationships could be developed. This, in turn, 
could lead to explanations of the changing relationships between organizations.  
Yin states that “to explain a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of 
causal links about it… These links may be complex and difficult to measure in any 
precise manner” (Yin, 2003: 120). On the other hand, Stake asserts that the goal with 
the comparative case study is not necessarily a causal explanation of events, but rather 
to perceive these events as “multiply sequenced, multiply contextual and coincidental, 
more than causal” (Stake, 2005: 449). What each is saying, though, is that determining 
causality is not always possible, but an understanding of the relationships and trends 
is.  
Methods of Data Collection and Analysis. This study used a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data that will help to define the organizational trajectories. 
(See Table 3-1). 43 Case study research often incorporates multiple types of data 
whose strengths and weaknesses are intended to limit the inherent bias of the author 
                                                
43 I would like to thank Andree Tremoulet for suggesting the use of a chart to clarify this part of my 
research design.  
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(Yin, 2003:86). The types of quantitative data collected and analyzed include 
demographic information from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, real estate value 
information from 1992-2006, and organizational financial data from 1994-2006. Since 
the time frame for the study encompasses 2 census data cycles, that part of the 
quantitative data examines the neighborhood demographic trends, while the RMLS 
data articulates the real estate trends noted in the neighborhoods and compares them to 
the Metro area.  
Table 3-1 
Summary of Research Units of Analysis, Data Sources, and Analytic Approaches 
Organization Principal Data 
Sources - 
Quantitative 
Principal Data Sources– 
Qualitative 
Analytic Approaches 
NECDC IRS 990 Forms, 
CDC Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas, 
portlandmaps.com 
Interviews: Former Board 
Members. Newspaper 
Articles, Kafoury Papers, 
Oregonian Articles  
Graphing of financial and 
development information, 
Interview Summaries, 
Explanation Building.  
Franciscan 
Enterprise 
IRS 990 Forms, 
CDC Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas, 
portlanmaps.com 
Interviews: Former Board 
Member, Executive 
Director and Staff. 
Oregonian Articles 
Graphing of financial and 
development information, 
Interview Summaries, 
Explanation Building. 
Housing Our 
Families 
IRS 990 Forms, 
CDC Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas, 
portlandmaps.com 
Interviews: Former Board 
Members, Executive 
Directors and Staff, 
Annual Reports and 
Audits, 1993-1997, 
Author’s personal papers, 
Oregonian Articles 
Graphing of financial and 
development information, 
Interview Summaries, 
Explanation Building. 
Sabin CDC IRS 990 Forms, 
CDC Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas, 
portlanmaps.com 
Interviews: Former 
Executive Directors and 
Staff. Annual Reports 
1992-1998, Meisenhelter 
Papers, Oregonian Articles 
Graphing of financial and 
development information, 
Interview Summaries, 
Explanation Building. 
PCRI IRS 990 Forms, 
CDC Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas, 
portlanmaps.com 
Interviews: Former Board 
Member, Current 
Executive Director and 
former Staff, Annual 
Reports 1999-2006, 
Oregonian Articles 
Graphing of financial and 
development information, 
Interview Summaries, 
Explanation Building. 
Context    
Each 
Neighborhood 
Census Data, RMLS 
Data 
Interviews: Long Time and 
More Recent Residents, 
Abbot & Gibson, Personal 
Interview Summaries, 
Charts for census data, 
graphs of RMLS data 
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observations 
Local Public 
Policy and 
Funding 
 Interviews: BHCD and 
PDC Staff, Public Official 
Interviews, HCDC 
Members Interviews, City 
Council Member 
Kafoury’s Papers, City of 
Portland Audit of City 
Housing Programs 
Interview Summaries, 
triangulation with Kafoury 
papers and other interviews, 
City Housing Audit 
Federal Public 
Policy and 
Funding 
 HUD Policy Papers, 
Schwartz, Abt & 
Associates Report on 
Nehemiah Grant Success 
 
Philanthropic 
Foundations 
 Interviews with past and 
current staff of the 
Enterprise Foundation and 
the Oregon Community 
Foundation, and Annual 
Reports, Ford Foundation 
Report on CDC Growth,  
Interview summaries, 
triangulation with annual 
reports, Summary of CDC 
growth report 
 
The Census Data encompassed eight census tracts at the heart of the Albina 
neighborhoods. These tracts, 22.01, 24.01, 33.01, 33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, and 
37.02, were chosen because of their rough alignment with the Boise, Eliot, King, 
Sabin, and Woodlawn neighborhoods, the main geographic target areas of the CDCs 
studied (Appendix I: 345). These tracts were some of the poorest and racially diverse 
tracts in the City of Portland in 1990 and had changed significantly by 2000. The 
categories of census data initially included Race, Household Income, Housing Tenure, 
Median Property Values, and Educational Attainment in order to gain a snapshot of 
both the population and the housing in the area. Later, I added the category of Age, 
after many of my interviews yielded information regarding the displacement of older 
homeowners whose relocation either by chance or by choice was a notable turning 
point in the gentrification of the neighborhoods.  
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The collection of real estate data occurred in two distinct stages and served two 
purposes: to develop a database of the number and type of housing units developed by 
CDCs and to track the change in neighborhood home prices over time. The first stage 
was to verify the data from The Community Development Corporations/Non-Profit 
Housing Atlas.44 This data was divided into the respective CDCs that developed the 
units to get a tally of units for each organization and to chart when these units were 
developed, an indicator of organizational growth and increasing complexity. Each 
address was verified to ensure the quality of the data, and organizational Annual 
Reports augmented the list, as its ending date was 1996. This list was cross-referenced 
with the list of properties that Multnomah County transferred to non-profit 
organizations from 1991-2006, and the State of Oregon’s list of Affordable Housing 
development projects that received tax credit funding between 1994 and 2006. Efforts 
to cross-reference this data with information from Portland Development Commission, 
which administered much of the federally funded housing work, proved futile.45 
Once the data were determined to be complete, an investigation into the sales 
of homes both to low-income and market rate buyers began. Sales of CDC-owned 
homes on the open market were an indication of precarious organizational fiscal 
health, as the increased value of the homes could provide cash flow for the CDC for a 
year or two. When this stage was complete, the data was mapped: the final product 
was a map that showed the location and number of CDC developed housing units with 
                                                
44 I am indebted to Meg Merrick for sharing a copy of this original report with me and for putting 
together the maps for me when she should have been working on her own dissertation. 
45 In its City Housing Program audit, the Office of the City Auditor noted that PDC’s housing data was 
very difficult to obtain; even when it was obtained, the data was unclear and unorganized (Office of the 
City Auditor, 2002). 
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the overall neighborhood home prices to determine whether the CDC housing 
development had a lasting effect on the neighborhood housing prices (Appendix I: 
347-348). 
The organizational financial data was available via three primary avenues: 
annual reports, organizational audits and federal 990 Forms, available online from 
www.Guidestar.org. Annual reports, when available, were accurate accountings of 
housing units developed, grants won and allocated, organizational cash flow, and 
organizational debt. The audits were a more detailed accounting of development 
activities and asset valuations. The 990 Forms provided a wealth of information that 
not only verified information from the Annual Reports and audits, but also listed staff 
numbers and salaries, as well as the addresses of properties bought and sold. Not all 
data was available through Guidestar, and additional requests to the IRS for the 
missing 990 Forms turned up empty, as they do not retain records for more than 7 
years. Hence, the information available from the 990 Forms overlapped for a limited 
number of years, and since each organization filled them out slightly differently, a true 
“apples to apples” comparison is not possible; this is a common hazard of using 
secondary data (data that is collected by someone else for a purpose other than the 
author’s). With this in mind, though, the Form 990s and the available Annual Reports 
were each excellent validations of the other and contributed to the robustness of the 
financial information.  
The qualitative data collected can be divided into 2 parts: 1.) Public 
documents, newspaper articles, and reports, and 2.) Information gleaned from 
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interviews with key stakeholders. These two types of sources were often used to verify 
one another and provided an opportunity for more detailed probing in the interview 
process.  
The public documents include former City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury’s 
public papers from the City Archives. These documents were collected during the 
summer of 2007. Documents include memoranda regarding housing policy, notes 
from meetings, and most interestingly, the exchange of letters between Bureau of 
Buildings Director Margaret Mahoney and  NECDC Executive Director Jaki Walker 
that outline the uncomfortable confrontations that Walker initiated with City Officials.  
The newspaper articles were the result of keyword searches within the Lexus 
Nexus search engine at the Portland State University Library. Several searches were 
conducted for each organization. Keywords included the name of the organization in 
different formats, the names of the key Albina neighborhoods, and the names of key 
stakeholders. The bulk of the articles were from the Oregonian newspaper; however, 
the Skanner, Willamette Week, and Portland Business Journal also contributed several 
key articles.  This was probably the most straightforward part of the data collection 
phase. For each organization, summaries were created, so that a timeline of key events 
could be developed (see Appendix J). This timeline served as a basis for much of the 
cross-case analysis.  
Reports include government generated material and reports to philanthropic 
groups. For example, the Abt Associates report on the effectiveness of the Nehemiah 
Grant was key in explaining NECDC’s performance on a national scale in producing 
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the number of houses that it committed to, while Joseph Hoereth’s report to the Ford 
Foundation on the building of community development capacity in Portland gave 
tremendous insight into the role of the philanthropic organizations and their 
expectations in the growth of Portland’s CDC industry. Local reports include the City 
of Portland’s Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Forces’ draft report on the number 
and neighborhood location of these units, as well as proposed solutions to the 
problems, a report by the City Auditor’s Office of City Housing Program 
Accomplishments 1996-2000, and, most importantly, Marlene Farnum’s report to the 
Neighborhood Partnership Fund on the Lessons learned from the merger process that 
created Albina CDC.  
The bulk of the information for this study, though, was gleaned from the 49 
interviews with key stakeholders that took place between August 2007 and July 
2010.46 These stakeholders included CDC board and staff, public officials, funders, 
neighborhood residents, both recent and long time. Initially, my intent was to 
interview a current or former staff member, a current or former executive director, and 
a current or former board member of each CDC. This was not possible for all of the 
organizations. Given the length of time since the demise of NECDC, I was only able 
to contact two former board members and one former temporary staff member. Public 
officials were very forthcoming, and I was able to interview several former BHCD and 
PDC staff and directors, former City Commissioners Erik Sten and Gretchen Kafoury, 
as well as a number of consultants who had played instrumental roles in the evolution 
of N/NE Portland’s CDCs. Interviewing neighborhood residents proved a little more 
                                                
46 The full list of interviewees and the outline of questions can be found in Appendix B.  
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difficult; however, I was able to attend several neighborhood association meetings and 
gentrification reconciliation sessions in 2008 to understand what the issues people 
were facing as both new and old neighborhood residents in a tense and changing 
environment.  
For each interview, a list of questions was developed to serve as a framework 
for the interview. Certain baseline information (length of involvement with a certain 
organization, length of neighborhood residency) was requested to provide some 
consistency. Each interviewee was asked, if they felt that there was someone in 
particular that I should talk to; this process of “snowballing” led to some people that I 
was not originally aware of and broadened the information about each organization. 
 The interview questions varied, depending on whether the interviewee was a 
current or former staff member, board member, funder, public official, neighborhood 
resident, or consultant; examples of these questions can be found in Appendix C.  The 
purpose of this variation was to glean a broad base of information about the 
organizations and their relationships to each other and the neighborhoods in which 
they operated.  The intent of these open-ended interviews was to allow respondents to 
explain their roles in and their attitudes towards the evolution of the organizations 
because the interview process is “inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, 
and contextually bound” (Fontana and Frey: 2005, 695). It is an active process that is 
intended to shed light on personal involvement. Two strategies for interviewing 
include “empathetic” and “structured” interviewing (Fontana and Frey: 2005, 701). 
The strategy in this research was a hybrid of the two: while a specific list of questions 
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was adhered to during the process, I relied on my knowledge of the organizations and 
the stakeholders to delve further into their stories. In doing so, I ascribed to an 
approach that has been attributed more to women: that women tend to try to remove as 
many barriers between themselves and their interviewees, to think about both what the 
interview accomplishes, and how it is accomplished, a strategy that ultimately allowed 
me to go back and easily ask follow-up questions (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 697). 
After completing each interview and reviewing the transcript, I created a 
summary of points. Each summary was then included in a summary of points 
associated with a particular organization. From these summaries emerged the salient 
issues that would become the basis for the analysis of each organization. The focus on 
organizational housing production was both evident and reinforced by the people 
interviewed. This focus could be viewed as a flaw in my logic, but the overwhelming 
amount of money that each organization spent on housing development, relative to 
their other programs, and its broader neighborhood impacts also reinforces this choice 
of housing development as a point of entry into describing organizations as a whole.   
Personal observation was also a key part of the data collected for this research. 
I have had the opportunity to consult professionally in my role as a housing designer 
with each of the organizations investigated and sat on the board of directors of 
Housing Our Families for three years. During the 1990s, I was an architectural and 
construction consultant to both PCRI and Sabin CDC.47 Jaki Walker and I had 
discussed my designing a number of homes for NECDC, but its demise occurred 
                                                
47 I was offered a full time position as Construction Manager at Sabin CDC in 1998, but turned it down 
because I did not feel that there was enough housing development work on the horizon to maintain the 
position for more than a year or so.   
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before our contract could be signed. Because of my work with these organizations, I 
saw first-hand the steep learning curves that the staff of these organizations 
encountered as they learned about project finance and subsequent property 
management.  
When Franciscan Enterprise embarked on the design and construction of a 
multi-family housing project on N. Mississippi, a colleague and I volunteered to 
complete the initial architectural drawings. I had the most intimate relationship with 
Housing Our Families; besides sitting on the Board of Directors for three years, I was 
a volunteer for certain projects throughout the 1990s and consulted on the renovation 
of its offices when the organization became Albina CDC in 2001.  My role in the 
organization was that of technical expert in both design and project development. This 
role continued as I maintained a role on the Board of Directors of several Single Asset 
Entities (SAEs). As HOF, and then Albina CDC, increasingly neglected these Boards, 
I felt particularly awkward as I spoke up and called for accountability. When Albina 
CDC began to negotiate with PCRI for the transfer of property, the rest of the Board 
looked to me and to one other Board member for explanations of complex financial 
dealings when it came to audits and HUD requirements, and I felt that much of the 
weight of decision-making rested on my shoulders. As a result, my view of the 
efficacy of a organization’s Board of Directors whose members represented a broad 
spectrum of the community was critical.  
Because of my involvement with several different organizations, my personal 
files contained a wealth of information that included board meeting minutes, 
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neighborhood meeting minutes, audits, balance sheets, news letters, annual reports, 
correspondence and a number of photographs of the Boise and Eliot neighborhoods 
from those years. This information was instrumental in describing HOF and other 
defunct organizations. As a result of knowing many of the Board and Staff of other 
organizations, too, I was the recipient of their personal files as well.  
My relationships with each organization both facilitated and complicated this 
research. My research was facilitated by the fact that many doors were open to me; 
people were willing to speak with me in part because they knew me from my time 
working with the different organizations. Because of this, I was able to interview 49 
people relatively easily. However, I did encounter dilemmas associated with an 
insider’s role: when I heard information that I had understood differently, I tended to 
discount much of the rest of what a respondent said. I was particularly conscious of 
body language that was incongruous with the answers that respondents were giving. 
When the respondents’ information was consistent with what I had understood to be 
true, I relied on these responses more than I should have, at least initially, and needed 
to take particular care in triangulating the information to develop a more balanced 
view of the organization as a whole.  
As Yin (2003: 98) impresses upon us the importance of using multiple sources 
to develop converging lines of inquiry, the validation and verification of information 
in this research project utilized a variety of sources.  Triangulation from multiple 
sources, both qualitative and quantitative, was an important part of the interview 
summation process in order to ensure the quality and validity of the interviews. The 
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choice of organizational board members, executive directors, and staff was intentional 
in order to accomplish a mini-triangulation within each organization that could then be 
verified from outside sources as well. This convergence of data from different sources 
is diagrammed in Figure 3-1: 
       (Adapted from Yin, 2003: 100) 
 
In some cases, interviewees made statements that represented a particular viewpoint 
and were found to contradict other interviewees’ statements and information gleaned 
from newspapers and other sources. Statements of this nature needed to be verified by 
at least one other source; if the statements could not be corroborated, they were 
discarded.  
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Limitations of Research Design and Methodology 
 The limitations of this project became more apparent once the data collection 
phase of the research began; they are noted as researcher bias, the length of time 
between this investigation and the occurrence of the events in question, the 
inconsistency of some of the quantitative data, and the availability of interviewees.  
Researcher bias is an inherent issue in qualitative research. Because of my 
relationships with key stakeholders, I was granted access to both people and 
information that I would not have had otherwise; the converse is that I have 
preconceived notions of the evolution of the organizations and neighborhood changes 
that no doubt influenced my choice of topic, choice of interviewees, questions used in 
interviews. I tried to overcome some of these biases by triangulating information from 
different sources.  
 The time between the commencement of this investigation and the inception of 
the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland was almost 20 years. This time lapse 
placed the onus on interviewees to remember specific interactions and events; hence, 
information was spotty at times, especially for the organizations that no longer exist 
and whose records were not readily accessible. The time lapse also affected access to 
public documents: very few of the philanthropic groups had maintained their records, 
the IRS had destroyed their information after 7 years, and many individuals had 
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discarded their personal files.48  This time lapse, most importantly, led to a truncated 
view of organizational finances.  
 Archival material, too, had been culled over time. The information from the 
City’s Archives was poorly organized (at least for my research purposes), most likely 
due the source material’s original filing system; hence, there were incomplete memos 
and letters, and certain reports were only available in draft form. In addition, access to 
the documents at the Portland City Archives was limited: city staff retrieved records 
from the archives specific to the topic of research, so that the documents that I could 
actually view were previously culled. This led to both a streamlining of the research 
process, but also a potential limitation of access to appropriate information. 
 During the interview phase of this research, I discovered a great number of 
people who were very forthcoming; however, my attempts to interview a significant 
number of neighborhood residents were met with non-responsiveness. In order to 
compensate, somewhat for this dearth of residents, I utilized the information gleaned 
in the Boise Voices Oral History Project (Yanke, 2009) and the gentrification 
reconciliation meetings sponsored by the Office of Neighborhood Involvement’s 
Restorative Listening Project that took place in North Portland in 2006 and 2007. One 
group that I did not contact was previous neighborhood residents who had been 
displaced. This population, I surmised, has been dispersed further east and further 
north. I attempted to contact the Albina Ministerial Alliance (AMA) in order to talk to 
                                                
48 With the exception of Diane Meisenhelter’s files for Sabin CDC from 1993-1997 and PNDSC from 
1996-2001, PCRI’s annual reports from 2001-2006 courtesy of Maxine Fitzpatrick, and my personal 
files for HOF and Albina CDC from 1994-2005, no other organizational files were directly available.  
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pastors who could put me in touch with parishioners who had been displaced. The 
AMA was in a state of transition, and this effort was not fruitful.  
 While these limitations were significant, they were not insurmountable. 
Information from the interviews, for the most part, was consistent and verifiable with 
other interview sources, so that it became the backbone of this study. In a sense, the 
study became more community based, rather than a quantitative and archival data 
study.  
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CHAPTER 4. 
CASE STUDY 1: NORTHEAST COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION 
 
 
 
Northeast Community Development Corporation (NECDC) was founded in 1984 by a 
group of black community leaders to promote economic development and job 
opportunities by sponsoring pre-apprenticeship carpentry training programs for teens. 
The houses that it renovated and then rented or sold to low-income families were a 
byproduct of the original intent (McLennan interview: 3; Talton interview: 2). Local 
activists Ron Herndon, Carl Talton, and Edna Robertson each brought unique 
experiences to addressing the social and economic needs of Portland’s black 
community. Herndon was the vocal chairman of Portland’s Black United Front, a key 
member of the N/NE Economic Development Alliance, the Executive Director of 
Albina Head Start, and president of the National Head Start Association (Spicer, 
1994b). Talton was more of a well-connected businessman. A former lobbyist for 
local utility Pacific Power and Light, Talton also served on the Portland Development 
Commission and the City’s Economic Development Advisory Committee (Talton 
interview: 2). Robertson brought a level of community connectivity to the 
organization as the head of the Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods and her 
involvement with Bethel AME Church, the Black United Front, the NAACP, the 
Urban League Senior Center, the Regional Drug Initiative, the Community Coalition 
for School Integration, and the Multnomah School Advisory Committee (Spicer, 
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1994a). With such broad based and well-connected leadership, NECDC’s high 
visibility and rise to power were virtually assured.  
NECDC’s seed money was a $50,000 grant from Nike, after the corporation 
had agreed to support community efforts in NE Portland as they were searching for a 
location for an outlet store.  “Before its (outlet) store had sold its first pair of 
sneakers,” executives from Nike had met with Herndon and other community leaders 
to forge an agreement to address “economic issues in Portland’s African American 
community” (Herndon, 2004).  Coupled with the fact that there was no other 
organized group in NE Portland that was able to take action at that time, NECDC 
began to mobilize resources and volunteers to assist with its youth training programs.  
While still a volunteer driven organization, NECDC won a $250,000 federal 
grant in 1987 to implement its youth employment training. The result of this endeavor 
was the training of 6 students in a carpentry pre-apprentice program and two renovated 
houses: the students then entered an apprenticeship program run by Associated 
General Contractors, and one house was sold, the other rented (Mayer, 1987). With the 
success of this first step, NECDC saw an opportunity to expand its programs with the 
redevelopment of an entire city block that had been destroyed by an explosion and fire 
in 1986 (Mayer, 1987).49 In 1988, NECDC partnered with the Housing Authority of 
Portland to construct five houses on the site; the houses would then be rented to low-
income tenants, and NECDC would be responsible for their management and possible 
sales (Blackmun, 1988). 
                                                
49 On New Year’s Day 1986, 5 houses on NE Beech St between NE 10th and NE 11th Avenues were 
destroyed when a resident of one of the houses committed suicide by removing a gas meter in his 
basement, letting the gas seep into his house, and lighting it on fire. (Blackmun,1988).   
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Also in 1988, NECDC hired its first Executive Director, Don Neureuther, a 
former priest from Omaha, Nebraska. Neureuther’s strengths in grant writing and 
planning were a great asset for the organization, but the fact that Neureuther was white 
always caused some friction on the board – because of the apparent conflict that a 
white face was publicly representing a black community organization (Talton 
interview: 3). Talton notes that in 1988, the organization did not have much 
experience with housing development, and Neureuther “head and shoulders above the 
other candidates in community development experience” (Talton, 2009). Some of 
NECDC’s board leadership, though, had focused on the social and economic 
empowerment of the Portland’s black community and felt that having a Director who 
was white undermined the purpose of the organization (Rudman interview: 12). While 
Talton feels strongly that this was not the case: he believes that Neureuther gave a 
high priority to the “black community agenda” and was a good fit for the organization 
at the time. City staff and neighborhood activists saw this in a different way: when 
Neureuther left the organization in 1991, they felt that he had been pushed out because 
he was white, in spite of his denial of that fact and board members’ public comments 
(Lane, 1991; Rudman interview, p 12; Stewart interview: 4; Talton interview: 3; 
Kafoury interview: 7).50 In any case, Neureuther’s relationship with the NECDC board 
was symptomatic of race relations in general in Portland: an uneasy subcurrent that no 
one wanted to discuss for fear of being called racist (Frater interview: 24; Stewart 
interview: 2). 
                                                
50 Neureuther became the Director of the Neighborhood Partnership Fund after Ed McNamara left in 
1994. 
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On the other hand, Neureuther was able to advocate for NECDC within the 
“patriarchal” hierarchy of City Hall and bridge some of the divides that had arisen 
from the different approaches to solving the social and economic problems of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland (Holden interview: 5). In the late 1980s, the problems of 
Inner North/Northeast Portland had begun to emerge on the downtown political radar. 
Both Commissioner Dick Bogle and Mayor Bud Clark had formed Task Forces to 
address the issue of vacant and abandoned housing; the Portland Development 
Commission established the redevelopment of Inner North/Northeast among its 
“priority goals” for 1989, and the City Council created an Economic Development 
Advisory Committee (Durbin, 1988).  In addition, Clark had formed the 
Neighborhood Revitalization Management Panel to oversee the work of neighborhood 
groups that were identifying the key problems and their potential solutions; this effort 
stalled in its efforts to offer solutions and was dissolved in 1990, its responsibilities 
assumed, unofficially at first, by the North/NE Economic Development Task Force, a 
grass roots effort formed by Herndon and others in 1989 to “advocate a neighborhood-
based approach to renovating the area’s most troubled neighborhoods” (Carlin, 
1990a). Clark’s approach to neighborhood revitalization, though, was cautious, slow, 
and bureaucratic, much to the chagrin of the black community leaders. With the 
stalling of progress on the Homestead Task Force, the disbanding of the Neighborhood 
Revitalization Management Panel, and increased friction between black leaders and 
Clark, the North/NE Economic Development Task Force “spearheaded neighborhood 
involvement” in revitalization efforts and emerged as a strong coalition of neighbors, 
 86 
business people, and activists that would, along with NECDC, guide much of the 
planning and redevelopment in NE Portland for the next several years (Oliver, 1990).  
A more insidious development, though, was the emergence of strained 
relations between Mayor Bud Clark and Portland’s black community. In October 
1989, Clark had fired his liaison to the black community, Ollie Smith. As a result of 
Smith’s dismissal, black community leaders, with Herndon as their chief 
spokesperson, met with Clark to discuss the dismissal. In that meeting Clark said that 
“he would be his own liaison to the community and that he was trying to get a suntan 
to make his skin darker” in order to better communicate with black leaders (Ames, 
1989). Subsequently, Clark, upon calls from Herndon and other black community 
leaders, apologized, albeit half-heartedly, for what “many feel was (a) racially 
offensive” remark (Oliver, 1989).  From the black community’s perspective, though, 
the incident was indicative of race relations in Portland, where the black community 
felt, and continues to feel, that whites, and especially those in positions of power, are 
not aware of the offense – that they “just don’t get it” (Talton interview: 8).  
In spite of the local racial discord, and perhaps due to Clark’s “go slow 
approach” to revitalizing NE Portland, NECDC sought the assistance of Congressman 
Les AuCoin and Senator Mark Hatfield to assist them in applying for a HUD 
Nehemiah Homeownership Opportunity Program (Nehemiah) grant. Named for the 
Biblical prophet who rebuilt Jerusalem in 62 days, Nehemiah was a federal program 
that lasted from 1987-1995 and consisted of three rounds of funding with a total of 54 
grantees whose urban and rural areas ranged in size from 30 to over 300 units of 
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housing. The model for Nehemiah was based on a project in the Brownsville 
neighborhood of Brooklyn, NY that brought together several different grass roots 
organizations to form the East Brooklyn Churches (EBC), the group that spearheaded 
the development of 1,250 single family homes that were sold at $53,500 each to 
families below the median income for the area. The extraordinary thing about the 
program was that it achieved costs savings in several different ways: innovative 
construction techniques, free land, interest free construction loans, and very low 
overhead costs.  Savings for the homebuyers included tax abatement, below market 
interest rate (BMIR) loans, and interest free capital loans from the City of NY that 
were re-payable when the unit was sold (Phipps et al: A-2-A-3). 
HUD used the EBC model to create a broader development program based on 
the successes in East Brooklyn. The federal Nehemiah program challenged grass roots 
organizations to develop housing on a large scale in blighted urban neighborhoods. 
This model offered federal funding of up to $15,000 per unit in the form of a second 
mortgage for single family and attached housing. The expectation was that local 
governments and agencies would step up and provide the land, assist in the 
procurement of below market interest on construction loans, rescind building permit 
fees for the developers, and provide property tax abatement and interest rate assistance 
on loans for homebuyers.  The application process was competitive, with local 
sponsors drawing together a host of public and private partners to provide local 
support. Ed McNamara remembers when Don Neureuther told him that NECDC was 
going to apply for the Nehemiah grant in 1989; McNamara laughed because he could 
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not believe that such a small, inexperienced group would apply for a grant that was 
intended for complex, large scale redevelopment projects for high density blighted and 
economically depressed urban neighborhoods (McNamara interview: 9).51 The intent 
of the Nehemiah Grant was to assist in large scale “contiguous”, primarily new 
construction development. NECDC’s proposal was to do scattered site single family 
house development in the King, Vernon, Boise, and Humboldt neighborhoods of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland and a mix of new construction and renovation projects. As a 
part of their application process, the organization worked with Congressman AuCoin’s 
office to augment the definition of “contiguous”, so that their application would be 
considered (Glanville, 1989; McNamara interview: 9). 
NECDC was one of 15 grantees in the first round of the federal Nehemiah 
grants in May of 1990, and the only western city to receive one (Talton interview: 3).52 
Because of the structure of the Nehemiah grant, NECDC took on a huge challenge 
before they would realize any financial benefit as a result of the sale of the houses.  
Predevelopment and construction costs needed to be covered. In 1990, NECDC 
received a $450,000 3 year grant from the Meyer Memorial Trust to build its capacity 
to implement its ambitious redevelopment effort and $250,000 each year for 3 years in 
operating support from the City of Portland (City Recorder, 1990). NECDC struggled 
for the next few years to put together the project basics: land, building designs, and 
                                                
51 When NECDC applied for the grant, they had only completed 4 units of housing, all of them single 
family house renovation projects. 
52 The other cities were Baltimore, MD,  Shelbyville, KY, Clairton, PA, Gary, IN, Chicago, IL, Tifton, 
GA, Woonsocket, RI, Tuskegee, AL, Pittsburgh, PA, Washington, DC, Des Moines, IA, Aguadilla, PR, 
Camden, NJ, and Highland Park, MI. Not all of the projects were urban, and few were of a scale that 
could take advantage of cost savings in construction (Phipps, et al: ES-4). 
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project financing. The original application stated that the group had hoped to be 
finished with 260 units by 1993, when in fact they had barely begun construction at 
that point. To complicate matters, Don Neureuther, who had had an uneasy 
relationship with several board members, resigned 18 months after the group won the 
grant. According to Carl Talton, it was never Neureuther’s intention to be part of the 
Nehemiah’s implementation (Talton interview: 3); however, his resignation in January 
1991 signaled a new chapter in NECDC’s history (Lane, 1991b).  
At that point, NECDC’s board launched a national search for a new executive 
director, and in April 1991, they hired Jaki Walker as their new executive director. She 
came to Portland from Seattle, where she had run one of the city’s housing programs 
(Lane, 1991b). Her enthusiasm for the project and the organization’s “can-do” attitude 
made her a good fit for NECDC. By all accounts, Jaki Walker had a confrontational 
style that lent itself to accomplishing the potentially unattainable goal of completing 
the Nehemiah project. Carl Talton notes that Walker had good connections to the 
community and good connections with federal officials, but lacked solid connections 
with the mid-level bureaucrats and local politicians who were a critical part of the 
organization’s success (Talton interview: 11). This ultimately contributed to her and 
NECDC’s downfall. 
Walker’s first task as Executive Director was to organize the land acquisition 
for the project. As a part of the local government and agency contribution, Multnomah 
County had agreed to provide 130 vacant houses or lots to NECDC (Tupper interview: 
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2).53 This relinquishment of tax foreclosed properties was the precursor to the 
County’s Affordable Housing Development Program the intent of which was to 
transfer County owned properties to CDCs for affordable housing development 
(Rubenstein, 1991). The problem for NECDC was that this program, like the broader 
Nehemiah program, was not tested – and working through legal issues like clearing 
titles and property liens took much more time than originally anticipated (Moore, 
1991). Ultimately, construction did not begin until December of 1991, more than 2 
years after NECDC received the grant, and in large part due to the property transfer 
issues.  
Putting together the financing for a project of this magnitude, and with many 
public and private partners, was by far the most difficult and layered part of the 
development process and also delayed the project, in part because of a tripling of 
project administrative and construction costs from the original grant proposal. The 
administrative costs increased because of the unanticipated amount of staff time spent 
to procure project financing, and construction costs increased in part due to the time 
lag between grant application and the initiation of construction (3 years), the use of 
smaller, inexperienced contractors, and the increased level of finish demanded by 
Walker to help with the marketing of the new homes.54 As a result, NECDC required a 
additional funds from the City of Portland (Mahoney, 1992c). Because the $3.75 
million federal contribution to the project was allocated during the buyer’s financing 
                                                
53 Since Multnomah County is responsible for the collection of property taxes, it is the trustee of 
delinquent properties.  
54 The cost of wood products (lumber, plywood, and finish materials) increased almost 20% in the early 
1990s due to the diversion of material from local markets to areas where natural disasters, such as South 
Florida after Hurricane Andrew, were occurring and the 1st Iraq war. 
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of their homes, a complex set of predevelopment funding and construction loans were 
required to develop the project and build the houses; NECDC procured $8 million in 
loans from the Oregon Housing Agency and $2 million from a consortium of 4 local 
banks for this purpose (Vondersmith, 1991). In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank 
of Seattle provided a “subsidy of $195,000 to help buyers with down payments and 
closing costs” for 65 of the homes (The Oregonian, 1992). 
In addition to the loans from the OHA and local lenders, the City of Portland 
assisted NECDC, albeit reluctantly, with a “float loan” of $2 million in 1993 
(Mahoney, 1992a; Kafoury, 1993). The float loan provided below market interest on a 
loan from City CDBG funds; a consortium of banks administered the loan, and should 
the City require access to the funds for another project, the banks would repay the City 
and provide funds to NECDC under a Master Loan agreement (City Recorder, 
1994).55 
Because the predevelopment phase of the Nehemiah project dragged on with 
nothing in the way of housing units to show for the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
spent, City Commissioner Kafoury and her staff remember Walker and the NECDC 
board balking when they were asked for an accounting of their expenditures (Lane, 
1991b). The uneasiness stemmed from the fact that NECDC was the most well funded 
CDC in Portland but was unable to produce any housing units.56 Critics pointed to 
Ron Herndon’s high profile position as NECDC board chair and outspoken leader in 
                                                
55 The consortium of banks included Bank of America Oregon, Bank of California, First Interstate Bank 
of Oregon, Key Bank of Oregon, US Bank of Oregon, and West One Bank (City Ordinance 168410). 
56 NECDC’s application estimated that “85 homes would be completed in 1990, 95 in 1991, and 75 in 
1992 (NECDC, 1990: 24). 
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the black community as a reason for the lack of accountability; one city staff member 
lamented, “If this was anybody else, it wouldn’t have been allowed to go on this long” 
(Lane, 1991b). 
 The contentious relationship between NECDC and City Commissioner 
Gretchen Kafoury and Bureau of Buildings Director Margaret Mahoney was detailed 
in a series of letters as NECDC was negotiating the terms of the float loan; a draft 
letter from Mahoney points out that NECDC had failed to provide “cash flow 
information and an audit” to the City, so that they could allocate additional funding to 
the agency (Mahoney, 1992b). A subsequent memorandum of understanding between 
NECDC, Commissioner Kafoury, and Director Mahoney explicitly outlines the City’s 
expectations of NECDC and admonishes them not to automatically expect that the 
resources are due them nor to send letters “questioning the motives” of anyone 
(Mahoney, 1992a). 
NECDC’s combative relationship with the City of Portland was magnified by 
several factors: their own inexperience, the novelty of the federal program, and the 
fact that new development in Inner North/Northeast Portland, especially that 
sponsored by a black community organization, was a new phenomenon. The 
institutions were not in place to facilitate this re-development, and each side of the 
debate (local and federal governments, community organization, banks) did not have a 
roadmap or precedent to follow. NECDC already had the grant in hand when they 
went to negotiate for construction loans with local lenders. The lenders were still in 
the process of re-educating themselves about the requirements of the Community 
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Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) – and 
were definitely lagging in Portland because the recent localized recession had further 
reduced lending. There was an expectation on NECDC’s part that they would be 
granted the loans because of the nature and scope of the project, but the lenders did not 
have guidelines or parameters for lending construction funding without clear 
permanent financing set in place or for the requirements of an untested Federal 
program (Frater interview: 24-25).57 What emerged from this initial consortium of 
banks lending to CDCs for larger scale development projects was the formation of the 
Network of Affordable Housing (NOAH). This permanent consortium of lenders 
reduced the overall risk to the individual banks, streamlined the banks’ education 
process, and assisted with meeting CRA requirements (Frater interview: 14). The 
creation of an institution like NOAH certainly facilitated the financing for later 
projects, but increased the time required to put together NECDC’s project financing.  
When the organization did start to produce units, neither the pace nor the 
number of units produced met the initial expectations of either HUD or the 
organization (Figure 4-1; Rollins, 1991b, 1992b).  NECDC had chosen to phase the 
project for a number of reasons: land availability, lending issues, and organizational 
capacity. NECDC’s constructing smaller of scale urban infill projects that were phased 
over a number of years was consistent with other Nehemiah project proposals; it is 
perhaps a critique of HUD’s attempt to replicate the EBC model in less dense urban 
areas (Phipps, Heintz, and Franke: 4-17). When NECDC ended its Nehemiah project 
                                                
57 As part of construction financing, permanent loans such as homebuyer mortgages need to be in place 
before the terms of construction financing can be agreed to; hence, the phasing of a project reduces the 
risk for the lender and creates a revolving pool of money that a developer can access as needed. 
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in 1997, after 2 extensions from HUD, it fell 90 units short of its initial projections of 
250 units (Kafoury, 1996; NECDC, 1990).58  
 
Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; NECDC, 1997-2000 
 
The organization’s learning curve, lack of continued availability of developable 
property, and financing issues were to blame for this shortfall – factors that could have 
been mitigated had the organization, Multnomah County, and Portland’s lending 
community had the capacity to complete the project more quickly. The costs for 
NECDC’s Nehemiah were scrutinized at both local and national levels. While 
                                                
58 This chart includes the Nehemiah units, as well as other rental and for-sale units developed. 1997’s 
unit production includes the construction of the 55 unit Gladys McCoy Apartments.  
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NECDC was spending $57,000 - $81,000 per unit on the houses, the average price for 
a Nehemiah house (nationwide) was $53,000 (Kiyomura, 1994).59 
 NECDC’s early homes, while significantly more costly than their original 
proposal, were viewed as “Cadillacs” by some funders because they contained 
relatively higher end finishes, appliances and light fixtures when compared with other 
concurrent affordable housing projects (McNamara interview: 13); however, the 
quality of the exterior materials was substantially less and has not fared well over 
time. The decision not to skimp on the appliances and finishes was a conscious one. In 
order to make the units more attractive to buyers, Walker felt that the inclusion of 
better quality items would not only market the units better, but would also save the 
homeowners money in the long run with lower maintenance and replacement costs 
(Holden interview: 7). In addition, as this was NECDC’s signature project, it was 
important to them to include the best quality fittings possible. While buyers liked the 
appliance and finish upgrades, one of the issues that they were disappointed with was 
the size and layout of the units (Phipps et al: 4-13). In contrast to some of the older 
houses in the area, NECDC’s new construction houses were smaller (and located on 
smaller lots in several cases) and had open floor plans to make them feel more 
spacious. This contrast has plagued developers of infill housing, especially affordable 
                                                
59 There was no mention in the article whether the size of NECDC’s homes was comparable to national 
averages – this would have a huge bearing on the overall construction costs; however, federal 
guidelines stipulate that the houses should be approximately 1200 SF. NECDC’s 4 new construction 
models averaged 1250 SF each, with an option for a finished attic on 1 model for an additional 216 SF 
(portlandmaps.com). In their Nehemiah Grant application, Neureuther specified that the average 
development cost/home would be $62, 555 (NECDC, 1990). 
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infill, and since NECDC’s project was a very high profile and novel endeavor, it drew 
a lot of attention to its assets and its flaws (NECDC, 1994). 
 One of Jaki Walker’s personal goals with the Nehemiah project was the 
inclusion of neighborhood and minority contractors on the project (Phipps et al: 4-16). 
Because many of these contractors were small and inexperienced, the cost of their 
inclusion was higher for both the organization and the actual building process. Much 
time was required to assist them with the required paperwork and scheduling 
coordination that was required on a publicly funded project, and, as small contractors, 
these participants were not able to take advantage of the competitive pricing afforded 
to larger and more experienced firms.  While this may have been more costly for the 
units, the value in neighborhood economic development was unprecedented (Talton 
interview: 4). 
Concurrent with NECDC’s predevelopment work on the Nehemiah project, 
Portland’s local architects were busy working on a competition for affordable housing 
designs. The American Institute of Architects (AIA) Portland chapter sponsored the 
Essential Housing Competition, a competition that stressed respecting neighborhood 
context for infill housing design. NECDC was drawn to the idea of design 
compatibility, and the group selected 3 different designs from the competition’s 
entries as the basis for its new single family and attached housing (Perlman, 1991a, 
1991b). Each of the architects donated their services to NECDC, thereby eliminating 
all of the design fees associated with the project. By selecting a total 4 models (3 from 
the Essential Housing Competition and 1 from a Competition participant) for 130 units 
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of new construction, NECDC was also able to realize significant efficiencies in 
construction through the repetition of floor plans and the bulk purchasing of items like 
windows, cabinetry, and flooring (Perlman, 1991).  
One of the highest profile phases of the Nehemiah development was the 
Walnut Park development. 18 units of housing were located on 2 blocks of NE 
Roselawn St, formerly known as “Crack Alley” and built just after the completion of 
the PDC funded Walnut Park shopping center, new NE police precinct, and the 
Portland Trailblazers Boys and Girls Club. Completed in 1996, this phase of the 
Nehemiah development was a particular showcase for NECDC because of the award 
winning designs and its proximity to other city sponsored development.  
Figure 4-2 
Walnut Park Nehemiah Housing 
 
 
NE Roselawn St., Photo by Author 
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Figure 4-3 
Nehemiah Houses over Time 
 
  
1995 (Bruner Award Application) 
 
2009, Photo by Author 
 
 The most compelling reason for delays in the Nehemiah projects stems from 
appraisal issues with new construction. HUD’s appraisers valued the houses 
significantly below the loan amounts and were inconsistent with other projects and 
sales occurring in the area at that time (Kafoury, 1992). Executive Director Jaki 
Walker referred to these exceptionally low appraisals as an extension of racism, and 
buyers were not able to complete their purchases.  HUD manager Richard Brinck 
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defended his agency’s appraisal methods as purely reliant on local comparable sales 
(Kafoury had disagreed with this assessment), but Walker accused the agency of 
perpetuating its practices of redlining, as HUD’s appraisers were basing their numbers 
on existing homes, rather than new construction homes (Lane, 1992b). These tensions 
played out in the media and resulted in Walker and her board writing letters to Senator 
Mark Hatfield, and Representatives AuCoin and Wyden. City Commissioner Gretchen 
Kafoury admonished Brink: 
I would simply comment that redlining was not solely the work of the 
banks. Your department, as well as the government that I represent, 
was part of the problem. If we did not proactively engage in relining 
activities, we certainly had access to the market data and other 
information that showed that they were happening (Kafoury, 1992). 
 
Ultimately HUD revised their appraisal numbers to match the construction 
costs of the new homes (Lane, 1992b). While the appearance of redlining based on 
economics (low neighborhood housing prices that had been a result of historical racist 
practices) rather than race struck a nerve with the organization, the fact that they were 
able to mobilize the political capital to compel HUD to change their original numbers 
to conform to the new situation was a victory for the both NECDC and the previously 
redlined neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Lane, 1992b).  
When NECDC completed their last house in 1997, home prices in the Boise, 
King, Vernon, and Humboldt neighborhoods had climbed significantly, a sign of 
neighborhood improvement that was both beneficial and problematic for the 
organization: beneficial in the sense that they had accomplished their task of creating 
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wealth – people who had bought Nehemiah houses were gaining equity in their homes, 
and problematic in that new development opportunities were becoming scarcer.60 
One of Jaki Walker’s goals with the Nehemiah program was to qualify as 
many families from the immediate neighborhoods as homebuyers, with a special 
emphasis on African American families (Malloy interview: 3). NECDC’s outreach 
programs attempted to contact 5,000 interested parties in order to find 250 qualified 
buyers (Rollins, 1991a). Their first buyers were a counselor at Woodlawn Elementary 
and a young family from the neighborhood, who were sidetracked by the HUD 
appraisal difficulties; however, by 1994, another 25 families had moved into their 
houses, and another 30 had been qualified (Leeson, 1994; Rollins, 1992b). NECDC 
also partnered with Emanuel Hospital’s Neighborhood Home Ownership Program, 
whereby Emanuel employees are eligible for subsidized loans to purchase houses in 
the immediate neighborhoods (Rashad, 1995). NECDC also worked with the Portland 
Housing Center and sponsored many homebuyer fairs and open houses in order to 
attract potential buyers; however, this was a monumental task from the beginning – to 
attract potential buyers, especially first-time homebuyers, in a neighborhood whose 
residents were low-income and often had poor credit histories (Malloy interview: 3). 
The outreach required to find and qualify potential buyers consumed much of 
NECDC’s resources at that time (NECDC, 1990; NECDC, 1997).  
 In 1997, NECDC had a relatively large staff (12 people) and high overhead 
expenses (Figure 4-4) that exceeded their revenue. The Nehemiah grant was 
completed, and other opportunities for a similar type of development were not 
                                                
60 Median home prices in Portland rose 22% between January and October  (Lalley, 1995). 
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forthcoming. In addition, NECDC had lost its operating support funding from the City 
of Portland and the Meyer Memorial Trust, so that when Channa Grace, a housing  
Figure 4-4 
NECDC Organizational Revenue and Expenses 1997-2000 
 
Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000 
developer with The One Company in Los Angeles, was looking for a non-profit to 
partner with on a large rental housing development that she was proposing on NE 
Martin Luther King Blvd between NE Skidmore and NE Going Streets, Jaki Walker 
welcomed the new venture (Kafoury, 1996). She saw the opportunity for a large 
developer fee that could sustain the organization and the cash flow that would be 
realized by entering into the rental housing business.  What she did not foresee was the 
complexity of the development and the resulting conflict that it would cause with her 
board. The result of this partnership was the Gladys McCoy Apartments, a 55 unit 
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apartment complex with many larger family units whose target population was 
families with 30-50% of MFI, per the City of Portland’s shift in policy to target more 
of its funding towards housing for lower income families (Office of the City Auditor: 
6). The development consisted of eight buildings along NE Martin Luther King Jr 
Blvd, with small commercial spaces at the north and south corners of NE Prescott 
Street. The corner spaces housed a shared space for tenants, an often-closed computer 
center, a coffee shop, and the complex’s management offices. The buildings on the 
south side of Prescott had ground floor residential units that faced MLK. These units 
had small windows on the MLK side to maintain privacy for the residents that created 
a blank wall along the street side.  
Figure 4-5 
Gladys McCoy Apartments 
 
 
 www.Googlemaps.com 
One of the reasons for the minimal inclusion of commercial spaces was the 
project financing. HUD would not include the costs of the commercial spaces in its 
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financing package, so that the commercial development had to be a completely 
separate deal with its own financing package, even though it was part of the apartment 
building. As HOF staff had discovered when developing the Alberta Simmons Plaza, 
adding this level of complexity to the development caused many headaches for staff, 
contractors, and other funders (Cross interview: 3; Hortsch, 1999a). The result was 
that the mixed-use development took longer than anticipated to complete, its 
apartments were difficult to rent, and neighbors were not necessarily pleased with its 
outcome. In addition, the inclusion of a minimal number of commercial spaces 
encouraged more purely residential construction along MLK, an outcome that PDC 
did not necessarily support (Rubenstein, 1999).  
NECDC’s development of the Gladys McCoy Village rankled board member 
Carl Talton; Talton was also on the board of PDC and had worked hard to focus 
commercial uses along MLK. That particular section of NE MLK Blvd had been 
included in the extension of the Convention Center Urban Renewal Area so that the 
area would be eligible for improvements funded by Tax Increment Financing (TIF).61 
In addition to sitting on NECDC’s board, Talton also sat on the board of PDC and had 
played a key role in extending the Urban Renewal Area (URA) to include NE MLK, 
NE Alberta, and NE Killingsworth. Talton also was a board member of the N/NE 
Economic Development Alliance (The Alliance). While PDC was charged with 
administering the Urban Renewal Improvements, The Alliance had played a 
significant role in the re-zoning of MLK Blvd to an “EX” designation in order to take 
                                                
61 For an in-depth discussion of Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing, see Wollner et al (2003).  
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advantage of Urban Renewal development (Holden interview: 3).62 Talton felt that 
NECDC’s development of the Gladys McCoy apartments undermined the efforts of 
both the Alliance and PDC to create a mixed-use district that focused on employment 
opportunities (Talton interview: 10).  
With the completion of the Gladys McCoy and few opportunities for low-
income housing development in Inner North/Northeast Portland left, Walker and her 
staff set out on a more entrepreneurial path. Geo Development was created to develop 
market rate housing in the target neighborhoods to take advantage of the gentrification 
that was beginning to happen there. The intention was for the profits from the market 
rate housing to be plowed back into NECDC; these profits did not materialize as Geo 
Development attempted to develop a piece of property in NE Portland adjacent to the 
Columbia River. The development became mired down in environmental issues, and 
city approvals were delayed for more than two years. Subsequently, Geo Development 
became a financial burden for the organization, rather than a contributor (Rubenstein, 
1999). 
In part due to the work of State Senator Avel Gordly, NECDC got into the 
lumber business in the late 1990s. Senator Gordly’s work with Senator Ted Ferrioli in 
1998 garnered NECDC a donation of lumber from OCHO Lumber, a constituent of 
Ferrioli’s  for the construction of a duplex in NE Portland (Hortsch, 1999b). At the 
same time, Walker had met David Kaunda, the son of Zambia’s deputy minister for 
                                                
62 The zoning designation Ex allows for a number of different uses, although the intent is for more 
commercial and industrial uses. Residential uses are allowed, but are not intended to predominate or set 
development standards for other uses in the area. For more information, see: 
http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=28197&a=53298  
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minerals and mining at a World Affairs Council Meeting. As a result of this meeting, 
Walker proposed a joint venture with Kaunda’s lumber company in Zambia and led 
two month-long trade delegations, whose participants included Senator Gordly, to 
Zambia to explore the potential of acquiring lumber and saw mills in exchange for 
technology development (Rubenstein, 1999). BHCD staff back in Portland were 
“incredulous” about the idea of investing in sawmills in Africa and at the amount of 
money spent on the trade delegations (Rudman interview: 8; Sten interview: 10). 
Walker admitted that the idea was farfetched but continued to defend the venture; 
however, NECDC’s board eventually “got cold feet” and pulled out of the 
negotiations, but not before the group had spent most of its nest egg from the sales of 
the Nehemiah houses (Rubenstein, 1999). 
Further upheaval, and poor press, occurred when both Walker and deputy 
director Sondra Price moved into NECDC houses constructed for low-income 
families, even though their salaries were far above the Income Requirements. Walker 
defended the moves in a letter to Steve Rudman: 
The employees at Nike are encouraged to purchase Nike footwear and 
apparel. The employees of Ford won a Ford vehicle, and the employees 
of Nordstrom wear Nordstrom’s apparel… In our case, offering 
NECDC-built homes for sale to NECDC employees makes the same 
statement (Rubenstein, 1999). 
 
Walker resigned soon thereafter, and NECDC never recovered from its loss of 
capital in either the Geo Development endeavor in NE Portland or the Zambia saw 
mill debacle, as both its revenue and development opportunities were drying up 
quickly (Figure 4-6; Figure 4-7), and its reputation as a neighborhood based 
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development organization was eroded to a point where it could no longer count on 
foundation and philanthropic support. 
Figure 4-6 
NECDC Revenue from Developer Fees and Home Sales 1993-2000 
 
Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000 
In 1999, the Enterprise Foundation’s Management and Organizational Development 
Division conducted a series of audits on the CDCs that it funded. The results of this 
audit showed that, because of its declining cash flow (see Figure 4-4; Figure 4-6), 
NECDC “appear(ed) to be in serious financial difficulty” (The Enterprise 
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999). 
 Soon thereafter, the merger discussions between the 5 CDCs based in the 
central neighborhoods of Inner North/NE Portland began, and NECDC quickly 
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dropped out of the talks, because of its debts (Rudman interview: 7). It had reduced its 
staff from 12 to 1 over a period of 2 years; its revenues and grant income were less 
than 1/6 of what they had been 4 years prior; and the group was saddled with the 
accrued debt of carrying costs for the last of its for sale homes (Oliver, 2000a; 
NECDC, 1999). While its board chair Jess McKinley was still somewhat optimistic, 
then-Housing Commissioner Erik Sten and BHCD Director Steve Rudman “pulled the 
plug” (Oliver, 2000b; Rudman interview: 8).  
Figure 4-7 
NECDC Revenue from Grants 1993-2000 
 
Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000 
 On August 31, 2000 NECDC closed its doors. It had 11 remaining unsold 
houses with a debt of $1.2 million that were turned back over to the mortgage holders, 
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its City of Portland and Enterprise Foundation funding had ceased completely earlier 
that year, and the rudderless agency was “out of gas” (Oliver, 2000b; NECDC, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 5. 
CASE STUDY 2: FRANCISCAN ENTERPRISE OF OREGON 
 
 
 
 The mission of St Francis is one of service to all; Franciscans espouse charity 
and humility and honor these values with good works, “to live life in solidarity with 
those in need” (Schraw quoting Fr. Matt Tumulty, 1992). In 1987, Franciscan 
Enterprise of Oregon was born out of an effort, based on these principles, to bring 
together parishioners from mainly white, upper middle class southwest Portland 
Catholic parishes. Inspired by a priest from Inner Northeast Portland’s St Andrew’s 
Church, a group of volunteers came together to acquire and renovate existing houses 
to rent to very low-income families in the poor neighborhoods of Inner North and 
Northeast Portland. These volunteers brought a host of specific skills with them that 
were connected to construction, development, and finance (Purcell interview: 3).  
The original intent of the organization was to attract and mobilize a small and 
consistent group of volunteers who would partner with churches in Inner 
North/Northeast Portland to form a broader network of volunteers, much like the 
Habitat for Humanity model. This network would undertake housing renovation 
projects as a means of good works – it was about “the transformative nature of this 
kind of work … it was a way to open their eyes” (DelSavio interview: 2). Early 
endeavors to partner with North/Northeast Portland churches on work parties worked 
well. Primarily black congregations from neighborhood churches would turn out in 
force to work on Saturdays to work with the suburban parishes, but cultural 
differences, and the fact that the white suburbanites were bankrolling the organization, 
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precluded these partnerships from becoming a mainstay of the organization (Purcell 
interview: 2). These differences, and the inability to overcome them, were some of the 
inherent obstacles that Franciscan would face in attempting to integrate themselves 
into the neighborhoods in which they worked.  
Franciscan Enterprise was the only truly church-based volunteer organization 
among the CDCs that were active in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast 
Portland. Its first director, Father Matt Tumulty, was the parish priest whose 
inspiration initiated the group and was well known and liked in the community 
(Simmons interview: 9). Father Matt ‘s “focus was on the transformative nature of 
(volunteer) work” (DelSavio interview: 2).  The organizational mission statement 
emphasized Franciscan’s “commitment to people, not programs buildings or projects” 
(Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). Like NECDC, the housing production was a bonus, but 
not the primary reason for the organization’s existence. 
The work party model, while the mainstay of Franciscan’s existence, was not 
the most effective means of engaging neighborhood residents and working towards 
being a community based organization.  The work parties, or “volunteer blitzes, “ 
swooped in on Saturdays and then left for 6 days; as a result, some neighbors became 
resentful of this technique and questioned the real purpose of the organization – to 
provide affordable housing or to assuage the guilt of wealthy parishioners (Kowalczyk 
interview: 11). In addition, the stop and start nature of the work-party renovations was 
neither an effective nor an efficient way to complete the projects – and subsequently 
Franciscan’s board realized “that it could not justify its existence (and public funding) 
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if we were doing maybe 2 houses a year” (DelSavio interview: 16, Kowalczyk 
interview: 4). As Franciscan took on larger and more complex projects, work parties 
began to have a smaller role in the organization’s mission and practice, although 
volunteers continued to be utilized for landscaping and demolition (Warner interview: 
8). 
The parishioners who participated in the work parties were not necessarily 
without judgment. Class differences were readily apparent, as parishioners often felt 
that they were “on safari in the ghetto” (Warner interview: 12). At one such work 
party, parishioners were overheard complaining that the tenants were lazy and had no 
sense of pride in their houses and wondering aloud why the tenants were not doing the 
yard work themselves, while the tenants were within earshot.  In addition, staff were 
required to attend the work parties, without comp time, a fact that some resented 
(Warner interview: 13). 
Franciscan’s first project was a house near St Andrew’s on NE 8th between 
Wygant and Alberta. While the renovation process was protracted, the project was 
completed and rented to a low-income family in about a year (Purcell interview: 1). 
Franciscan’s first tenant, a single mother with 5 children, was subsequently evicted 
after a year for nonpayment of rent; at that point, the house was in such a state of 
disrepair that it required many more Saturdays of volunteer work to make it habitable 
again. It was at this point that the group decided to form a CDC to separate themselves 
and their charitable mission of community service from the more complex and 
demanding job of managing rental housing for very low-income tenants (Purcell 
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interview: 1). Franciscan Enterprise gained its nonprofit status in 1987 and proceeded 
to expand slowly in three stages: the early volunteer-oriented years (1987-1993) that 
were led by the board and Fr. Matt Tumulty, the middle growth-oriented years (1993-
1996) that were led by Jerry Lindsay and Tom DelSavio where the group 
professionalized and took on larger projects, and the later, internally chaotic years 
(1997-2000) that were led by Karen Voiss. 
Soon after its incorporation, the group procured, renovated, and rented a 
second house around the corner from St Andrew’s. During the renovation work parties 
for this house, radio talk show host Lars Larson took notice of the group, because he 
owned a rental house around the corner on NE Wygant; soon after the completion of 
the second house in 1988, Franciscan Enterprise bought that house from Larson for 
$22,000 (www.portlandmaps.com). With three houses in their portfolio and newly 
acquired 501(c)(3) status, Fr. Matt attended the NPF training sessions for emerging 
CDCs, in spite of the fact that he was conflicted about the apparent cross purposes of 
establishing a housing development corporation with the volunteer driven model that 
he had begun (Sohl interview: 8). While Fr. Matt completed the trainings and wrote 
the group’s business plan with its board, he was not fully engaged with the process of 
growing an organization and increasing its capacity to undertake new and larger 
development projects, as was expected of the groups who participated in the training 
sessions (McNamara interview: 5). Even as the group obtained 14 more houses that 
had been slated for demolition in conjunction with the renovation of the Roseway Fred 
Meyer grocery store into a Safeway, Fr. Matt began to distance himself from the 
 113 
organization and left much of the work on these projects up to the board (Purcell 
interview: 2). 
 These 14 structures, acquired in 1992, were relocated to vacant lots in the 
King neighborhood that had been procured from Multnomah County’s Tax 
Foreclosure program (Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). This was a complex project that 
required multiple levels of financing, planning, and construction expertise that delayed 
the project for well over a year (Rudman, 1993). There had been very little 
neighborhood outreach, and neighbors were surprised when one Saturday morning “14 
houses get plopped on the neighborhood”; the empty structures were surrounded by 
chain link fencing and became a magnet for criminal activity, the most infamous 
incident being the dumping of a murdered woman’s body under one of the structures 
as it sat up on blocks (DelSavio interview: 7). Seven of the fourteen houses sat vacant 
and seemingly forgotten for several months while the Franciscan board worked on a 
financing package before any construction activity began, and were the source of 
much neighborhood frustration (but little action) with group; however, at that time, the 
neighbors were not organized enough to force Franciscan into quicker action, even 
though the organization operated often at cross purposes with neighbors (DelSavio 
interview: 27).63 What did force Franciscan to speed up their development timetables, 
though, were the demands of public agencies and banks. The 14 houses were a larger 
scale development than Franciscan had previously completed and highlighted the need 
for the organization needed to update its development model. As a result, Franciscan 
                                                
63 Franciscan volunteers completed the renovation of 4 houses during 1992-1993, and 3 more by May of 
1994 (Franciscan Enterprise Annual Report, 1993-1994). 
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adopted a more professional model by hiring new leadership (Kowalczyk interview: 
6). 
In 1994, the organization hired Jerry Lindsay and Tom DelSavio as co-
executive directors and Bill Kowalczyk as construction manager. DelSavio and 
Kowalczyk were instrumental in moving Franciscan Enterprise from a volunteer 
organization to a professional housing development corporation. On the finance side 
of development, DelSavio was able to access “nun money,” funds from the Sisters of 
Charity, Sisters of Loreto, and Sisters of St Francis orders that were used as 
Franciscan’s equity contribution to development projects (Franciscan Enterprise, 
1994; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997). As DelSavio explains, “ these were 
groups of nuns … who traditionally loaned money to community development credit 
unions… these loans were 3-5 years, with the understanding that if you were good 
users of their money, and the program was still consistent with their values, they 
would renew your loan.” The loans were typically 2-3% interest rates for loans of 
$25,000 – 50, 000 (DelSavio interview: 30). DelSavio prized this relationship that he 
had established in his previous work in Eastern Kentucky as a cornerstone of the 
Franciscan’s mission and worked diligently to maintain it (DelSavio interview: 29). In 
terms of organizational capacity, access to these funds allowed Franciscan to begin to 
develop its first new construction project, a multi-family housing complex (8 units at 
Killingsworth Court seen below) and to serve a broader population by partnering with 
a local mental health care provider.   
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Figure 5-1 
Killingsworth Court 
 
 
Photo by Author 
On the construction side of development, Franciscan’s board initially 
encouraged Bill Kowalczyk, the construction manager, to manage the volunteer work 
party system; however, the coordination of the volunteer labor consumed a significant 
amount of Kowalczyk’s time and caused him to question the efficacy of that model 
when the group was faced with the responsibilities that surrounded the ownership of 
houses in need of renovation (Kowalczyk interview: 4). The intent was that “by using 
volunteers, you could keep the cost down, and you could keep your costs down by 
doing the minimum work required…”  - this model ended up costing more money and 
more time than using professional contractors (Kowalczyk interview: 3). Kowalczyk 
remembers “trying to move the board to its mission to being more involved in what 
was needed in the neighborhood, than making the volunteers feel like they had a good 
volunteer experience; I felt like that was too weighted in the interest of servicing the 
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interests of the volunteers, not the interests of the neighborhood” (Kowalczyk 
interview: 4). 
This situation was both the cause and the result of one of the organization’s 
biggest conundrums: the use of volunteer labor created a long and drawn out 
development process, and drained resources that could otherwise be spent on creating 
better quality housing; however, the volunteer model is what made this organization 
unique. This uniqueness diminished as projects got larger and demanded a more 
professional approach, a task that Kowalczyk achieved, but not without cost to the 
organization’s mission.  
Franciscan Enterprise also struggled with its image as a neighborhood outsider 
throughout its existence. The disparities between the skill sets of the board members 
who were from outside of the neighborhood and those who lived in the neighborhood 
were quite stark.  The board members who did live in the neighborhood “didn’t have 
backgrounds in housing, and … were figureheads from the neighborhood, not true 
participants with real power and the sort of skills to make the organization based 
there” (Kowalczyk interview: 5). The neighborhood resident women board members 
tended to be low-income and black, while the other board members were mostly 
wealthy and white. For a number of years, too, the two neighborhood based board 
members were also women. Alberta Simmons, one of the neighborhood board 
members, characterized most of the members Franciscan’s board as “good old boys,” 
white men who translated many of the top-down, paternalistic qualities of the Catholic 
Church into their work in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Simmons interview: 9). The 
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role of race and gender differences contributed to a power imbalance that assured that 
Franciscan Enterprise would fully integrate itself into the communities in which it 
operated.  
The fact that Franciscan was not considered a CHDO (Community Housing 
Development Organization as defined by HUD) and therefore was not eligible for 
HOME funds for housing development, limited the organization’s housing 
development opportunities. Franciscan had missed out on a considerable number of 
funding opportunities without the CHDO funds, but more importantly had not built up 
the political capital in its neighborhoods, so that it was not considered an 
indispensable part of the community.64 While Franciscan had provided tenant services 
and focused on building the skills of its residents, it had failed to truly incorporate 
itself into the community; in fact, Franciscan’s budgets did not have a specific line 
item for neighborhood outreach (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000). HOF, 
through its neighborhood liaison staff members, Sabin, by virtue of its membership, 
and PCRI by the shear volume of housing that it owned, all had huge stakes in their 
neighborhoods. This was not apparent for Franciscan, especially in the later 1990s 
when the work parties, their greatest potential for community building, became fewer 
and further between. As the work party emphasis of the organization decreased, so did 
any specific outreach to neighborhood churches (Purcell interview: 9).  
                                                
64 The main criterion for a CHDO that Franciscan did not meet was that 1/3 of its board membership 
was not low income and did not necessarily represent the community in which it worked. For more 
information, please see: 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/materials/factsheets/CHDO.pdf 
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The board members from outside the North/Northeast neighborhoods saw their 
community participation differently: they strongly identified themselves as “working” 
board members, and their participation in construction work parties, real estate 
acquisition, development and finance was evidence of their skill sets (Purcell 
interview: 6). The “working board” members wrote grant proposals, organized 
neighborhood activities, and were the backbone of the Saturday work parties (Purcell 
interview: 4; Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). This approach changed, though, as the 
organization professionalized and the board became less hands-on, as staff took on 
responsibility for project finance and development and assumed the role of liaisons to 
PDC and BHCD (Warner interview p. 12).  
Franciscan’s challenges with property management were evident as the 
organization took on larger and more sophisticated development projects. Franciscan’s 
early guiding principles included providing “housing for  (very low-income) people 
until they got up on their feet” (DelSavio interview: 18; Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). 
Even as the organization matured, the group did not have systems in place to govern 
rental rates and procedures, and “no one had a plan to say you’re in for a year, then 
we’re going to review your income, then we’re going to kick you out” (DelSavio 
interview: 18). This lack of systems development was a reflection of the disparate and 
idealistic views of the board (that tenants would have the opportunity to increase their 
incomes and want to move on) and the realities of poverty and lack of opportunity for 
residents of Inner North/Northeast Portland. Franciscan’s mission was set up to serve 
very low-income families, those whose incomes were below 50% of area median; they 
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were to pay 30% of their income in rent, with Franciscan absorbing the remaining debt 
through different grants and donations (Schraw, 1992, Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). 
 Rental income was inconsistent at best: former Executive Director Tom 
DelSavio remembers that the organization’s rental income was inconsequential to the 
livelihood of the organization, in part because the “financing of these things allowed 
people to go months on end without paying their rent, there was little if any debt on 
any these … 2 or 3 houses (in the early days)” (DelSavio interview: 2).  With such lax 
self-regulation and unpredictable rental income, Franciscan was only able to continue 
to function in the early years because its rental properties had very little debt service 
and the fact that development projects were fairly easy to come by.  DelSavio and 
Lindsay succeeded in putting some systems in place to ensure that the organization 
would be able to collect rents, pay its bills, and develop new properties, but they 
continued to struggle with the day to day issues of property management. The realities 
of the complexity of the management of a small, scattered site, single-family house 
portfolio were apparent in simple chores like mowing lawns.  
It was the cost and the logistics of who is going to cut the grass; we can’t 
afford a professional landscaper, so we have some neighborhood guy who 
does it, and there’s issues of worker’s comp, and if you had a particularly 
concerned board member who is worried about being sued, you have these 
long conversations about Jim could cut the grass, but he’s a disabled 
person, and so do we want him cutting the grass, and are we paying him 
under the table, he’s not an employee, a little thing like cutting a patch of 
grass, 3 feet by 20 feet in  front of the house became this long drawn out 
conversation, and they got multiplied because you ended up making the 
decisions based on the particular tenant in that particular house.  Property 
management was huge, and again because the rents were so low you 
couldn’t afford a property management company, when in fact that’s 
probably what you wanted.  
DelSavio interview: 25. 
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The staff time spent on property management exceeded the rental income realized 
– a model that was only sustainable at a certain level of organizational 
development and at a time when neighborhood property values were very low.  
Property management demands a unique, and sometimes adversarial, 
relationship between tenants and landlords. Franciscan, like the other 
organizations in the neighborhood, encountered several problems, both internal 
and external, with the management of the properties it developed. Franciscan 
Enterprise had a particularly difficult time being property managers because of its 
charitable mission to create shelter and its naïveté about the responsibilities of 
owning rental property. Franciscan was “wanting to do all this other grandiose 
sort of community building, but I think we were really bad (at being) landlords, 
none of us wanted to play the bad guy…” (DelSavio interview: 6). 
While the property management was an ongoing struggle, the construction side 
of the organization was catalyzed by with the hiring of a professional contractor. Bill 
Kowalczyk had been seeking “more meaningful construction employment” and 
endeavored to produce high quality housing for Franciscan Enterprise. He oversaw the 
completion of the rehabilitation of the remaining 8 of the 14 Fred Meyer houses in 
under two years and began work on the Killingsworth Court project (8 units of special 
needs housing developed in partnership with Cascade Behavioral Health services), one 
of Franciscan’s two new construction projects (Kowalczyk interview: 2). Just prior to 
DelSavio and Lindsay’s departure, Kowalczyk and DelSavio initiated the acquisition 
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and re-development of the Texas Lounge on Alberta St into the Maggie Gibson 
Apartments. 
This move towards a professionalization was undermined when Lindsey and 
DelSavio decided leave Franciscan, and the board hired Karen Voiss, a former 
volunteer with the organization who had no formal training in either property or 
organizational management or property development (Warner interview: 2).65 Voiss 
had come to the organization as a volunteer, “started working with the board, and 
within a very short period of time, the board only talked with Karen … they relied on 
Karen for all the information flow back and forth between the board and staff.” The 
staff was very upset with this situation, so that after DelSavio and Lindsey had left and 
the board went through a hiring process, the staff protested their lack of input. In spite 
of these protests, the Board hired Voiss as Executive Director, and the remaining staff, 
including Kowalczyk, all quit.66 As a result, Voiss’s first order of business was to hire 
an entirely new staff. Staff upheaval was an ongoing issue during Voiss’s tenure as 
Executive Director – the staff that she hired all quit within 18 months of being hired 
(Warner interview: 2-3). This conflict and resulting lack of continuity or overlap of 
staff members contributed to a certain level of disorganization at Franciscan that made 
it a necessary participant in the merger process (DelSavio interview: 4). 
 
 
                                                
65 DelSavio left because he needed to earn more money. He remembers that his children were entering 
school, and he wanted a full time job, so that he could afford to buy a house (DelSavio interview: 15).  
Lindsey was not interviewed.  
66 Voiss declined to be interviewed, and Purcell declined to discuss this issue, as he considered it a 
confidential personnel matter.  
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Figure 5-2 
Purcell Building 
 
  
Photo by author 
 
If the “Fred Meyer” houses were the turning point for Franciscan Enterprise, 
then the Maggie Gibson Plaza was its downfall. The former Texas Lounge building 
was located at NE 17th and NE Alberta; it was a large two-story building with a rich 
and jaded history. Bill Kowalczyk remembers the Royal Esquire Club – a social club 
that catered to mostly older black neighbors – as a welcoming place; the Royal 
Esquire was supplanted by the Texas Two, or Texas Lounge, a seedy bar considered a 
“neighborhood danger zone, often sprayed with gunfire and a central spot for criminal 
activity” (Kowalczyk interview: 8-9; Levine, 1997).  The building’s renovation into 
the Maggie Gibson Plaza mixed-use project entailed significant design, construction, 
and building code challenges and, more importantly, a complex financing package. 
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The development includes two commercial buildings with offices and nine apartments 
upstairs and a duplex that has seen both commercial and residential uses. Acquired in 
1996, the building’s renovations were not completed until 2000 (Leeson, 2000). 
Figure 5-3a 
Maggie Gibson Plaza 
 
 
  NE Alberta St between NE 16th and NE 17th, (www.portlandmaps.com) 
 
Figure 5-3b 
Maggie Gibson Plaza 
 
 
       Photo by the Author 
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This project was the last development that Franciscan Enterprise completed, 
was stalled by Voiss’s inexperience with development, as the rest of the organization 
was in “melt down” (Sohl interview: 10). This project was particularly complex 
because it required two different financing packages, one for the ground floor 
commercial spaces, and one for the rental apartments because it was receiving 
subsidies for the apartments (Warner interview: 15).  
Because Franciscan had no experience in commercial or mixed use 
development, Warner had commissioned local developer Eric Wentland to complete a 
market study and business plan for the building to include retail and restaurant uses on 
the ground floor. Since Franciscan had been struggling to put together a finance 
package that included realistic costs for the mixed use project, Wentland specified the 
construction requirements and their associated costs, but the plan “never saw the light 
of day … Karen glommed on to all the copies, and it disappeared” (Warner interview: 
5). Voiss apparently insisted on sticking with unrealistic numbers and layouts for the 
buildings, but was determined to show some kind of progress on the building. Without 
building permits, Voiss authorized the demolition of the 2nd floor apartments 
(including the accidental removal of structural walls) by volunteer work parties prior 
to the closing on construction loans (Warner interview: 15). The completion of a 
financing package for the building was delayed for 2 years, due to Voiss’s inability to 
reconcile real costs for construction and development, oversee realistic redesign work, 
and put together a financing package; hence, the timeline for the completion of the 
buildings dragged out over a four year period of time, just as the Alberta St Corridor 
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Plan was being enacted, and developers like Roslyn Hill were positioning themselves 
to take advantage of city led improvements, ones that Franciscan was not able to 
access due to the delayed development schedule (Levine, 1997; Sohl interview: 9; 
Warner interview: 5). As a result of the time consuming missteps, Franciscan was 
weakened as an organization.   
Because of its small size, the organization needed the developer fees associated 
with small and medium sized housing development projects to maintain cash flow and 
thrive as an organization. The fact that the surrounding neighborhood was beginning 
to gentrify made these development opportunities both more elusive and more 
expensive, and Franciscan Enterprise had missed their chance for a more stable 
organizational cash flow from the rents associated with the Maggie Gibson.  
In addition, this lack of either consistent or larger scale development activity 
hampered the organization because of the need for PDC’s recognition that the 
organization was meeting benchmarks for growth and merited continued funding (the 
Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999; 
Warner interview: 9). As seen in Figure 5-4, Franciscan’s early housing production 
was very slow, because it was based on the volunteer work party renovation model. 
With the renovation of the 14 “Fred Meyer” houses, its production significantly 
increased between 1993 and 1995. However, it was the acquisition of the LIHPRHA 
properties beginning in 1996 that significantly increased Franciscan’s portfolio, but 
also put them in the position where their management responsibilities surpassed both 
their organizational capacity and their cash flow. Franciscan Enterprises acquired two 
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LIHPRHA projects, the 14-unit King/Dishman apartment complex and the 22-unit 
Avenue Plaza Affordable Housing. The management of Avenue Plaza was another 
instance of turmoil in the organization’s existence. Each LIHPRHA project, or Single 
Asset Entity (SAE), was a quasi-autonomous housing corporation, at least on paper; 
however, each CDC counted their SAE units as part of their portfolios  - which both 
inflated their unit counts and helped them meet PDC’s benchmarks. 
Figure 5-4 
Franciscan Enterprise Housing Production 1986-2000 
 
 
Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000. 
Franciscan’s unit counts left it in a precarious position: like it had experienced under 
DelSavio’s watch, the organization did not have enough units to manage effectively 
internally, but it had too many (with not a lot of margin for error) for a small 
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organization to manage by themselves. Franciscan was at a crossroads: it would either 
have to develop a considerable number of units to achieve a scale at which it could 
afford to manage the units effectively, or forgo the management fees altogether. 
Neither option was realistic for the organization and contributed heavily to the board’s 
decision to enter into merger discussions (Purcell interview: 4). 
Like several other CDCs, Franciscan had utilized other programmatic funding 
to supplement its housing development activities. Funding for in-home childcare was a 
locally popular HUD program that provided money for renovation and operating 
subsidies for low-income child care providers. It was potentially a win-win situation 
for both landlords and child-care providers, as there was guaranteed grant money for 
renovations, subsidies and income for tenants, and guaranteed income for landlords. 
Franciscan partnered with ROSE CDC, an organization based in outer Southeast 
Portland, to establish a low-cost loan fund for in-home childcare providers to renovate 
houses to accommodate these facilities and act as a clearinghouse to match parents and 
providers (Dursch and Frater, 1995). However, Franciscan’s efforts to add childcare 
services were limited in scope and funding and gradually dissolved (Purcell interview: 
10). The program was never allocated more than $36,000, whereas both ROSE and 
PCRI allocated significantly more resources and not only provided technical 
assistance and loans, they renovated houses specifically for childcare providers, set up 
networks of providers with their tenants, established scholarship funds for families in 
need, and provided support to both parents and providers, so that the program became 
a mainstay of the organization (ROSE CDC, 2000). 
 128 
Another program that Franciscan participated in was the Neighborhood 
Network Center development, a program that met with limited success for several 
organizations. This program was instituted in conjunction with the LIHPRHA 
program and was intended to provide computer facilities, education and job training 
for low-income residents of the apartment complexes and surrounding neighborhoods. 
Franciscan partnered with Sabin CDC and Housing Our Families on some of these 
projects, to avoid overlapping services too much (Meisenhelter, undated-b), given that 
each group had at least 1 medium sized apartment complex within ½ mile of others 
(the Maggie Gibson [FE], The Alberta St Apartments [Sabin CDC], King Dishman 
Apartments [FE], Lydia Roy Gardens [HOF], the Margaret Carter Apartments [HOF], 
Gladys McCoy Apartments [NECDC]).  
In the case of HOF and Franciscan Enterprise’s properties, the failure of the 
Neighborhood Network Centers occurred with its operation. In each apartment 
complex, the owners set aside and renovated units for use as computer centers, 
ensured the ongoing funding to staff the centers, provided initial training for residents 
to use the computers and access internet resources, and committed to providing 
upgrades to both hardware and software on a regular basis. After a few years, several 
of these Neighborhood Network Centers became glorified storage rooms for out of 
date technology, as poor management and lack of staff led to underutilization of the 
centers.67  
                                                
67 I was a Board Member of three SAE’s and on a site visit to the Margaret Carter Apartments in 2004 
was very disappointed to find that the Neighborhood Network Center was no longer functioning due to 
lack of staffing. 
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Franciscan Enterprise also relied on a variety of grants throughout its tenure to 
enhance neighborhood safety initiatives. Because of their joint venture with Cascade 
Behavioral Healthcare on the Killingsworth Court project, Franciscan Enterprise 
became involved with the New Approaches Anti-Drug grant and received ongoing 
funding for this endeavor through the City of Portland  (City Recorder, 2000). The 
intent of this program was for community groups to find creative solutions that 
worked for them in their specific locales to avert drug and crime problems. Solutions 
included partnerships with local police and rehab facilities, as well as neighborhood 
involvement in activities such as foot patrols, new street lighting, and youth education. 
 One of Franciscan’s final large grant projects was a community policing 
project for which they received $250,000 from HUD. The moneys from this grant 
were to be used to “pay for two officers for one year, and one office the second year”; 
the rest of the money, $70,000 would be used for “capital improvements” for low-
income housing units in the area (Bernstein, 1998). At this point in time, direct 
operating support from the Collaborative (the Enterprise Foundation, BHCD, and 
NPF) was dwindling (Franciscan’s had declined from $250,000 in 1997 to $135,000 in 
2000), and Franciscan’s staff was pursuing different types of grant money that could 
be incorporated into existing projects (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000). 
Franciscan Enterprise benefited from the prodigious funding for operating 
expenses that flowed into Portland’s CDCs in the early 1990s. Core operating support 
came from BHCD, the Neighborhood Partnership fund, and smaller foundations like 
the Meyer Memorial Trust and the Collins Foundation. PDC project based finance was 
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augmented by Tom DelSavio’s access to “nun money,” so that the organization had 
ready access to project equity at a very low interest rate for small development 
projects. In addition, Dorene Warner remembers the “$200,000 week”, where she and 
three colleagues had won large grants for different programs from tenant services to 
childcare programs to housing development (Warner interview: 7). While the core 
operating support from the Collaborative was being reduced in the late 1990s, 
Franciscan was expanding its fundraising capacity, realizing the income from new 
rental properties, and selling off single-family houses to offset the loss of income and 
maintain cash flow (See Figure 5-5). Given that Franciscan’s housing portfolio was 
acquired though a combination of donations, Multnomah County foreclosures, and 
LIHPRHA, several units had a very low cost basis, and the asset to debt ratio was 
fairly positive. The increased property values in the neighborhood added to 
Franciscan’s stability on paper (and their potential revenue should they sell off 
additional properties) but did not reflect the larger challenges of finding properties to 
develop within the target area. For example, a lot that Franciscan acquired in 1996 for 
$10,000 was valued at $35,000 in 1998, so that the organization was unable to have a 
continuous pipeline of developable property in reserve (Siegel, 1998). 
As a result, the organization had a staff of 15, income from apartment rentals 
that did not cover its costs, funding for programs other than housing to support most of 
the staff, but no development opportunities in sight. In its financial analysis of 
Franciscan Enterprise in 1999, PNDSC staff found that the organization had not 
broken even for three years and was not in control of its revenue stream (The 
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Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999). It was 
at this time, too, that the Collaborative began to strong-arm several CDCs into merger 
discussions and strongly encouraged Franciscan to participate, given its modest (and 
low cost-basis) asset base and organizational and fiscal instability.  
  As the merger discussions were plodding on, and Franciscan needed more 
immediate cash, they sold three single family house properties for a total gain of $56, 
000 and reduced their debt, without reducing their income substantially (See Figure 5-
6). These sales, and their gains, would not have been possible 10 years prior and is a 
reflection of the changing role of the organization in its gentrifying locale (Siegel, 
1998). In addition, it magnified the necessity of a CDC that could compete with the 
private interests that were gentrifying the neighborhood.  
Figure 5-5 
Franciscan Enterprise Revenue and Expenses 1997-2000 
 
Sources: Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000 
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What these graphs do not show is that by 1999 Franciscan was immersed in the 
development of the Maggie Gibson, whose units were already counted as a part of the 
housing portfolio even though they were not producing income, and had no other 
Figure 5-6 
Franciscan Enterprise Assets and Debt 
 
Sources: Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000 
development opportunities “in the pipeline” (Warner interview: 16). It had reduced its 
staff size from 15 to 6, and the board’s focus was on the merger discussions with 
Sabin CDC and Housing Our Families (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000). 
In August 2000, too, Karen Voiss resigned as Executive Director after a tumultuous 
tenure, so that the organization’s stability was shaken up further. Fran Ayaribil 
assumed the position of interim Executive Director as the board weighed its options to 
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continue with the merger process (Farnum, 2003: 11; Oliver, 2000). Because of the 
combination of the reduced operating support, lack of development activity and 
ongoing opportunities, and the staff instability, Franciscan Enterprise had “run out of 
steam” and no choice but to merge with another organization or organizations, or to 
liquidate its assets (Sten interview: 12). 
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CHAPTER 6. 
CASE STUDY 3: HOUSING OUR FAMILIES 
 
 
 
 Housing Our Families (HOF) was formed in 1991 and obtained its 501(c)(3) 
status in 1992. Originally a loosely affiliated    
group of women from many different walks  
of life, HOF sought to bring together  
professional women and low-income 
women and to utilize their collective skills 
“develop affordable rental housing and 
improve neighborhood livability” (Smock, 
1999:3). Using the National Congress of 
Neighborhood Women (NCNW)’s model 
and goals for developing “principled 
partnerships”, the group sought to honor 
each woman’s skills and contribution and to 
encourage women’s leadership development 
using the NCNW goals (Willer interview: 
7).  
 The idea for Housing Our Families 
coalesced at a 1989 conference of local 
activists and neighborhood residents at  
NCNW Brochure, Undated  
Figure 6-1 
NCNW Goals 
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Portland Community College’s Cascade Campus in North Portland; this conference 
provided a forum for people to “speak out” about their experiences with housing. 
Linda Grear, a single mother and long time North Portland resident, spoke about the 
tremendous difficulties that she had encountered trying to find decent affordable 
housing in the surrounding neighborhood for herself and her two daughters (Sohl 
interview: 4).   As a result of this meeting, a core group of women continued to meet 
to discuss how to form an organization that would address the issues surrounding 
women in poverty, including housing and women’s leadership development. This core 
group took the name of the initial conference, Housing Our Families, as its 
organization’s name. Founding members Barbara Willer and Alberta Simmons went to 
New York to participate in an NCNW training that was designed to help solidify the 
organization by defining goals and a framework for growing the organization and 
returned to share those ideas at a second conference in 1990 (NCNW Brochure: 1).   
The NCNW organizational model (Figure 6-1) espouses inclusion, respect for 
others, and principled partnerships as a means of empowering low-income and 
minority women. This model that HOF adopted included “a real commitment to 
partnership, to operating on equal playing fields, to the developing of strong 
relationships with one another and to developing a strong mutual understanding … it 
was very non-bureaucratic” (Smock interview: 3). Since NCNW had been the 
cornerstone of the inspiration that created HOF, several founding board members felt 
strongly that their model of decision-making process and ideas about equality should 
form the basis of HOF’s ethos (Schleiger interview: 2). 
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Using the NCNW goals, HOF created a set of ground rules that were read at the 
beginning of each meeting and served as the structure for the ensuing “principled 
partnerships”: 
• Speak from your own experience: All participants are considered experts. 
• No putdowns, blaming, judgments, or unsolicited advice. 
• Go-rounds: In discussions, each participant is given an opportunity to speak in 
turn. 
• Equal time for all: Time limits are often used during go-rounds; interruptions, 
cross talk and speaking out of turn are not allowed.  
• Decisions by consensus. A series of go-rounds allows for the sharing of 
information, establishment of a position on an issue, and the reaching of a 
decision that includes all particpants’ perspectives.  
Smock, 1999: 4. 
Because HOF did not originate in a specific neighborhood and therefore did 
not fit NPF’s definition of a community development corporation, NPF did not 
include HOF in their first round of capacity building training sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation (Schleiger interview, p 3). The women of HOF were ruffled by this 
exclusion and followed up with NPF to see what it would take to include HOF in the 
trainings. The answer was simple: pick a geography (Willer interview: 4, Sohl 
interview: 5). As a result, the group chose to focus on the Boise, Eliot and Humboldt 
neighborhoods, the very neighborhoods that Linda Grear had spoken about at the first 
meeting. With assistance from TACS, HOF acquired a four-unit apartment building 
from Multnomah County in the Boise neighborhood and renovated it; as would be the 
case with all of HOF’s properties, it was named for a living woman who had inspired 
the group, in this case local activist Vesia DeWeese Loving. Run initially by a 
volunteer board, HOF acquired its 501(c)(3) status in 1992; the group was still in its 
nascent stages as it continued to apply for grants from local foundations to hire its first 
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staff person; Gretchen Dursch was hired as Executive Director in November 1992, and 
her first task was to raise the money for the rest of her salary, as the organization did 
not yet have adequate funding (Simmons interview: 4). By 1993, HOF Board 
Members had successfully participated in the NPF trainings and drew up a business 
plan that qualified them for NPF’s start-up funding, a sign of both stability and 
legitimation from the funding community. In order to accommodate the new staff, 
HOF rented office space in a building with PCRI. In addition, the group completed its 
second housing development project, the rehab of a duplex on NE 7th Avenue (HOF, 
1993).  
HOF’s housing development curve soon steepened. After the completion of the 
7th Avenue duplex in May of 1993, the owners of the 48 unit Colonial Park 
Apartments put the word out that they were interested in selling the problem-plagued 
complex approached Gretchen Dursch. Colonial Park was located in the heart of the 
Boise neighborhood adjacent to Unthank Park; it was the site of ongoing police calls 
and numerous building code violations (Fitzgibbon, 1993; Dursch interview: 5). Then-
Kafoury aide Erik Sten remembers that “they used to have a vat of acid so you could 
throw your drugs in there when the place got raided or chased, and the guy who 
managed the place came into my office with a gun” (Sten interview: 3). 
Dursch presented the project to HOF’s Property Development Committee and 
Board; in general, Dursch presented every development opportunity to the group 
because she felt strongly that by allowing Board to choose, she and they would  
“honor the group’s consensus process” (Dursch interview: 5). To Dursch’s surprise, 
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the Board was interested in the Colonial Park – because it was a huge leap in scale for 
the group (Dursch interview: 7). She had worked closely with Gretchen Kafoury’s 
office on this property acquisition and noted that both Kafoury’s office and HOF’s 
Board eagerly took credit for the initiation of the redevelopment (Dursch interview: 5). 
Since HOF’s goal was to provide housing for women and their families, the 
group set about creating a family friendly apartment complex. In their plans, they 
reduced the number of units from 48 to 42 to include a Head Start Center and ruffled 
some feathers in the process (Christ, 1995; White and Swanson, 1993). Ron Herndon, 
the local leader of Head Start and founding board member of NECDC, was irked 
because he was not consulted about this part of the project and felt that the new Center 
would compete with existing ones. As a key leader in the African American 
community, Herndon’s opinion carried much weight in the neighborhood (McLennan 
interview: 17).  
Each courtyard of the complex was designated for active play, quiet play, or 
gardening (Christ, 1995). Much care was given to the inclusion of benches, play 
structures, and raised beds for gardening; however, much like Potemkin’s village, the 
Maya Angelou apartments began to disintegrate soon after the tenants moved in. What 
drove the project was the “strong political pressure from city council and elsewhere to 
maximize unit production” … and for funders to “look at a proposal and say what is 
the least amount of money we can put in so that we can have some money left to do 
yet another project,” (White interview: 2).  PDC, the main funder of development 
projects sought to “leverage their inputted dollars to the maximum” (Lokan interview: 
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1); in other words, “to do it (housing development) as cheap as you can” (Kelley 
interview: 9).  
Figure 6-2 
Maya Angelou Apartments 
 
 
Photo by Author 
The undercapitalization of the renovations required a piecemeal approach to 
the construction. Not all plumbing was replaced: decrepit fixtures were left in place, 
aging hot water heaters were repaired rather than replaced, and the cheapest possible 
materials were used. The general contractor on the project called this approach 
“basically putting lipstick on a pig” (Purcell interview: 6). In spite of this lack of 
investment and looming maintenance problems, HOF persevered, but this lack of 
attention to basic systems would cost the organization much more in terms of property 
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maintenance in the ensuing years, and also require that the every unit in complex 
would have to be entirely re-renovated only 8 years later (Learn, 2001).  
Colonial Park, later renamed the Maya Angelou Apartments, “flipped (HOF) 
to a larger scale” (Dursch interview: 7; Fitzgibbon, 1993). Because of the money from 
the developer fees for the project, HOF initiated an effort to organize the 
neighborhood surrounding the Maya Angelou and hired Kris Smock as a community 
outreach coordinator to “get people engaged in developing action plans for the 
neighborhood” (Smock interview: 1). Smock was hired under the AmeriCorps/VISTA 
Volunteer program, a federal program that subsidizes the efforts of community 
organizers like Smock to link up to public and private non-profit organizations to work 
in low-income neighborhoods.68 Smock’s work was recognized by the Enterprise 
Foundation and its Rudy Bruner Award for creating a community organizing endeavor 
and was, by all accounts, one of HOF’s most successful endeavors (Kafoury, 
undated).69 The result of Smock’s efforts was a “comprehensive initiative that was 
intended to build leadership skills of residents” (NCNW: 3). This initiative was 
divided into four action plans: Youth, Crime, Physical Revitalization, and Community 
Building (Smock interview: 1). Known throughout the neighborhood as “the girl on 
the bicycle,” Smock succeeded in bringing neighbors together to form a neighborhood 
watch, participate in neighborhood clean-ups, and to operate youth programs (Morgan 
interview: 11). Smock describes her time at HOF as the “magical years” when she was 
                                                
68 AmeriCorps VISTA is the national service program designed specifically to fight poverty. Founded 
as Volunteers in Service to America in 1965 and incorporated into the AmeriCorps network of 
programs in 1993, VISTA has been on the front lines in the fight against poverty in America for more 
than 40 years (www.Americorps.gov). 
69 HOF beat out NECDC’s Walnut Park development for these honors in 1995. 
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able to “gain the trust of the black community, especially amongst the elders” (Smock 
interview: 3, Morgan interview, 11). This trust, though, depended on Smock’s efforts, 
and, after two renewals of her VISTA contract, Smock left for Chicago to attend 
graduate school.  Those organizers who followed her were not as successful in 
bringing the neighborhood and organization together, in part because property 
management and internal staffing issues had begun to hamper the success of the 
organization and in part because of the change in the demographics of the 
neighborhood (Pequeño interview: 1; Smock interview: 5). 
 HOF’s efforts with tenant organization were much less successful, in part due 
to the efficacy of the individuals and in part due to tenants’ realization that “they did 
not want to be organized by their landlord” (Pequeño interview: 4). In addition, these 
efforts were undermined by high tenant turnover rates, something that affected both 
the finances and the mission of the organization. The mission of the organization was 
linked to empowerment. After Smock’s successes, organizing efforts became the step-
child to housing development (Pequeño interview: 4).  Barbara Willer noted that by 
the time that she returned to the organization as Interim Executive Director in 1998, 
HOF’s organizing efforts “had served their purpose, which was to improve the 
neighborhood, (and) there was less need for them” (Willer interview: 3). 
As HOF, like the other groups in the surrounding neighborhoods, began to 
amass a significant housing portfolio, there was an underlying current of discontent 
between neighborhood groups, especially the Boise Neighborhood Association (BNA) 
and HOF. For several years, HOF identified itself as a women’s development 
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organization, and one of the underlying points of discomfort between the neighbors 
and HOF was that the organization was perceived as an outside white women’s 
organization, even though 60-70% of the Board of Directors were African American 
and/or neighborhood residents (HOF, 1994 and 1996). The other point of discomfort 
for the neighborhood organization, and sometimes within the organization, was that 
approximately 30% of the board members were Lesbians. While the board (and most 
of the staff) remained exclusively female, and while this distinguishing characteristic 
was a source of pride for the organization and its board, it was the source of distrust in 
the neighborhood (Willer interview: 5). The fact that the organization was perceived 
as a lesbian organization was also source of discomfort for HOF’s first Executive 
Director who was often the public face of the agency (Dursch interview: 3).   
In one Boise Neighborhood meeting, Charles Durham, a local builder whose 
sister Kahlia was HOF’s bookkeeper in the late 1990s, expressed concern and mistrust 
for HOF because of their “exclusion” of men from the Board at a Boise Neighborhood 
meeting; later, Durham referred to HOF as “poverty pimps” (Lydgate, 1999). This 
distrust grew as “people were sort of offended by the image that a bunch of women 
were running this organization and were exclusive, and would not allow men, and this 
was primarily amongst some of the business owners… only a few people that knew of 
the tremendous successes they had had and could say that HOF had great moments 
and could point to it” (Bauer interview: 6).  Neighborhood trust of the organization 
was also tempered by the perception that the group was composed of outsiders, and 
mainly white women, who had access to City money (Smock interview: 11).  
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Janet Bauer was the Manager of the Mississippi Target Area project, a City led 
organizing effort that was intended to organize the businesses along Mississippi and 
promote local economic development. Bauer’s office was initially located in HOF’s 
offices, so that she had a multi-faceted view of the work of the organization and its 
criticism. Bauer remembers that because the organization identified itself with the 
empowerment of local women, its board and staff did not “anticipate the need to do 
bridge building beyond the women that it was empowering;” they were not as 
sensitive to the needs and perceptions of the neighbors and did not realize that they 
were as accountable to them as to their tenants, a fact that encouraged the initial 
flourishing of the organization but then contributed to its eventual downfall (Bauer 
interview: 10-11). Early on, the BNA had been very leery of HOF – they were 
skeptical of change that was led by perceived outsiders, as witnessed by their history 
with the Model Cities programs and later Urban Renewal; the early doubts led to a 
distrust of the organization that became more magnified as it encountered its own 
internal management difficulties. Smock described the relationship with the 
neighborhood residents and the Boise Neighborhood Association (BNA) as a “house 
of cards”  - Smock’s efforts to organize neighbors were often met with both resistance 
and inertia because the neighbors well understood that HOF did have a relationship 
with the City of Portland and was able to access funding that they were not (Smock 
interview: 11).  
The BNA in 1994 represented the old guard of the neighborhood: older 
African American homeowners who were not particularly organized or proactive. The 
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group was not able to put together groups of volunteers for neighborhood foot patrols 
or paint-a-thons or come to an agreement on a common planning agenda (Smock 
interview: 5). By 1996, this group had changed, as younger white residents had begun 
to settle in the neighborhood. These newcomers felt attacked with the use of the word 
“gentrification” – because they could not believe that they were part of that trend; 
however, in time, this group of newcomers “took over the neighborhood association” 
because they were frustrated with the level of participation and actions of the old 
guard in response to what was going on in the neighborhood (Grear Long interview: 
15). This new generation was more active and more vocal in its criticism of HOF 
(Smock interview: 4-5). In the end, the BNA became HOF’s greatest critic (NPF, et al, 
1999: 15; Swart and Wolf, 2002). The neighborhood association and neighborhood 
CDC never truly saw eye to eye; the BNA’s initial skepticism of the early organization 
was never overcome, and there was no established history of a solid working 
relationship, especially after Kris Smock’s departure.  
In 1996, HOF acquired the vacant lot at the corner of N. Mississippi and N. 
Shaver to begin its most controversial development: the Betty Campbell Building. The 
Betty Campbell was developed just as most of the original board members were being 
“termed out” and new Board leadership was engaging with both the machinations of 
the organization and the gentrifying neighborhood, whose leadership was also in the 
process of turning over. Begun in 1995 and completed in 1997, this building was one 
of two new buildings on an otherwise run-down N. Mississippi Ave. The lot at the 
corner of Mississippi and Shaver was at the center of an old commercial district  - and  
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Figure 6-3 
Corner of N. Mississippi Avenue and N. Shaver Street, 1995 
 
 
Photo by Author 
held great meaning to the neighborhood residents. HOF’s  building (see Figures 6-4, 
6-5) was intended to be a mixed use structure with 5 units of housing upstairs and 
HOF’s office space on the ground floor; this structure’s design was intended to fit with 
the historical character of the neighborhood. Initially, the upstairs housing units were 
3-4 bedrooms with a provision for play space for children on a roof terrace. Because 
of the demands of PDC and the inability to make the building “pencil”, the number of 
housing units was increased to 8 (with a third story added to the building), and the 
exterior play space was eliminated. These major changes to the density and scale of 
the building added to its poor reception in the neighborhood. In hindsight, the 
provision for family housing without places for families was a poor decision for the 
organization, one that contributed to its ultimate downfall.  
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Figure 6-4 
Original Concept Sketch of the Betty Campbell Building 
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Figure 6-5 
The Betty Campbell Building 
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During the initial stages of construction of the Betty Campbell, a significant 
amount of site contamination was discovered. Apparently, the demolition of the 
previous structure had not been inspected by the City of Portland, and the contractor 
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had imploded the structure on top of some potentially toxic chemicals, including old 
oil tanks that had not been properly decommissioned. The malodorous sludge was 
termed “black goo” by the contractor and necessitated an additional $300,000 cleanup 
of the soil before construction could even begin (Purcell interview: 4). No one had 
anticipated the extent of this problem, so that the building had to be re-designed with 
much of its interior play space and architectural details lost to value engineering.  
The apartments in the Betty Campbell were difficult to rent; few families 
wanted to live in a poorly constructed apartment building with no play space for 
children. As a result, the tenant population was particularly hard to manage. Others 
have referred to the building as a “war zone;” former construction manager Chris 
Cross noted that the proximity of a bus stop, a pay phone, and a perpetually unlocked 
front door exacerbated the drug dealing that already existed in the area (Cross 
interview: 16-17). The resulting building has been the target of ongoing neighborhood 
criticism, too; in 2007, a neighbor appealed a design review decision for a new 
construction just up the street and cited the Betty Campbell as “a social and 
architectural failure” that neighbors considered to be an eyesore from day one 
(Lydgate, 1999; Elizabeth, 2007). 
Ironically, Franciscan Enterprise developed a residential structure of similar, if 
not lesser, quality 3 blocks to the north a few years earlier (Purcell interview: 7; 
Warner Interview: 6). This building remained under the radar, in spite of the fact that 
it housed a similar density of low-income tenants, while the Betty Campbell, probably 
because it was located at the very heart of the Mississippi Historic District and 
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developed by HOF when its shaky reputation was already declining further, was an 
easy target for the neighborhood to rally around. 
HOF’s property management staff had their work cut out for them with 
properties like the Betty Campbell and the Maya Angelou Apartments. HOF originally 
hired two property managers from its board; these managers proved ineffective and 
were let go – causing a rift amongst staff and the board (Alexander, et al, 1996). 
Subsequent efforts to hire professional property managers proved futile, as the salaries 
that the organization could offer were below what other professional management 
companies were offering. As a result, the property management side of HOF never 
fully matured into a rigorous and professional part of the organization; however, the 
property development side grew under “the constant pressure to be developing new 
rental properties” (Pequeño interview: 1).  
Property management problems were most evident at the Maya Angelou 
Apartments and the Betty Campbell. These apartments were the sites of regular drug 
sales; it appeared that tenants were directly involved with the activity and facilitated 
the sales (Cross interview: 16).  While neighbors were concerned for their own safety 
because of the drug problems, HOF suffered ongoing economic losses because of the 
increased maintenance and high tenant turnover. Apartment units regularly required 
costly repairs, and the jerry-rigged construction of the projects, especially at the Maya 
Angelou, compounded the organization’s inability to meet the needs of its tenants and 
satisfy the safety concerns of the surrounding neighbors (Morgan interview: 12). This 
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loss of neighborhood support and social capital created a feedback loop that HOF 
could not escape.  
In spite of this situation, HOF continued to acquire and develop new properties 
at a fast pace. Just before the completion of the Betty Campbell, the organization 
embarked on its first large-scale new construction project, the 64-unit Alberta 
Simmons Plaza.70 In 1996, the group signed a development agreement with Union 
Manor Management to develop a low-income senior housing apartment building with 
commercial spaces on the ground floor. This development signaled a new life for that 
part of Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd and a new challenge for HOF. The project’s 
financing included not only multiple sources of funding for both the residential and the 
housing parts, it also drew on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit for project capital 
Figure 6-6 
The Alberta Simmons Plaza 
 
 
Photo by Author 
                                                
70 The Betty Campbell had 10 housing units and a ground floor commercial space and was considered a 
small project. Projects over 30 units were generally considered larger scale.  
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and signaled HOF’s foray into a realm of larger scale project development. Because of 
the financial structure of the deal, this apartment complex was a separate entity from 
HOF; it had its own governing board and separate property management, so that HOF 
was not able to realize any ongoing income from the project after the completion of 
development. 
In addition to the aforementioned developments, HOF acquired three 
properties through HUD’s Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident 
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) Program that mandated that private developers, who 
had taken advantage of federal tax credits to construct apartments beginning in the 
early 1970s and subsequently utilized the Section 8 Voucher Program (mostly unit-
based, as opposed to tenant-based vouchers) to subsidize the rents for their projects, 
could not simply sell these apartment complexes on the open market when the tax 
credits expired 20 years later. A new HUD mandate required these property owners to 
offer the complexes to non-profit groups, in an effort to preserve affordable housing. 
Several apartment complexes in the Portland area were eligible for this program, and 
HOF acquired 4 complexes with a total of 100 units of housing in 1996.  
Each apartment complex became its own Single Asset Entity (SAE), so that the 
sponsoring non-profit would become the fiscal agent for each property. This meant 
that HOF acted as a bridge between the property management company and HUD, 
was responsible for convening board meetings, and was a repository for all required 
paperwork; sponsoring non-profits were not allowed to receive any compensation for 
these services per HUD regulations. One of those apartment complexes, the Martha  
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Figure 6-7 
The Martha Wells Court 
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Wells Apartments, is located one block off of N. Mississippi Avenue. Always 
incongruous with the single-family homes on the street, it was not inviting to begin 
with, and drug dealers would regularly cut through the courtyard to the alley. The 
apartments eventually became an eyesore and an ongoing source of neighborhood ire; 
the fact that it was connected to Housing Our Families added to the organization’s 
poor reputation both with neighbors and with HUD.   
By 1996, HOF was undergoing some dramatic internal organizational 
upheaval. A division between staff and the Executive Director became more 
pronounced as HOF was in the process of determining how it wanted to grow with its 
five-year strategic plan; the organization had grown very quickly between 1993 and 
1996 – there were 2 staff in 1993 and 7 in 1996, but no clear personnel system in 
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place. Executive Director Gretchen Dursch conceded that human resource issues were 
not her strength, but also pointed out that the many development deals were 
consuming the bulk of her time (Alexander, et al, 1996; Dursch interview: 9). As a 
result, she was being pulled in several different directions as the organization grew. At 
this point, HOF included management systems and procedures and how to grapple 
with the property management issues that had plagued the organization in its new 
strategic plan (HOF, 1995). 
One of HOF’s missteps that contributed significantly to their property 
management difficulties had occurred early on. HOF’s Board made a critical property 
management decision to forgo police background checks and discount credit histories 
in their tenant screening process (HOF, 1994; Dursch interview: 11; Fitzpatrick, 
1999). This was at a time when the African American community had a particularly 
contentious relationship with the Portland Police Bureau, and many Board members, 
naïvely in retrospect, felt that these requirements would preclude those who deserved a 
chance for housing (HOF, 1994; Willer interview: 5). The discounting of credit 
histories was consistent with the group’s effort to house a marginalized population.71 
What HOF did not realize was the number and depth of problems that their tenants 
would have and the excessive wear and tear on the units (Schleiger interview: 9). The 
result of these two policies combined with a poorly renovated or constructed building 
was a high turnover of tenants, increased maintenance costs, and property destruction. 
In the case of the Maya Angelou Apartments, it was necessary to re-renovate it fully in 
                                                
71 As was often discussed at meetings, but never formally documented, the organization sought to create 
housing for those who could not afford market rate rents, but either did not qualify for or could not 
obtain a Section 8 voucher.  
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2002, and again before the transfer of the property to PCRI in 2006 (Learn, 2001; 
Fitzpatrick Interview: 9).  
Coupled with the property management issues was a neighborhood perception 
that the staff was “incompetent” (Morgan interview: 11). Part of HOF’s mission of 
empowerment included the development of skills for women in the neighborhood. As 
part of the implementation of these goals, HOF hired several women from the 
neighborhood as organizers and/or administrators. Executive Director Gretchen 
Dursch remembers the ineffectiveness of a particular staff member because of a lack 
of experience: “she was able to build relationships with people and people liked her … 
but she was not able to make things happen” (Dursch interview: 24). While neighbors 
noted the organization’s good intentions, it was also clear to them that several of the 
staff hired from the neighborhood were not able to up to the challenges of their 
positions (Morgan interview: 11). The Board, on the other hand, was committed to the 
idea of developing women’s skills to gain the experience necessary to gain real power 
in their neighborhoods – this was what made the organization unique and drew this 
initial group of women together (Schleiger interview: 5; Willer interview: 12). 
However, this basic tenet did not always serve the best interests of the organization, 
especially as the organization had taken on the responsibilities of being a landlord.  
The need for a professional staff to run the more technical property 
development and management side of the organization conflicted with the reality of an 
inexperienced staff and came to a head in 1996 (Willer interview: 12). A 
neighborhood resident who had been acting as property manager was let go, and the 
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staff had several contentious retreats to work through a series of internal conflicts; 
these conflicts also divided the Board of Directors, with several of the original 
members leaving when their terms expired (Willer interview: 12). In 1997, the board 
composition had changed – it reflected a larger neighborhood presence, and HOF 
experienced the first of its organizational crises (HOF, 1997-1998).  
Executive Director Gretchen Dursch had taken maternity leave and returned in 
1998 to find a different organization. A few months later, the Board asked her to leave 
permanently, with much bad blood between Dursch and several board members 
(Dursch interview: 27). Dursch’s abrupt departure, too, left many questions in limbo – 
and no way to answer them. Dursch’s forte had been housing development, and with 
her departure, HOF’s development activities, and their associated revenue from 
developer fees, dropped off significantly (see Figure 6-8, below, and Figure 6-9). The 
housing development opportunities were becoming scarcer and more complex at this 
time; without an experienced property developer at the helm, HOF forewent a number 
of opportunities, and the volume of production was permanently curtailed.  
One of the great sticking points for HOF as the organization took on more 
responsibility and grew in complexity was its commitment to its consensus model. 
HOF’s organizational model ostensibly focused on broad-based community inclusion, 
a model that is slow and deliberate and not necessarily commensurate with the 
decisions that were required as the organization had grown and professionalized. 
While the process “provided an ideal framework during HOF’s early years for 
fostering a respectful, inclusive atmosphere for discussion and decision-making about  
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Figure 6-8 
Housing Our Families Housing Production 1992-2001 
 
Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; McGee, 2005 
 
the organization’s vision, mission, and policies”, it was not a sustainable model 
because of the increasing complexities of decisions, especially concerning housing 
development finance, and HOF shifted toward a more traditional style of leadership 
and management (Smock, 1999: 6). This shift alienated several long-time members 
because it undermined the very essence of the organization: creating a safe space 
where a woman’s voice could be heard and valued.  
One of the wonderful pieces of that process was, very simplistically, 
getting the women who talked a lot to shut up and the women who didn’t 
talk a lot to start feeling safe enough to voice their wisdom and talk 
about what they knew; it was a phenomenal process because it really 
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worked... to engage women in all different kinds of levels. So while we 
were trying to empower women and build leadership in women who had 
identified themselves as leaders, we were creating our vision of 
ourselves, … and we made a decision that we were a women-only run 
organization, (be)cause there wasn’t anything like that, and because the 
model that we were using really supported women coming into their 
own… 
      Schleiger interview: 2 
This schism played out along racial lines in the structure of the Board of 
Directors: those with more technical expertise were generally white, and those with 
local social capital were generally black. Deferring decisions to those with expertise 
steered the organization towards a more conventional model, rather than its original 
consensus based model. This process was especially evident during board meetings – 
board decisions were theoretically reached by consensus. However, key board 
members’ opinions and when they were expressed in the dialogue played a role in 
decisions. At each meeting, the group would sit in a circle, and each member would 
speak. The person who spoke last had the often had greatest effect on the direction of 
the subsequent vote. One board member reminisced that she would specifically choose 
where she sat in a meeting, because the seating arrangement would most likely 
determine how resulting votes would turn out; the words of the final person to speak 
would have the most lasting impact on the group decision (Pequeño interview, p 11-
12).  
By the late 1990s, HOF experienced declining neighborhood support and an 
increased sense of outsider-ship, two circumstances that further undermined any sense 
of solidarity that the organization had. In 1997, HOF had moved their offices into their 
newly constructed Betty Campbell Building, an action that was intended to give them 
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neighborhood presence and alleviate concerns about the organization and their tenants. 
However, their choice to locate here, and subsequently close the shades and lock the 
doors at all hours, was a perceived as an affront to the neighborhood and a denial of 
their responsibility for the drug deals on Mississippi (Bauer interview: 8). Staff 
members of HOF remember feeling out of place in the neighborhood. As businesses 
that catered to new residents moved in to N. Mississippi Ave, HOF’s African 
American staff felt increasingly ill at ease in what they perceived as their 
neighborhood (Schleiger Interview: 11). For example, when the Fresh Pot coffee shop 
opened across the street from the HOF offices, white staff members rejoiced in being 
able to get a cup of coffee near their office; while black staff members would avoid 
going there, as it was a “white people’s hang out” where they did not feel welcome 
(Long interview: 17). The flip side of this was that white staff members had not 
previously felt comfortable going to the NuRite Way Market, where black staff often 
purchased food and beverages (Schleiger interview: 11). The fact that at all times at 
least some staff members did not feel comfortable in the neighborhood where the 
organization was based can be seen as a allegory for the lack of synchronicity between 
the neighborhood and HOF.   
In 2002, Cornelius Swart and Spencer Wolf released a documentary of the 
neighborhood strife with HOF, Northeast Passage. Ostensibly conveying the stories of 
individuals in the Boise neighborhood who were caught between the irresponsible 
CDC and the forces of gentrification in the late 1990s, this movie fueled support for 
the BNA and vilified HOF to a point where it was no longer able to develop properties 
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in the Boise neighborhood (Swart and Wolf, 2002). A key factor in HOF’s downward 
trajectory, the BNA and its membership represented an increasingly changing hostile 
towards low-income housing developers in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Schleiger 
Interview: 11).   
When HOF began its work in the early 1990s, the BNA was composed of 
primarily older African American homeowners. While this group was leery of HOF’s 
work because it was composed of a “white women that lived outside the 
neighborhood... They were used to dealing with NECDC, a group of black people who 
were promoting homeownership. NECDC was reaching something that was an 
ingrained goal in an older black generation’s mind: our thing is to help our younger 
people buy a home” (Long interview: 18).  Through HOF’s organizing efforts, the 
neighborhood residents eventually became more comfortable working with HOF for 
several years; however, this changed as they residents who were involved in the 
neighborhood association changed (Long interview: 19; Morgan interview: 4; Smock 
interview: 7). By the early 2000s, neighborhood organizations’ membership rosters 
had changed dramatically and reflected the newer demographic composition of the 
area; there was no institutional memory for supporting HOF, and, with the new, and 
more active and vocal membership, the BNA used HOF as an example of what was 
wrong with the neighborhood (Bauer interview: 6; Long interview: 19; Smock 
interview: 11).  
One of the reasons that HOF’s perceived outsider-ship was an issue for the 
BNA in the early 1990s was the fact that a significant number of Board members were 
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lesbians. The early BNA members, albeit unorganized and less effective than later 
members, were elderly black homeowners who were not comfortable with HOF’s 
leadership. This early difference between the board and the neighborhood contributed 
to the BNA’s ongoing skepticism of the organization. As a result of ongoing strife 
between the BNA and HOF, the two groups worked out a Good Neighbor Agreement 
(Housing Our Families, 1999a). This agreement was the result of mediation efforts 
between the BNA and HOF and a response to the BNA’s Housing Preservation and 
Development Policy that was intended to preclude HOF from developing any more 
rental housing in the neighborhood - a direct blow for the organization as they were in 
the pre-development phase of Fargo Row, a townhouse development just off the 
Kerby St off-ramp at the south end of the neighborhood (Housing Our Families, 
1999a). As a result of these interactions, HOF changed its policy of a women-only 
board, and invited several active members of the BNA to join the board. Carl 
Edwards, a Boise neighborhood resident, joined the board in May, 1999 (Housing Our 
Families, 1999b). 
HOF’s leadership also suffered in the late 1990s. After Gretchen Dursch was 
asked to leave the organization in 1997, HOF suffered a significant blow. In 1998, 
Interim Executive Director Barbara Willer discovered that the bookkeeper Kahlia 
Durham had embezzled $20,000 while Dursch had been on maternity leave in 1997; as 
a result of the impropriety, HUD became very concerned that their portion of HOF’s 
funding had been “tainted”, and other funders were reticent to consider any new 
projects of HOF’s, so that the organization’s cash flow from development 
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opportunities was severely restricted (Dursch interview: 23; Willer interview: 15). 
Willer had only agreed to an interim position, and the Board eventually hired Joan 
Miggins, a former board member, after a yearlong fruitless search (The Enterprise 
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999: 16). However, 
Miggins “did not have the capacity or the skills to run the organization”, and HOF was 
in a weakened position with scarce leadership and little cash flow (Cross interview: 
13; Bauer interview: 6). 
At this point, HOF was in a weak position financially: a PNDSC Financial 
Analysis Report noted that HOF was heavily reliant on government funding for 
operating support and had a bleak long term outlook (The Enterprise Foundation’s  
Figure 6-9 
Housing Our Families Net Income 1993-2002 
 
Sources: Housing Our Families, 1997-2002. 
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Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999).72 As a result of this financial 
analysis, the City-initiated discussions for a merger of Inner North/Northeast CDCs, 
referred to as the “Northeast Collaborative Approach Action Plan” began in earnest 
(PNDSC Staff, 1999). HOF, Sabin, NECDC, and Franciscan Enterprise boards and 
staff began to discuss the principles and procedures for such an undertaking, and 
HOF’s development activities were further curtailed. Both their rental income and 
grant revenues dropped, as a result of the chronic leadership turmoil, focus on merger 
talks, and changing local development opportunities. As a result, HOF was in the red 
for the first time.  
 In spite of the drop in revenue, HOF did not reduce staff or expenses in part 
because of the pending merger (Figure 6-9, Figure 6-10). Staff turnover, entwined 
with the leadership problems, added to the organizational disarray. The increase in 
expenses in the late 1990s reflected an increase in consultant fees to make order from 
the confusion that was necessary to satisfy the other merger participants. Because its 
revenues could not cover its expenses, HOF’s asset to debt ratio (Figure 6-11) also 
declined steeply, in spite of the increasing property values in the neighborhood and the 
fact that it had completed a new eight-unit project in 1999. This decline further 
weakened its position in the merger negotiations. 
                                                
72 HOF, along with Sabin CDC, NECDC, and Franciscan Enterprise, received an “Enhanced Level of 
Funding” from PNDSC (PNDSC Allocation Chart, 1998-1999). 
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Figure 6-10 
Housing Our Families Organizational Expenses 1994-2002 
  
Sources: Housing Our Families, 1996, Housing Our Families, 1997-2002 
 
Figure 6-11 
Housing Our Families Asset to Debt Ratio 1995-2002 
 
Sources: Housing Our Families, 1996, Housing Our Families, 1997-2002 
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 At this point, too, HOF’s Board of Directors, led by Janice Flowers, an African 
American teacher who had grown up in the neighborhood, was floundering. The 
dwindling financial position, and no clear remedy for it, pushed Flowers and the Board 
to forge on with the merger talks and eventually dissolve the existing organization, as 
it had alienated its surrounding neighborhood, was an anonymous landlord to much of 
its tenantry, was failing to manage its existing properties adequately, had no 
development opportunities on the horizon, and its leadership had “run out of gas” 
(Sten interview: 11). 
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CHAPTER 7. 
CASE STUDY 4: SABIN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 Sabin Community Development Corporation (Sabin CDC), formed in 1991 by 
a group of concerned neighbors, was an “outgrowth of the Sabin Community 
Association” and their work on the Albina Community Plan (Meisenhelter, undated-
d). This group acquired its 501(c)(3) (non-profit) status in 1992 and endeavored to 
address a host of issues including rising housing costs, diminishing neighborhood 
diversity, high crime rates, and a lack of local job training. The main purpose of the 
organization was to “keep resources and money in the hands of the community” 
through developing low-income housing, job training and youth employment 
programs, economic development, and commercial revitalization pieces (Meisenhelter 
interview: 3).  Probably the most programmatically diverse of the Inner N/NE 
Portland’s CDCs, Sabin CDC  “did everything from those arts, cultural things, to the 
affordable housing, tenant support, resident organizing, tenant counsels, jobs and 
social service support for our tenants, the rent to own piece, the commercial 
revitalization, the computer labs, job search, special needs housing” and was the 
closest thing to the form of a grassroots, geographically based CDC model of the five 
organizations in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Meisenhelter interview: 3; Kelley 
interview: 10; Sten interview: 9) 
 Diversity within its mission has continued to be a cornerstone of the 
organization as both the surrounding neighborhood and the organization leadership 
changed. In 2006:  
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Sabin’s primary purpose was to make sure there was a stock of 
affordable housing for all people within this neighborhood of change, 
because we knew the change was coming.  Secondly, we know that our 
goal is to provide more than just a roof over your head. We know there 
has to be accompanying services in order to get you from a renter with 
us to homeownership, and to placing your children to send them off to 
college or whatever works,  
 Fondren interview: 4 
 
Sabin CDC’s service area includes “the Vernon neighborhood, the low-
income portions of Sabin Neighborhood and small adjacent potions of the King and 
Concordia Neighborhoods” (Hoereth, 1998; Sabin CDC, 1996). The organization 
participated in the Neighborhood Partnership’s early training sessions that enabled 
this group of residents to form a CDC with a business plan and seed money to hire 
staff. Because of the fear of losing the cultural and racially diverse neighborhood to 
gentrification, affordable housing development became the cornerstone of Sabin’s 
mission: 
The Mission of Sabin CDC is to stabilize and improve the livability of 
culturally diverse Portland neighborhoods by assuring the availability 
of long-term affordable housing for its low and moderate income 
residents, and by encouraging community partnerships for local 
economic development, self-help projects, and youth and senior 
programs.  
www.SabinCDC.org 
 
As a result, Sabin CDC, like other organizations in the adjacent 
neighborhoods, began its broad based community efforts by redeveloping derelict 
housing into affordable units. “We were very much wanting to secure a pool of long 
term affordable housing, and that was affordable for families at 50% of median 
family income, or below” (Meisenhelter interview: 1). Their foray into housing 
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development began modestly, with the renovation of single-family houses that had 
been acquired from another defunct non-profit developer (Meisenhelter, 1993; Sabin 
CDC, 1995).  
Because the neighborhood changes that occurred in Inner North/Northeast 
Portland were rooted in both race and class, CDCs, especially those who were viewed 
as the projects of white outsiders, were targets of resistance from black residents 
within the community (Frater interview: 30). Sabin CDC staff members often 
encountered animosity from black neighbors, especially in the early days 
(Meisenhelter interview: 2). This status as an outsider and its accompanying 
resentment was a common issue for the other CDCs as well – the downside of having 
access to public dollars and publicized housing development.  
Soon after procuring office space, Board chair Diane Meisenhelter assumed 
the position of Executive Director and hired Jane Ediger, who had previously worked 
at PCRI and was also a neighborhood housing activist, to run their housing 
development programs (Ediger interview: 8; Sabin CDC, 1995). Under Ediger’s 
direction, Sabin’s housing development capacity grew, and incorporated a land trust 
model and a limited equity lease program, in addition to rental housing (Meisenhelter, 
undated-a; Sabin CDC, 1996). This focus on development was reflected in both an 
increased portfolio and new challenges for the organization. By 1996, Sabin CDC had 
completed “54 units of housing ... and had 46 units in various stage of development” 
(Sabin CDC, 1996; Figure 7-1). At that time, Sabin staff recognized that they were 
“facing the challenge of moving from primarily developing single family, scattered- 
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Figure 7-1 
Sabin CDC Housing Production 1993-2006 
 
 
Sources: Sohl, 1995; Sabin CDC 1995-1997; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006. 
 
site homes to beginning work on larger (apartment) complexes as well” (Sabin CDC, 
1996). Sabin CDC, like their counterparts, initially re-developed existing single-
family houses. As these opportunities soon proved both scarce and too costly, the 
organization looked to the redevelopment of duplexes and small apartment 
complexes. Sabin CDC’s largest construction projects were relatively modest: Otesha 
Place, a new mixed use building at the corner of NE 15th and NE Alberta, that houses 
the organization’s offices and 11 affordable apartments, and a seven-unit townhouse 
development at the corner of NE 27th and NE Killingsworth.  
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Figure 7-2 
Otesha Place and Sabin CDC Offices 
 
 
Photo by Author 
Figure 7-3 
Sabin CDC Housing NE Killingsworth St and NE 27th Ave 
 
Photo by Author 
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Through the federal Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident 
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) program, Sabin acquired three apartment 
complexes with a total of 49 units of affordable housing and continues to be the fiscal 
agent for them today, thereby preserving a significant number of units in N/NE 
Portland. These apartment complexes represent the largest holdings in Sabin’s 
housing portfolio, and, in 1996, when BHCD first asked groups in North/Northeast 
Portland to work together to mitigate an overlap of services, and Sabin, Housing Our 
Families, and Franciscan Enterprises worked together to establish a series of 
Neighborhood Network Centers (NNCs) in their recently acquired LIHPRHA 
properties. These Centers were developed in conjunction with the LIHPRHA program 
and were intended to provide residents of those apartment complexes, and other low-
income neighborhood residents, access to computer training and the Internet. In 1997, 
these same organizations initiated discussions on a joint workforce development 
program. This program was intended to utilize the technology of the NNCs and to 
“provide pre-employment training and related support service workshops” so that 
their collective tenantry could “get good services from workforce agencies that would 
lead to living wage jobs” (Dursch, 1997). 
In addition to its low-income rental housing programs, and as a part of its 
holistic approach to community development, Sabin CDC initiated a number of other 
types of housing programs:  Limited Equity Lease and Land Trust programs for 
homeownership, as well as transitional housing for women emerging from drug 
rehabilitation programs.  The Limited Equity Lease Program requires that prospective 
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buyers lease homes for two years, so that they have an opportunity to “work on their 
credit history, prepare for the responsibilities of homeownership, and to save their 
portion of their down payment and closing costs,” and targets very low-income 
buyers, those at or below 60% of the area’s Median Family Income (Meisenhelter, 
undated-c).   
Sabin CDC’s Limited Equity Lease Program was developed in conjunction with 
the Vernon Neighborhood Action Group (VNAG). In 1993, VNAG approached Sabin 
CDC to explore a partnership to address community concerns about problem 
properties in their area. The two groups decide to utilize a lease purchase strategy to 
promote neighborhood stabilization by redeveloping several vacant and abandoned 
properties that VNAG had previously identified (Sabin CDC/VNAG Lease Purchase 
Pilot Project, undated).  This partnership was unique among CDCs - none of the other 
groups responded as directly to a Neighborhood Association’s specific need as Sabin 
did for Vernon. The concept of “limited equity” was especially important to Sabin’s 
leadership because the neighborhood had begun to gentrify in the mid 1990s, as the 
intent of this program was to prevent “speculation by homebuyers and assure 
continued affordability” (Sohl, 1995). 
Sabin CDC’s Land Trust program, the first of its kind in Portland, took 
advantage of vacant lots in their target neighborhoods and built new infill houses, as 
well as renovating existing housing stock (Ediger interview: 9). The land trust model 
legally separates the land (and its value) from the value of the structure. The land is 
placed in a community trust, and the buyer pays for the structure and any subsequent 
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improvements that they make. When an owner chooses to sell his or her house, they 
have a limited gain on the sale, so that the house will remain affordable in perpetuity 
(Sabin CDC Land Trust Program Pamphlet, undated). This solution enabled several 
families to enter into homeownership at a time in Portland when wages were not 
keeping up with increased home values. Portland’s other Land Trust Program, the 
Portland Community Land Trust, operates independently and works with several 
CDCs in the area, but Sabin CDC’s Land Trust is the only specifically community 
based one. A total of 16 housing units were developed under the Limited Equity 
Lease and Land Trust programs (Figure 7-1).  
The Ujima Project was a relatively short-lived effort to develop supportive 
housing for women and their families, as they transitioned out of drug treatment 
programs. This highly structured program sought to provide housing and services 
such as drug counseling, parenting, and anger management classes, as well as job 
training classes, for African American women (Perlman, 1994). While near and dear 
to Diane Meisenhelter’s heart, this program encountered a number of difficulties from 
NIMBYism; in spite of the fact that over 25 community organizations had initially 
signed letters of support for the program and its location in the Sabin neighborhood, 
property management difficulties and complaints from neighbors eventually shut 
down (Meisenhelter, undated-e; Meisenhelter interview: 6). Sabin CDC sold the 
property that housed the Ujima project in 2003 (Sabin CDC, 2004). 
Sabin developed all of its rental housing units prior to 1998, when Jane Ediger 
left the organization; at that point, the emphasis shifted from housing production to 
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economic development and youth opportunity activities for several reasons: the local 
and federal funding for housing had begun to dwindle, there were few vacant or 
abandoned houses left in the neighborhood, vacant lots had become too expensive for 
non-profits to develop into affordable housing, purchasing existing houses and 
apartments on the open market was prohibitive, and, most importantly, the new 
executive director, Felicia Allender-Brant, had a different focus from the earlier 
leadership.  
Sabin CDC’s housing production totals 108 units of rental housing, 16 land 
trust houses, and four limited equity lease houses (see Figure 7-1). While other CDCs 
managed their own rental units and continued to expand their housing development 
expertise, Sabin contracted out both its property management and housing 
development activities after 2000 (Fondren interview: 16). This shift in part reflected 
the focus of the organization and the funding sources accessed. PDC provides project-
based funding, while the Collaborative of BHCD, Enterprise, and the Neighborhood 
Partnership Fund provided operational support. Given that Sabin CDC was forced to 
forgo funding from the Collaborative when it declined to proceed with the merger 
process in 2001, it is no surprise that its focus, while already shifting towards 
economic development and youth education programs, continued in that direction 
because Allender-Brant had been successful in acquiring grants from sources outside 
of the region (Fondren interview: 8; McLennan interview: 14; Sohl interview: 10 
White interview: 9).  
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Instead of seeking out new and larger housing development opportunities on its 
own and in partnership with private developers, as several other CDCs have done, 
Sabin has focused on youth education and training programs in part because of 
leadership and staff enthusiasm and in part because of stiffer competition for 
diminished housing development prospects in its service area. The limited production 
levels ensured a small staff size (never more than twelve) that shrank to four persons 
or less after the withdrawal from the merger process (Sabin Community Development 
Corporation, 2003-2006). This has had mixed results: the organization is less visible 
to the broader community, in part because they are focusing on the construction of 
skills rather than the construction of housing, but they are less vulnerable to housing 
market shifts and local housing funding priority shifts. 
Sabin’s work outside of housing development began in 1995, when Sabin staff 
worked with the merchants of Alberta Street in its most visible project, the Alberta 
Corridor Plan. Sabin CDC initiated this strategy with the City of Portland as a way of 
knitting together the concerns of neighborhood newcomers and long time residents 
(Sharpe interview: 2). Begun as the Alberta Corridor Plan to revitalize the street into 
a “prosperous, neighborhood-serving business district”, this endeavor initially 
focused on youth, residential and commercial revitalization (Bureau of Planning, 
undated-a). Eventually, Sabin CDC and other stakeholders split off into different 
approaches: the Alberta Streetscape Improvement Plan and Sabin’s ongoing Youth 
Employment Programs. The original steering committee of the Corridor Plan 
struggled for membership in its first year, but in 1996, its workshops overflowed with 
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participants (Bureau of Planning, undated-b). At the first street fair in 1997, though, 
over 1500 people came to view the art galleries on a rainy Thursday evening (Bureau 
of Planning, undated-b).  
The Alberta Corridor Plan represented a new and different level of 
engagement and production for Sabin CDC. The organization engaged a host of 
diverse stakeholders: a number of bureaucracies (Portland Department of 
Transportation, Oregon Department of Transportation, TriMet), neighborhood 
business and property owners, old and new neighborhood residents. As the Plan was a 
project of the City of Portland, a broader group of stakeholders was involved, and the 
focus was on the “newcomers into the neighborhood” (Sharpe interview: 8). 
As a result, Sabin saw their role in the long-term plan and interim projects diminish, 
and a new non-profit organization, Art on Alberta, formed to coordinate the monthly 
art walk and the publication of a map and directory of local businesses.  
Roslyn Hill was one of the business owners who played an active role in both 
the Alberta Corridor Plan and the Alberta Streetscape Improvement Plan. A long time 
neighborhood resident, Hill had by 1995 redeveloped two buildings near the corner of 
NE 15th and NE Alberta and had opened a coffee shop and art gallery in one of those 
buildings (AARP, 2008; Barnett, 2007b). The Alberta Streetscape Plan committee 
met at Hill’s coffee shop because “that was the only place that there was” on Alberta 
(Sharpe interview: 9). Hill’s development expanded as she bought and sold property 
(including a house from Sabin CDC [Fondren interview: 11; Sabin Community 
Development Corporation, 2004]). Her development aesthetic, funky architecture 
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with corrugated metal, siding set a tone for the rest of the street (Fondren interview: 
6).  Roslyn Hill has been recognized nationally for her contributions to the 
revitalization of Alberta Street and continues to be one of the largest landholders on 
the street (Barnett, 2007b; Herzog, 2000).  
Sabin’s marginalization from the Alberta Corridor plan was indicative of the 
shifting political power in the neighborhood, as Alberta Street was revitalized, and 
new business owners and residents sought a greater role in their neighborhood. Diane 
Meisenhelter laments Sabin CDCs role in encouraging gentrification, where “outside 
forces got PDC money to do their buildings, and then it was like a little bit, it doesn’t 
take very much before the ball really, really starts rolling fast” (Meisenhelter 
interview: 17).       
 Sabin CDC was unable to capitalize on their role as the initiator of the 
Corridor Plan in part because their ability to develop commercial projects that 
would secure an ongoing grass roots presence was limited:  
We should have secured those properties before we did, (because) we 
weren’t into commercial revitalization and commercial development, 
we were into housing development. There were city policies that 
affected the housing (development) that they didn’t use in the 
commercial realm, for instance. We tried to buy some commercial 
property or at least explore the possibilities, and sometimes people who 
had these vacant properties. They wouldn’t do anything about, or they 
wouldn’t talk to you about, but they were just sitting there all boarded 
up and stuff, and (the owners) were just sitting on them waiting until 
they could make a killing on them. The City (missed the opportunity) 
to level the playing field a little bit more in that area with some sort of 
public good in mind down the road… 
     Meisenhelter interview: 19. 
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The result of Sabin’s initial endeavor is the revitalization of a commercial strip that 
caters to a different clientele: once-empty storefronts now house trendy shops and 
restaurants that cater to the neighborhood newcomers.  While only some of the 
redevelopment has remained in long time residents’ hands, the overall improvement 
is striking, and the age and race of those walking down the street has changed just as 
significantly (Simmons interview: 1). Last Thursdays on Alberta, the organized 
gallery walk, is one of the most visible results of the planning efforts: a gallery open 
house and street fair that has become so popular that additional traffic control 
measures are instituted on those days (Bales, 2008). “Alberta Street represents the 
new population not the old population, but on the other hand, there wasn’t a lot there 
before, there was things there but there wasn’t a lot there, and by and large it catered 
to a select number of people, obviously more the black community, there was 
remnants of the old black community, and a lot of boarded up old buildings, a lot of 
unused space” (Sharpe interview: 4, Barnett, 2007a). 
 These days, long-time residents complain that they are not welcomed, either 
by design or default, in many of the newer establishments and still must go out of the 
neighborhood for restaurants and entertainment: 
But I have trouble with some of the changes because (of the way) it 
used to be... As a woman of color it hasn’t changed for me; Alberta 
Street is really weird, and it’s nice, it’s beautiful. I go there to get my 
hair done, believe it or not, but it’s like if you’re a woman of color, 
anybody of anybody of color, I don’t feel comfortable, I really don’t. I 
feel out of place. They’re ... looking at you like you’re the second class 
citizen, and I want to say, Honey, I was here before you was even born, 
I’ve seen the ups and downs... (But now), we’re welcome I’m sure, but 
I don’t feel the closeness of the welcome, I feel left out. (It’s) good that 
my kids, my grandkids will be welcome, but I feel like (the new 
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residents are) just taking over and want to change a lot of things; a lot 
of things are good changes, change is always good if it’s done right...  
It’s like we’re going so far, and what amazes me, I don’t drink but I did 
(laughs), oh I did, but this wine stuff and all of that, to me that’s just 
like putting something that’s not supposed to be in our neighborhood, 
the wine tasting, I guess the wine is so high tail, we as the colored can’t 
go in there and buy it. 
      Simmons interview: 2. 
 
 While the neighborhoods surrounding Sabin were changing, the organization 
itself was undergoing a number of changes, both in terms of structure and finances. 
As local funding diminished towards the end of the 1990s, and Sabin shifted gears to 
take advantage of other programs and revenues, its overall financial picture shifted as 
well. Figures 7-2 – 7-5 depict the financial history of Sabin CDC. Figure 7-2 shows  
Figure 7-4 
Sabin CDC Organizational Support 1993-2006 
 
Sources: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1996-2006; Sabin CDC, 1993-1997.  
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the levels of organizational support and reflects an early reliance on BHCD and NPF 
funding, as well as the waning levels of federal support. Sabin’s decline in support 
from 1998 onward was noted by PNDSC staff as a key indicator of its financial 
instability, a key reason for its inclusion in merger discussions (The Enterprise 
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999). The most 
dramatic drop in Organizational Support, though, occurred when Sabin CDC 
withdrew from the Merger process. In 2002, the local funding of the organization all 
but ceased. This withdrawal of local support had a broad effect on the organization as 
reflected in Figure 7-5.  
Figure 7-5 
Sabin CDC Net Income 1993-2006 
 
 
Sources: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006, Sabin CDC, 1993-1996. 
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 In order to sustain the organization, Sabin CDC sold a total of six properties 
between 2001 and 2006 (Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006). 
Because of the increase in neighborhood property values, the property sales in 2006 
enabled the organization to have a positive cash flow for the first time since 1999. 
The trend of selling former rental properties does not bode well for the future of the 
organization (its rental income has declined by $35,000 since 2003; while it is 
contradictory to its mission and decreases its revenue in the long run, the sale of a 
housing unit is a stop gap measure – and a way that this organization was able to take 
advantage of the rising neighborhood housing prices to keep itself afloat.  However, 
this trend of selling a property or two every few years has persisted as the 
organization continues to struggle internally and with its outsider status.  
 As a result of the home sales, too, the overall asset valuations for the 
organization declined (Figure 7-6), in spite of the fact that real estate prices have 
continued to rise in the area. The asset valuations are also indicative of the rise in 
property values in the neighborhood and the shift in development activity from 
affordable housing development, seen in the rapid increase in units and their value in 
the early and mid 1990s, to the leveling off of Sabin’s participation in the housing 
development market in the late 1990s.  
 Sabin CDC’s revenue came from a variety of sources. Early on, most of the 
revenue was operating support via BHCD, NPF, and the Enterprise Foundation, 
developer fees, and small grants from foundations like the Meyer Memorial Trust and 
the McCauley Foundation (Sabin CDC, 1997). These revenues increased as the 
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organization grew, developed more housing, and took on projects like the Alberta 
Street Corridor. In 1999, Felicia Allender-Brant and Craig Fondren shifted the focus 
to more youth opportunity and education programs and stabilized the rental income, 
so that they were able to weather the loss of support from the Collaborative (Fondren 
interview: 8; Sohl interview: 10). 
 
Figure 7-6 
Sabin CDC Asset Valuations 1997-2006 
 
 
Source: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006. 
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Figure 7-7 
Sabin CDC Gross Revenue 1993-2006 
 
Source: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006, Sabin CDC, 1993-1996. 
 
While Sabin’s finances have been somewhat inconsistent, its leadership has 
been fairly consistent and a clear reflection of the organization’s level of involvement 
in the neighborhoods. The Board of Directors, Executive Director, and Staff have 
been primarily neighborhood residents. Sabin’s first executive director, Diane 
Meisenhelter, held that position for almost 7 years. During that time she shared 
executive director duties with Jane Ediger, whose focus had been housing 
development. Meisenhelter left in early 1998, and Topaz Faulkner was hired as an 
Interim Executive Director (Ediger remained through late 1998) while the 
organization searched for a permanent replacement (Meisenhelter interview: 2). The 
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Board hired Felicia Allender-Brant in 1998, a relative outsider; she remained with the 
organization through 2006. Allender-Brant was originally from Portland, but had 
been working on the East Coast in the early 1990s, where she had developed strong 
ties to several social service organizations including the United Way, Big Brothers 
and Big Sisters, and the YWCA (University of the District of Columbia, 2007).  She 
capitalized on these ties when Sabin CDC withdrew from the merger process and 
sought funding elsewhere.  
Sabin’s board roster has continually reflected the changing neighborhood 
(Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2005; Sabin CDC, 1994-1996). 
The founding board represented a “broad cross section of the community. Over two-
thirds of the Board are low income, and over half the Board is African American” 
(Meisenhelter, undated-d). While primarily neighborhood homeowners, the board has 
been and continues to be both diverse and primarily neighborhood based. Sabin has 
had a fair amount of Board continuity, both a benefit and a detriment for the 
organization (Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2005). A benefit 
because Board Members were familiar with the organization and did not require 
training and time to acquaint themselves with the policies and projects of the 
organization. A detriment because often the Board represented the neighborhood 
from a moment in time, and in the late 1990s and early 2000s, those moments were 
fleeting, as the neighborhood experienced gentrification and rampant housing 
speculation, so that there was what felt like a continuous demographic shift (Fondren 
interview: 12).  
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As the neighborhood changed to a wealthier, whiter demographic, the board 
evolved and began to draw on experts, both black and white, moving into 
neighborhood, as well as long time residents, and reflected the changing racial 
composition of the neighborhood. The ensuing board expertise and corporate 
connections helped to refocus Sabin’s priorities through a number of tumultuous 
years following their withdrawal from a City mandated merger process (Fondren 
interview: 8). For example, one Board Member worked for Microsoft, and through 
her efforts, Sabin CDC acquired computers and software that enabled both the 
Neighborhood Network Centers and the Education Video Project to provide 
opportunities for low-income neighborhood residents. These projects also represent 
some of the different partnerships that Sabin CDC capitalized on as it moved away 
from housing development (Fondren interview: 8). 
In addition to its Executive Directors, there were key staff members who had 
an impact on the direction of the organization. Craig Fondren, whose latest title is 
Director of Economic Development, was a driver behind Sabin CDC’s youth outreach 
and education programs; his arrival in 1995 signaled the beginnings of the shift in the 
focus of the organization:  
I came in to do programs and services to kind of expand what  we were 
doing with our affordable rental housing and affordable other units to 
design some homeownership programming, educational  programming, 
which I think were both very successful,  but then also expand on our 
partnerships as well as grant writing and foundation research. 
      Fondren interview: 1. 
  
Because of Sabin’s ongoing work with Franciscan Enterprise and Housing 
Our Families and the Collaborative’s desire to eliminate the competition for funding 
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in Inner North/Northeast Portland, these three CDCs were set to merge to form 
Albina CDC in 2000;73 however, at the 11th hour, Sabin called a meeting of its 
membership and withdrew from the merger process that the Board had previously 
agreed to (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 2003). Fondren was a pivotal player in organizing 
Sabin’s membership vote that ultimately led to their withdrawal from the merger 
process because he felt strongly about Sabin’s status as a membership organization. 
He saw “the merger of Northeast CDCs (as) orchestrated from downtown not from 
the community...” and reiterated that the “membership told us we don’t want you to 
be a part of that, we went through the whole thing of all the meetings, and the studies, 
we went through all that, but our membership said that this is a good idea” (Fondren 
interview: 7). Others, both inside and outside of the Collaborative, feel that Fondren 
“orchestrated that outcome” (White interview: 9). Given the fact that the organization 
formed from the merger (Albina CDC) ultimately failed, Sabin CDC’s withdrawal 
from the merger process ultimately saved them from the same fate. 
With this withdrawal, though, Sabin entered into a new realm. The political 
fallout from this bold move was significant and is remembered ten years later. Local 
funding for operating expenses all but ceased and has not been actively sought since 
then, but Sabin was fortunate enough to have an Executive Director, Felicia Allender-
Brant, whose priorities reached beyond housing development. In addition to selling 
houses, Allender-Brant garnered key grants from national organizations such as the 
United Way, so that while Sabin’s rental and development income decreased, their 
program service revenue actually increased substantially between 2001 and 2006 
                                                
73  A more in depth discussion of the merger process can be found in Chapter 9.  
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(Fondren interview: 8; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006). 
This subsequent shift in funding sources ensured that it would remain a smaller 
organization. When combined with Sabin’s affordable housing, the emphasis on 
educational programs both enabled and encouraged low-income families, albeit a 
limited number, to remain in the neighborhoods. In the middle part of the decade, 
Sabin seemed to have overcome some critical hurdles in establishing and maintaining 
neighborhood ties and weaning itself from local development-oriented funding. At 
Sabin CDC’s 15th Anniversary Party in 2006, various funders and politicians attended 
– at least giving the appearance that some of the animosity had subsided.  
Sabin CDCs current presence in the neighborhood, though, is muted. Its 
previously higher profile role in the Alberta Street Fair and Last Thursday events has 
been overshadowed as the events, created for and by the creative community that 
initiated the gentrification process, have taken on a life of their own (Mitchell, 2006). 
The results of the youth education programs and economic development activities 
have manifested themselves in very different ways. The youth education programs 
have sponsored summer internships, filmmaking classes, and business community 
partnerships for teens to gain work experience and focus to either go on to college or 
find gainful employment (Fondren interview: 16; Stimson, 2009). These programs, 
while empowering to its participants, no longer focus on bringing neighbors together, 
as the Alberta Corridor Project had. Combined with Sabin’s minimal new housing 
development, often an organization’s most visible neighborhood activity, their 
visibility in the neighborhood has lulled (Andrews interview: 7). Former Executive 
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Director Diane Meisenhelter lives 5 blocks from the Sabin CDC office and was not 
aware of Sabin’s current projects and programs (Meisenhelter interview: 3). 
 “Today’s neighborhood does not know who the heck we are,” surmises Craig 
Fondren (Fondren interview: 17). Sabin, in its “streamlined” position as tenant 
service provider and advocate, is not a visible presence in the broader neighborhood; 
its limited presence at neighborhood-wide events and the organization’s limited 
resources in recent years does not bode well for the organization’s future.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CASE STUDY 5: PORTLAND COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
 Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) was the brainchild of 
future City Commissioner Erik Sten, then aide to Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury. 
The result of neighbors clamoring for the City to resolve the issues that resulted from 
the bankruptcy and indictment of the owners of the Dominion Capital, PCRI was 
specifically created by the City of Portland in 1992 to renovate and manage the 354 
housing units of the tainted Dominion Capital portfolio. Dominion Capital’s owners, 
Geoffrey Edmonds and Cyril T. Worm, had amassed their portfolio by inflating 
appraisal values and offering financing that included a complex series of secondary 
transactions associated with each loan; as a result, they were arrested and subsequently 
sued for damages by the State of Oregon. Worm and Edmonds filed for bankruptcy in 
response to the lawsuit, and their creditors were left with a legal mess of entangled 
ownership and housing that was worth less than what they had invested in it (Lane and 
Mayes, 1990; Lane, 1990a; Lane, 1990b).  In addition, many of the houses had blatant 
building code violations that rendered them uninhabitable (Lane and Mayes, 1990; 
Kraus interview: 11). 
 The Dominion Capital scandal was first reported by Dee Lane in The 
Oregonian in 1990 in her expose, “Blueprint for a Slum”. This three part series of 
articles detailed the debacle, the endemic neighborhood redlining and lack of 
regulatory oversight, and spurred the City of Portland to take action. Dominion 
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Capital, funded by mostly out of state investors, had acquired significant numbers of 
single family houses to sell on contract to homebuyers, many of whom were unable to 
qualify for conventional financing, either due to the location of the property or their 
own credit limitations, or both (Lane, 1990b). If an individual wanted to buy a home 
in any of the Albina neighborhoods at that time, they had very few choices because of 
the combination of bank lending reluctance and low home values. Banks were 
unwilling to loan on properties worth less than $30,000, because they would not make 
a profit on the loan. The average property value in Inner North/Northeast Portland at 
that point in time was approximately $25,000.  Dominion Capital swept in to this 
vacuum and provided loans, albeit under false pretenses; the company offered to 
finance their properties for buyers, but their financing packages included fraudulent 
appraisals, estoppel deeds, and balloon payment requirements that were not clearly 
noted (Lane and Mayes, 1990).74 Even after Dominion Capital declared bankruptcy, 
the holders of the 1st mortgages sought to foreclose on the homebuyers – and offered 
loans at 17% interest rates as a way of avoiding foreclosure (Lane and Mayes, 1990). 
The City of Portland stepped in and sought to buy out the investors (Edmonds and 
Worm had rescinded their interest in the properties). A local consortium of real estate 
investors led by Michael Debnam had tried as well to bid on the properties but were 
rebuffed by the City (Axley, 1992; Messinger, 1991; Stewart interview: 14). The 
negotiations between the City of Portland and the non-Dominion Capital investors 
                                                
74 An estoppel deed contains more than one property on a single deed. With multiple properties on a 
single deed, clear title to a single property was nearly impossible (Stewart interview: 15). 
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went on for about a year with the investors reluctantly relinquishing their interest in 
the portfolio of houses to PCRI (Pickett, 1991; Mayes, 1991; Lane, 1992a, 1992b).  
Given that PCRI’s original housing portfolio was primarily single family houses 
that were spread out over a fairly large geographic area (27 different neighborhoods), 
their undertaking would require a tremendous amount of financial and property 
management finesse. The fact that this was a City backed effort was a tremendous 
political risk for its proponents, Gretchen Kafoury and her chief assistant, Erik Sten 
(Fitzpatrick interview: 10; Stewart interview: 14). During the negotiations for the 
property acquisition, parties interested in buying the properties warned Sten that PCRI 
would “find itself hopelessly in trouble as it tries to digest this large (sic) an operation” 
(Messinger, 1991). Because the City’s approach had never been tried, there was plenty 
of skepticism and expectation that the effort would ultimately fail.  
The financing for this endeavor was a heretofore-untested combination of 
public and private money, an approach that neither the City of Portland nor any of the 
lenders had significant experience with. The bulk of the money was a $12.43 million 
line of credit, at below market interest rates, from a consortium of lenders led by US 
Bank. This loan was secured by the State of Oregon’s entire allocation of Affordable 
Housing Tax Credits for 1992 and a Section 108 Loan from the City of Portland 
(Kiyomura, 1992; PCRI, 1993; Kelley interview: 2).75 Yielding to the political 
pressure to issue such a large loan to an untested organization was evidence of the 
banking community’s commitment to improving their Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) ratings and the political will of 
                                                
75 A Section 108 Loan is guaranteed by future local Community Development Block Grant Funding. 
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City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury and her aide Erik Sten and their commitment to 
championing affordable housing (Frater interview: 20).  
The line of credit was divided into property acquisition ($10 million) and 
property renovation ($2.43 million) (City Recorder, 1992). The extent of the property 
renovations was somewhat unknown at the time of the securing of the properties 
(Fitzpatrick interview: 5). As the portfolio was being acquired, assessments were 
being made of the individual properties to determine the extent of the renovations 
required, but Craig Kelley, PCRI’s first construction manager, remembers “nobody 
had any idea what they were getting into … they were literally driving by homes, and 
before they acquired the portfolio saying that house needs this much work” (Kelley 
interview: 5). Kevin Kraus, former construction manager for REACH CDC who 
volunteered to help out with the assessments, recalls his inspections of a number of the 
houses and that “there were some pretty abysmal dwellings that needed a lot of work” 
(Kraus interview: 11). It became clear that very few if any of the rental houses were in 
good condition, and the bulk of the portfolio required at least a moderate amount of 
rehabilitation work.  
 The first order of business for PCRI, though, was to stabilize 70+ fraudulent 
land sale contacts (Kafoury, 1993a; Ediger interview: 3; Fitzpatrick interview: 1). Guy 
Alverson and Jane Ediger were hired to clarify and clean up these contracts in order to 
relieve the investors of any lasting legal and financial interests they may have had in 
the properties (Ediger interview: 2). Many of the residents who held these contracts 
were not “bankable”, so US Bank representatives went out into the community and 
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wrote up new mortgages for those who were “bankable” and extended new land sale 
contracts to those who weren’t (Ediger interview: 3). While PCRI’s staff was involved 
with this aspect of the portfolio, the rental houses remained in a state of limbo; many 
were uninhabited and boarded up, while others had residents who were living in often 
substandard conditions (Kelley interview: 2). Because Dominion Capital was 
originally set up to sell properties and not necessarily to manage them, they had 
become unintentional landlords when they foreclosed on a property; often, units were 
not re-saleable without a “significant investment”, so they remained rental units 
(Fitzpatrick interview: 4).   
 During this initial flurry of activity, PCRI’s Board of Directors was conducting 
a national search for a permanent Executive Director.  In 1994, Maxine Fitzpatrick 
was hired and has been with the organization ever since. Fitzpatrick came to Portland 
from Milwaukee, Wisconsin where she had been responsible for several housing 
programs (Fitzpatrick interview: 6). She has steered the organization through the 
uncertainty of its early years and is well respected by both her peers and funders for 
her persistence in stabilizing and managing the original portfolio (Benjamin interview, 
p 9; White interview: 9). The fact that PCRI has had only one director in its existence 
is both a strength and a weakness: a strength because Ms. Fitzpatrick has established 
strong relationships with funders, neighborhood leaders, and other CDC staff, a 
weakness because there will come a time when she will be moving on, and that 
transition for the organization will be difficult, even with the most astute planning, 
because of the duration of her tenure (Guajardo, 2009b). 
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When Fitzpatrick arrived, she had a two-pronged approach to running PCRI: 
stabilize the rental portfolio and build the capacity of the organization. She hired staff 
specifically to take on the task of renovating properties and establishing property 
management standards and policies. PCRI’s staff has morphed with the transition of 
the state of the portfolio and in response to available funding. There were three 
construction managers from 1994-1997: Craig Kelley, then fresh out of college, and 
Michael Gardner who had similar experience ran the major rehab projects, while 
former contractor Michael Quinn ran the moderate rehab projects (Kelley interview: 
2).  
PCRI was initially hampered by the rental homes’ numerous building code 
violations and its limited initial housing rehab budget (Lane, 1992b; Kraus interview: 
12). The renovation process proceeded modestly (50 rehabs in 4 years) as the staff 
grappled with the condition of the properties and their own learning curves. In 
addition, one of the goals for the organization was to utilize neighborhood based 
contractors as a part of an overall economic development scheme; however, this goal 
became an impediment because staff were unable to find experienced contractors to 
complete the work within their limited budgets (Kelley interview: 4). Most of the 
CDCs were similarly making a concerted effort to hire smaller, neighborhood 
contractors to complete the rehab work; in many cases it was the contractors’ 
introduction to paperwork that was more than the “back of the envelope” level of 
sophistication, so that they were “building capacity” along with the PCRI staff about 
the requirements of working on a project that had some public oversight (Loving, 
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2001; Kelley interview: 4). Because of the dearth of experienced contractors, PCRI’s 
need for internal capacity building, and the backlog of houses in need of repair, some 
units remained boarded up for several years. This lack of progress irritated some 
neighbors who realized that their opportunities for buying houses in their 
neighborhood were limited as surrounding property values began to rise (Stewart 
interview: 21).  
PCRI moved forward with initial renovation projects until the US Bank Line of 
Credit, after one extension, reached its limit in 1997-98 (Kelley interview: 3). At that 
time, PCRI shifted its focus from portfolio stabilization to the establishment of 
management practices that would ensure the longevity of the portfolio and the 
organization. In order to streamline and maintain its remaining portfolio, PCRI 
divested itself of several houses that were too expensive to renovate or too far flung to 
manage effectively; one of the early core tasks of the organization was to  develop a 
business plan and to establish criteria “by which PCRI should consider selling versus 
trying to maintain as affordable rentals” (Fitzpatrick interview: 4). By 2000, though, 
the selling of houses did add to the problem of gentrification, as 6 of the 15 units sold 
between 1997 and 2000 were resold within 6 months at a substantial profit (Jaquiss, 
2000).  
During this time period, the other CDCs in Inner North/NE Portland began to see a 
drying up of development opportunities and began to focus on more sophisticated 
multi-unit developments, the acquisition of LIHPRHA properties, and the 
development of more tenant service based programs. In  2000, PCRI reinvigorated its 
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housing development programs with the hiring of Valerie Garrett who was both a 
licensed architect and experienced project manager. Garrett expanded PCRI’s 
portfolio to include PCRI’s only new-construction projects, oversaw the renovation of 
Park Terrace, and facilitated the development of homes for child care providers.  
When Garrett left in 2004, PCRI’s housing portfolio consisted of 366 units of housing, 
205 single family houses, and 161 multi-family units (McGee, 2004). During its 
existence, PCRI had only divested itself of a total of 30 units: 6 homes sold on the 
open market and 24 sold to low-income tenants (Jaquiss, 2000).  
Figure 8-1 
Park Terrace Apartments 
 
 
Photo by Author 
 
 Initiated in 1999, the acquisition of the Park Terrace apartments was one of the 
high points of PCRI’s Executive Director Maxine Fitzpatrick’s tenure (Fitzpatrick 
interview: 2). Park Terrace is an 88 unit apartment complex located in the Humboldt 
neighborhood. Its previous owner had taken advantage of tenants with HUD’s Section 
8 voucher program to populate the complex; these tenants had started to organize in 
1992 to combat “harassment effort of management” (Portland Community 
Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a). 
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 Park Terrace was a unique project in that it was one of the first “preservation 
projects” completed in the City of Portland. The City Council had passed an 
“Affordable Housing Preservation Ordinance” in 1998 that stated  “ owners of Federal 
Preservation Projects who have decided to “opt out” of their contracts” must notify the 
City of their intent and first negotiate with the City, or its designee, to sell the property 
in order to maintain a supply of affordable housing (City Recorder, 1998; City of 
Portland, 1998). The subsequent time frame for maintaining affordability (where 
tenants pay no more than 30% of their income for rent and utilities) is 60 years (City 
of Portland, 1998). In PCRI’s case, Park Terrace not only required substantial rehab, 
but also was a foray into a new level of property management – a multi-family 
apartment complex with a mix of unit-based Section 8 vouchers  and market rate units 
(McGee, 2004). 
 PCRI’s instant housing portfolio catalyzed its organizational capacity building. 
While it had an initial staff of 8, three of those people were construction managers in 
charge of the moderate and whole house rehab programs (Kelley interview: 4). As 
time went on, PCRI’s original US Bank line of credit began to dwindle, and its focus 
expanded beyond the physical stabilization. As a result, PCRI’s staffing became more 
diversified and involved with property management, tenant services, and child care 
development programs. Marni Vlahos was hired in 1994 to initiate PCRI’s  childcare 
programs. Under Vlahos’s leadership, PCRI’s childcare program flourished into three 
parts:  the Parents Child Care Network, the development of homes for small family 
childcare businesses, and an emergency scholarship fund (Meyer, et al, 2003).  
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Figure 8-2 
PCRI Rental Housing Unit Acquisition 1993-2006 
Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a and 
2006a. 
 
 Working in conjunction with the Peninsula Children’s Center, PCRI staff  have 
expanded these programs as a part of their tenant service package and have worked to 
incorporate these programs a model into its holistic tenant services. Access to 
childcare programs became a cornerstone of PCRI’s tenant services, and served as the 
basis for moving PCRI from a low-income housing development and management 
agency into a model other CDCs strive to follow (Warner interview: 26). 
 By 1999, as other CDCs in the area were struggling to find new development 
projects (and their associated fees to help keep the organizations afloat), PCRI was 
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enjoying a fairly consistent revenue stream from its properties, in addition to the 
developer fees from the Park Terrace development. The time that Fitzpatrick had  
Figure 8-3 
PCRI Childcare House 
 
Photo by Author 
spent initially to solidify the organization was beginning to pay off – but perhaps even 
more beneficial was the low cost basis on the portfolio. PCRI had acquired the bulk of 
its portfolio when the real estate market was at its nadir (approximately 
$30,000/house); hence, the debt cost was very low, so that rents could remain low, and 
even intermittent higher vacancy rates or unit repair would not adversely impact the 
organization’s cash flow to the extent that they would be forced to sell properties or  
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explore other avenues to maintain the staff and services (Sten interview: 9).76 Hence, 
PCRI’s solid financial position has allowed the organization some latitude when 
choosing new projects.  
Figure 8-4 
PCRI Revenues from Rental Income 
and Development Fees 1995-2006 
 
Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b, 
2006c. 
 
One of the avenues that PCRI chose to pursue was development that addressed 
green building practices. In addition to Park Terrace, PCRI completed 10 additional 
                                                
76 PCRI’s housing revenues are based on a combination of rental income and developer fees for major 
renovation and new construction projects (which have been somewhat limited in recent years). They 
reflect both the availability of public money and property for development and the economy as a whole. 
Development activity had its ebbs and flows, while rental income, once the units were stabilized, 
remained somewhat consistent, although not a reflection of the increased market rents, due to the 
income and rent restrictions necessary to be. 
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construction projects in 2003, under Construction Manager Valerie Garrett’s auspices. 
The Russet Morris Green Plexes and the Fab Four Green Building Rehabs were 
constructed with particular attention given to green building principles (Portland 
Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2003b).77 These developments represented a 
new direction for affordable housing: a greater investment in up-front building costs 
with higher quality and more efficient and less toxic systems and materials. This 
investment would pay off in the long run for both management and tenants; for 
management in lower replacement costs and greater longevity and for tenants in lower 
utility bills and a healthier environment. Greener building principles had been 
encouraged by PDC, the main funder of development projects; however, PDC did not 
increase its funding commensurate with the increased costs of green building, so 
groups like PCRI were pushed to seek more creative financing of these projects, 
especially the smaller ones with fewer economies of scale78.  
In 1999, the Collaborative asked the CDCs of Inner North/NE Portland to enter 
into discussions of ways to consolidate their organizations. The Collaborative’s 
rationale was that they could no longer continue to fund a total of 6 organizations that 
were overlapping each other in terms of service delivery and were competing for a 
limited number of development opportunities (PNDSC Staff, 1998; Farnum, 2003; 
Oliver, 2000). PCRI’s board decided to not participate because Fitzpatrick was very 
                                                
77 The Morris Green Plexes were constructed on sites that PCRI had already owned, so their addition to 
the portfolio offset the loss of the previous unit that was torn down. They also represented an increase in 
density for the sites from 2 units to 5. The green building practices utilized included the mitigation of 
lead based paint, the use of low energy light fixtures and appliances, low VOC paints, natural flooring 
materials, and higher efficiency furnaces and water heaters (Portland Community Reinvestment 
Initiatives, 2003b).  
78 Green Building practices are now standard for publicly funded affordable housing development.  
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leery of the mandate and “it wouldn’t cripple the organization” to forgo that funding 
(Fitzpatrick interview: 7). By staying out of the fray of the organizational merger 
process, PCRI was able to stay focused on its property management, restructure the 
financing on many of its units, to explore homeownership opportunity programs, and, 
unknowingly, to place themselves in a position to acquire Albina CDC’s units when it 
foundered in 2004 (Rudman interview: 9; White interview: 9).  
 PCRI’s housing portfolio was both its greatest challenge and its greatest asset. 
Acquired when property values were very low, PCRI’s portfolio has only increased in 
value (Figure 8-5); one of the organization’s great conundrums, though, is how to take 
advantage of the equity that PCRI has in its portfolio (Rudman interview: 9).  
Figure 8-5 
PCRI Asset Valuations 1999-2006 
 
Sources: McGee, 2004; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 
2003a, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2006b. 
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Leveraging the equity allowed PCRI to acquire properties like Park Terrace, but 
Fitzpatrick is keenly aware of the danger of encumbering the properties with debt 
because the margins between adequate cash flow and indebtedness are very slim 
(Fitzpatrick interview: 1). It should be noted that the Asset to Debt Ratio grew at a 
uniform pace until the acquisition of the Albina CDC Portfolio in 2006 (Figure 8-6). 
Figure 8-6 
PCRI Asset to Debt Ratio 1999-2006 
 
Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b, 
2006b; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a and 2006c. 
 
With PCRI’s portfolio in good shape, Fitzpatrick turned her attention to a problem 
that had become more magnified as the surrounding neighborhood had gentrified: 
minority homeownership (Fitzpatrick interview: 11; Housing and Community 
Development Commission, 2004; Malloy interview: 13). Earlier, she had been part of 
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an advisory committee that had recommended funding for such a program – and she 
expanded PCRI’s expertise to include homeownership opportunities as one of her 
tenant service goals. The minority homeownership program was established in 
response to the gap in homeownership rates  - 38% of African American households 
are homeowners versus 59% of white households (Guerrero, 2004; Housing and 
Community Development Commission, 2004). Begun in 2004, shelved in 2007, and 
reinvigorated in 2010, PCRI’s homeownership program was not been nearly as 
successful as either its rental housing or its childcare initiatives, in part because of it 
was established at the height of the real estate market. PCRI established an Individual 
Development Account (IDA) program to assist participants (mainly from its own 
tenantry) in saving for a down payment, as well as financial counseling and education 
about the home buying process (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a; 
Malloy, 2010; www.pcrihome.org, 2010). The Portland City Council allocated 
substantial funding to this endeavor and prioritized minority homeownership in the 
face of one of the hottest real estate markets in the country. In its first year, only one 
family was able to navigate the system to buy a home; however, in its second year, 11 
tenants became first time homebuyers, while “more than 80 residents were counseled” 
(Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2005a).79 
                                                
79 By contrast, the Portland Housing Center, a local nonprofit that assists first time homebuyer 
education programs, foreclosure prevention, and financial counseling, has assisted more than 5,500 
individuals since 1991 with homeownership process (www.portlandhousingcenter.org) . This program, 
and its public support, has since foundered, due to the reorganization of the Housing Department of the 
Portland Development Commission (the program administrator) with the Bureau of Housing and 
Community Development, but more importantly due to its establishment at the height of the housing 
market.  
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 Success was not a given with PCRI. They had weathered a number of 
controversies with both the neighbors and the local press, in part because of its 
position as a publicly created and partially publicly funded agency. Because of its 
initial high profile, PCRI could have been a magnet for criticism, but it managed to go 
about its business, in part because it did not complete any large flashy new 
construction projects that inevitably drew the attention of the neighbors and the press. 
Mike Andrews, formerly of the Enterprise Foundation, gives credit to the efforts to 
stabilize the portfolio, rather than expand it with new construction projects, as the 
reason for PCRI’s low-key endurance (Andrews interview: 9). 
However, the organization did not escape all scrutiny. In 2000, an article in 
Willamette Week criticized PCRI’s personnel costs and other policies; this article 
stated that PCRI’s personnel costs had increased 140% since 1993 – a reflection of not 
only the increased numbers of staff, but also its professionalization (Jaquiss, 2000).  
This professionalization of staff was required as both the organization and projects 
became more diverse and complex and the fact that all property management was 
handled in-house (Fitzpatrick interview: 4). Childcare programs, resident services, 
property development, management and maintenance were amended to include 
homeownership services in 2004. More importantly, though, the creation of the 
positions of Deputy Director and Human Resources/Office Manager reflect a change 
in the structure of the organization to a broader management configuration, one that 
shifts some of the day-to-day responsibilities of the organization from the Executive 
Director and could ensure the longevity of the organization.  
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Another critic of the organization is Fred Stewart, long time neighborhood 
resident, former president of the King Neighborhood Association, and local realtor. 
Stewart has often wondered if PCRI should “go away” (Stewart interview: 14). 
Neighbors, led by a vocal Stewart, perceived that PCRI was trying to muscle them out 
of opportunity (Jaquiss, 2000). Since the inception of the organization, Stewart had 
been conflicted about PCRI’s role in the neighborhood; boarded up houses were not 
only an eyesore, but a foregone opportunity for neighborhood residents who wanted 
to buy homes in the area (Stewart interview: 16; Jacquiss, 2000).80 When competition 
for cheap houses was heating up between non-profit and for-profit developers, 
“investors who would call up on houses if they found out a nonprofit owned it, or the 
city, and start making complaints. I’m a neighbor that lives at 4566, that address 
doesn’t even exist, I’m tired of this, they’ve got gang members, they’re hoping the 
city or somebody will force the nonprofit to sell that out” (Stewart interview: 17; 
Morgan interview: 4). This created tensions between non-profits like PCRI and 
neighbors, because they would have to decipher which calls were red herrings, and 
which were legitimate, especially when it came to tenants.  Stewart’s personal lack of 
trust with the organization has decreased since they now have been good neighbors 
for 15 years – he appreciates the fact that some affordable housing has been preserved 
in Northeast Portland, especially since the “window of opportunity” for affordable 
housing development, now viewed in hindsight, closed so quickly (Stewart interview, 
p 26). 
                                                
80 Houses would remain boarded up for several years, as the organization gained capacity and worked 
through its backlog of renovations in its early years.  
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On the other hand, each time PCRI staff began to work on a house in the early 
days, neighbors would come up and ask, “Hey, what’s going on?” They were “happy 
to see the houses get fixed up” (Kelley interview: 3). These renovations proceeded 
steadily in the early years and tapered off as the neighborhood began to gentrify, so 
that the flurry of activity associated with renovation projects quickly became 
associated with gentrifiers, rather than a low-income housing provider. This was a 
function of both the timing of PCRI’s finite funds from its line of credit for housing 
renovation, and the tremendous influx of private development in the neighborhoods 
of Inner North/Northeast Portland beginning in the late 1990s. 
As private investment in the neighborhood created a wider gap between the 
haves and have-nots, PCRI shifted its priorities from major renovation of its units to 
maintaining low rents for its tenants and provided additional services for those 
tenants. This shift to include more tenant services was reflected in the organization’s 
income sources and staffing. Because most staff positions are in part funded by 
individual grants (in PCRI’s case, it is roughly 20% of the organization’s income, but 
varies as seen in Figure 8-7), the number of staff and their job descriptions fluctuate. 
The size of the organization has varied from eight to twenty four staff at any one 
point in time (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b, 2006b; Personal observation). Early staff focused on the 
renovation and management of housing units to stabilize the portfolio, while later 
staff focused on the maintenance of units and accessing programs that would 
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Figure 8-7 
PCRI Organizational Support and Program Support from Grants 
1995-2006 
 
 
Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 
2005b, 2006b. 
 
expand PCRI’s tenant service delivery (child care programs, financial literacy and 
IDA accounts, thriving family programs).  
 One of the greatest impacts on PCRI was the shift in the types and levels of 
housing development funding. As housing development became more expensive, the 
Collaborative encouraged more multi-family housing development, and virtually 
eliminated its funding of single family housing redevelopment, in part because 
development costs were very expensive for only 1-2 units of housing, and in part 
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because of the funding priority for very low-income families.81 Because PCRI’s 
portfolio was composed of mainly single family houses, it was nearly impossible for 
it to redevelop any that had not yet been renovated; most funding from the 
Collaborative or PDC was earmarked for housing for families in the 0-30% MFI 
range (and limited the rents that could be charged), and the costs of construction and 
development far outweighed the rents that could be realized.  This was also counter to 
PCRI’s renovation approach under Construction Manager Valerie Garrett – to spend 
more money on each unit up front in order to ensure a smoother long-term unit 
management.  
 As a result of the shift in housing development priorities and a contraction of 
tenant service funding in the early 2000s, PCRI became, once again, a lean 
organization. Its revenues continued to exceed its expenses, and it successfully retired 
almost half of its original US Bank Line of Credit (Portland Community Reinvestment 
Initiatives, 2006a, 2006b). Because of its fiscal soundness, PCRI was one of the few 
candidates for the acquisition of ACDC’s portfolio in 2004 (Albina CDC Board SAE 
Boards, 2004a). Its solvency, too, made it unique among its counterparts in Inner 
N/NE Portland, where the other organizations did not have the benefit of a substantial 
portfolio with a low cost basis, one of the key factors that allowed PCRI to weather the 
gentrification of the neighborhoods. The fact that the cost basis for PCRI’s portfolio 
did not demand a relatively high level of cash flow to keep it in the black, 
 
                                                
81 In 2004, the City of Portland created the 10 Year Plan to End Homelessness and having already 
focused its housing funding on those in the 0-30% MFI range (Walsh interview: 9). 
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Figure 8-8 
PCRI Revenue v. Expenses 1999-2006 
 
 
Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 
2005b, 2006b. 
 
 
and that the organization maintained a 97% occupancy rate over a several year period, 
are evidence of a business operation that was in a position to expand without risking 
the equity that it had built up.   
In April 2004, the board of PCRI entered into negotiations with the remnants of 
the board of Albina CDC to acquire their portfolio. The board of Albina CDC had 
decided to cease operations and divest itself of its properties, after trying to re-
invigorate the organization and bring on some new board members (Albina CDC SAE 
Boards, 2004c). They considered NW Housing Alternatives, REACH CDC, and PCRI 
 209 
and ultimately chose PCRI for its success in managing a large portfolio and its strong 
and stable leadership and its commitment to the neighborhoods of Inner North/NE 
Portland (Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004b; Purcell interview: 4).  
At that point, PCRI was on sound financial footing, and had set its sights more 
towards homeownership programs when this opportunity arose. Maxine Fitzpatrick 
took the opportunity to “negotiate with PDC, renegotiate loans, and reduce monthly 
payments”, as well as renovating a significant number of the properties to ensure that 
they would be more manageable (Purcell interview: 4). While the Albina CDC Board 
originally intended to transfer the properties by August 2004, the negotiations with 
PCRI lasted for two years, during which time the properties were renovated, and the 
staff of PCRI prepared to take on the management of a significantly larger portfolio 
(Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004b). By acquiring 360 housing units in 2006 from 
Albina CDC, PCRI brought its total number of housing units to just over 700 –a 
dramatic increase since the portfolio had remained relatively stable since its inception 
(Jaquiss, 2000; Fitzpatrick interview: 2).  
When assuming the Albina CDC portfolio, PCRI was in a unique position to 
stipulate that these units arrived in a freshly renovated condition and with financing 
that provided for reasonable loan repayment, adequate reserves, and affordable rents; 
more importantly, the acquired units would be of benefit to the organization as a 
whole – they would not be a drain on PCRI’s finances, as was witnessed in the 
creation of Albina CDC (White interview: 9).  However, after Albina CDC had 
entered into negotiations, the debt on much of its portfolio was restructured by PDC, 
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and properties that had not been previously encumbered with debt were saddled with 
debt and lender restrictions (McIllhattan, 2003; McGee, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2010). This 
refinancing, along with the initial increase in expenses to accommodate such an 
increase in unit management, proved to be a drain on PCRI’s cash flow in the long 
run. PCRI’s decreased asset to debt ratio from 1.5:1 to 1.375:1 and compromised the 
overall stability of the organization (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 
2006b; Fitzpatrick, 2009). 
With the increased unit counts (and greater concentration of multi-family 
apartment complexes), though, PCRI can now enjoy some economies of scale and 
certainty with its asset management, a status long heralded by funders. Because they 
have attained this “scale”, PCRI, once the organization has worked through the newly 
acquired debt issues, will be in a position to leverage new programs and expand 
development opportunities, an approach that will secure them a long-term role in the 
neighborhoods they serve (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2006a).82 
One of the property management issues that is magnified with the large portfolio is 
the changing racial and ethnic composition of the tenantry. When PCRI was founded the 
majority of its tenants were Black or Caucasian, the demographics have shifted, and 
their tenant population is increasingly Hispanic. Accordingly, PCRI staff composition 
reflects the neighborhood racial and ethnic changes that have occurred in the past 16 
years. In 2004, PCRI’s staff could communicate in 10 languages other than English, and 
their diversity mirrored the diverse tenant population (Portland Community 
                                                
82 Generally the term “scale” refers to organizations that operate several hundred units of housing 
(McLennan interview: 20; Walsh and Zdenek, 2007).  
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Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a).  Former City Commissioner Erik Sten has remarked 
that PCRI is “the only CDC, and I don’t mean any offense to anyone else, where, when 
you walk into their office, the maintenance staff is Russian, and the property manager is 
African American, and in this very, very white town, they serve a very diverse 
constituency extraordinarily well …” (Sten interview, pp. 8-9).  
Another property management issue that has become magnified as the 
neighborhood has gentrified is PCRI’s role as a landlord. Being a responsible 
landlord has two sides: to the tenants and to the surrounding neighborhood. Each 
group has a different kind of reciprocal relationship: tenants are more likely to pay 
their rent and remain as tenants when landlords respond to their requests for repairs 
and upkeep, while neighbors are more likely to support another project by the CDC 
when their track record of having good tenants and property maintenance is evident 
(Lydgate, 1999). Conversely, if a CDC is not a good landlord, neighbors respond not 
only by withdrawing their support for new projects, but by applying increased 
political pressure on organizations to rein in their development activities and clean up 
their existing properties. The dilemma is that the diminished organizational income 
(from developer fees) due to a lack of new development opportunities can cripple an 
organization, especially one highly focused on housing development, and, as a result, 
impede the remedying of existing management problems by cutting off the flow of 
money.  
One of the lasting questions about PCRI is whether it is a CDC by definition. 
Maxine Fitzpatrick maintains that the organization was created because the 
 212 
community clamored for a resolution to the Dominion Capital debacle (Fitzpatrick 
interview: 1). Its board has consistently had a nominal, yet consistent tenant 
representation: Ayanna Curry, PCRI tenant, is one of the longest serving board 
members (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a, 2003b, 2004b, 
2005a).83 The remainder of PCRI’s Board of Directors has been a list of who’s who in 
Portland and has always been primarily “downtown” oriented. Drawn from Portland’s 
development, finance, and political communities, the Board has not been a grass roots 
effort. Initially, Erik Sten, the aide to City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury who 
initiated the idea of forming PCRI to acquire the Dominion Capital houses, served on 
the board for several years before he ran for City Commissioner. The faces on this 
board were initially very different from the faces in the neighborhoods in which they 
worked; this is no longer the case, as the neighborhood demographics have changed. 
The Board has also boasted bankers, lawyers, politicians, and key players in city 
development agencies: “it was not grass roots up, it was City-backed and opportunity 
driven” (Sten interview: 8).84 
 What has made PCRI successful, though, is its consistency as a property 
developer and manager, its relatively low-key presence in the neighborhoods in which 
it worked, and its consistent and strong leadership. These three strategies facilitated 
PCRI’s ability to manage its portfolio and gradually expand its tenant services. When 
                                                
83 This dearth of resident control has prevented PCRI from being designated as a CHDO, so that it 
would be eligible for HOME funds, something that other CDCs strive for, while PCRI, with its ready-
made portfolio, may not feel is a necessary funding addition. 
84 Other board members have included Fred Hansen, Director of Tri-Met, and Judith Pitre, former 
program director of the Housing Authority of Portland, Amy Miller-Dowell, project manager for PDC, 
and Dave Castricano, Vice President for US Bank (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 
2002a, 2003b, 2004b, 2005a). 
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coupled with its ready-made, low cost-basis portfolio, PCRI’s more business-like 
approach to its mission of housing and service delivery allowed it to weather changes 
in funding priorities and development opportunities that other organizations were 
unable to achieve.  
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CHAPTER 9.  
CASE STUDY 6: MERGER TO CREATE ALBINA CDC 
 
 
The Merger Process 
Every BHCD staff member still cringes when they hear the word “merger”. With 
hindsight, BHCD staff, Enterprise staff, and CDC boards and staff agree that while it 
may have been a fiscally necessary process, the implementation was so poorly 
executed that it left the resulting organization weaker and more dysfunctional than its 
predecessors (Farnum, 2003: 24; McLennan interview: 11). 
The merger process took root in 1996, soon after the Enterprise Foundation 
established an office in Portland, and the Portland Neighborhood Development 
Support Collaborative (PNDSC) was created. PNDSC was an agreement between the 
Enterprise Foundation, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund, and the Bureau of 
Housing and Community Development to pool their resources and streamline CDC 
funding and reporting requirements (Neighborhood Partnership Fund, et al, 1996).  
Enterprise had brought a new level of accountability to Portland, as it was been in 
charge of the disbursement of funds from a consortium of nation-wide corporations 
and private philanthropic organizations called the National Community Development 
Initiative (NCDI); NCDI monies, while plentiful at that point, were restricted in their 
use (Luckett & Allen interview: 13). The initial infusion of support was for a two year 
time period, with the potential for a two-year extension (Andrews interview: 2). Until 
this point, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund (NPF) had been funding organizations 
on an ongoing basis – they had been in the business of “flowering many small CDCs” 
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and were less concerned with performance or accomplishment (Luckett and Allen 
interview: 7); an organization would receive funding because it was in year three of a 
five-year cycle, and not for a particular project or because they had attained a 
particular benchmark (Andrews interview: 3). Towards the mid-1990s, NCDI relied 
increasingly on local partnerships to encourage CDCs to diversify their funding 
sources, so that it would be “easier to weather the departure of any single funder” 
(Walker, 2002: 55). By 1996, too, BHCD’s main sources of federal funding were 
diminishing, and the Housing Investment Fund that Gretchen Kafoury had established 
in 1994, and Erik Sten later championed, from the City of Portland General Fund had 
limited and finite resources (McLennan interview: 8).85 The idea for the creation of a 
Real Estate Transfer Tax as a permanent and stable source of funding was in its very 
nascent stages and was to face a long uphill, and so far unsuccessful, battle in the State 
Legislature.86 
Across the river, the by-products of neighborhood improvement, increased 
property values and new residents with higher incomes, were already visible in the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Farnum, 2002:5; Hunsberger, 
1998). With the increase in property values, development became more expensive, and 
as the Albina neighborhoods became more desirable places to live, non-profits began 
to compete with for-profit ventures for development opportunities. The saturation of 
                                                
85 CDBG funding was waning, and HOME had a particular set of requirements that prevented CDCs 
from using its monies for operating support. The Housing Investment Fund was a one-time designation 
of $30 million for affordable housing production over a number of years – this fund’s greatest 
expenditures occurred in its first three years, 1994-1996 (www.pdc.us/hsg-brc). 
86 Previously defeated several times in the State Legislature, the current Real Estate Transfer Tax bill 
seeks to increase the real estate document recording fee by $15. Its projected revenue that will be 
dedicated to affordable housing production is $15 million in the current biennium 
(http://oregonon.org/newsletters/newsletter-october-28/#Public%20Hearing%20for%20Housing).  
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CDCs in such a small geographic area forced the organizations to compete against 
each other for the limited development opportunities. One factor that magnified this 
competition was the decline in the number of properties that Multnomah County made 
available through its foreclosure program: between 1992 and 1998, the county 
transferred 170 properties to CDCs in Inner North/Northeast Portland for re-
development, and between 1998 and 2003, it transferred 22 (Tupper, 2007).87 The 
North/Northeast Portland CDCs had relied on these properties for essentially free 
development opportunities, and the decline in available county properties required that 
CDCs search for lots, apartment complexes, and houses on the open market – an 
increasingly unviable approach for them.  
 Given the finite streams of funding, the neighborhood improvement that was 
readily becoming more visible, and the increased level of competition for scarcer new 
development opportunities, “ the city and funders wanted to rationalize the various 
funding streams” so that they could improve CDC “productivity and efficiency”(Rohe, 
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 25). Because PNDSC staff felt that this rationalization was 
an abrupt transition, “we did the Portland thing – we asked them to get it together” 
(Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 35). PNDSC initially requested that the CDCs of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland discuss opportunities where they could share resources and 
take advantage of skills that they had developed in order to increase their efficiency 
(Farnum, 2002: 2). 
                                                
87 This number includes properties donated to non-profits who were located in the vicinity but whose 
work was included in this study: Habitat for Humanity, NW Housing Alternatives, Jubilee 
Communities, and Network Behavioral Healthcare.  
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 The CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland had a history of cooperation. For 
example, Gretchen Dursch of Housing Our Families and Diane Meisenhelter of Sabin 
CDC met several times to discuss different economic development projects that they 
could work on together (Dursch interview: 13).  Karen Voiss of Franciscan Enterprise 
and Maxine Fitzpatrick discussed a shared vision for their in-home childcare programs 
(Dursch and Frater, 1995). In the case of HOF and Sabin, these discussions did not 
yield any substantive results because of a change in leadership at both organizations 
and shifts in focus.88 Also, HOF, Sabin, and Franciscan, along with the Housing 
Authority of Portland, shared the $250,000 federal grant for neighborhood policing 
and community safety in 1998 (Bernstein, 1998). While these efforts to work together 
were laudable, they were, for the most part, tangential to the real issues of 
inefficiency, overlapping service areas, and redundancy that the organizations faced. 
Gretchen Dursch remembers the conundrum that the organizations were trapped in: 
trying to “create a reason why we (were) different”, but at the same time work 
together (Dursch interview: 13). This need for the organizations to distinguish 
themselves occurred as each group was becoming more similar – HOF, Sabin, and 
Franciscan had all graduated to developing similar multi-unit rental projects. These 
three organizations, at certain times, even shared board members and staff.89 In 
                                                
88 The lack of continuity in leadership not only affected the ability of the organizations to work together, 
it also undermined the organizational stability in some cases. HOF, Franciscan, and Sabin CDC each 
transitioned between their first and second Executive Directors during this time. Please see the next 
chapter for further discussion. 
89 Jane Ediger, co-Executive Director of Sabin CDC, sat on HOF’s board. Alberta Simmons sat on both 
Franciscan’s and HOF’s boards. Linda Grear was a founding member of HOF and worked for Sabin 
CDC. Teri Duffy worked for NECDC and sat on HOF’s board. Sheila Simmons worked for HOF, and 
later Albina CDC, and sat on Franciscan’s board. Mike Dolan sat on Franciscan’s board and later on 
Sabin CDC’s board.  
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addition, the organizations were overlapping geographically. HOF, NECDC, and 
Franciscan had projects in the Sabin Neighborhood, and Franciscan and Sabin CDC 
had developments in the Boise Neighborhood where HOF was based (see Appendix I). 
However, being that each organization sprang from different roots, each had an 
independent identity that was the basis for many of the difficulties encountered in the 
merger process (Dursch interview: 13, McLennan interview: 10).  
 Concurrent with the City’s request that organizations streamline their 
operations was the creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development Support 
Collaborative, or PNDSC. Ostensibly creating a more efficient funding process, the 
Collaborative was the result of negotiations between BHCD, NPF, and Enterprise to 
pool their funding and subsequent reporting requirements for CDCs, to rationalize the 
funding stream (NPF et al, 1996; Sten interview, pp.6-7). Instead of three funding 
applications and three sets of reporting requirements, there would be one application 
and one set of reporting documents. This shift in thinking met with mixed reviews. On 
one hand, both the applications and reporting requirements would be simpler and more 
streamlined, and there would be less duplication of efforts (NPF, et al, 1996). On the 
other hand, a CDC would only get one chance for operating support – and if it did not 
get it, there would be serious financial implications (NPF, et al, 1996).90 This shift in 
how organizations were funded was also an opportunity for the City and NPF to cull 
the number of organizations that they had played a key role in creating; this 
rationalization of the CDC industry, so soon after it had been created, left several 
                                                
90 BHCD and NPF had supplied operating support for the five organizations at varying levels, from 
$50,000/year for PCRI to $250,000/year for NECDC (PNDSC, 1999; Fitzpatrick interview: 7; Kafoury 
interview, p, 7) 
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Executive Directors shaking their heads (Dursch interview: 23). With Inner 
North/Northeast Portland’s neighborhoods showing signs of gentrification rather than 
blight, the City had turned its attention to the revitalization of “other struggling city 
and suburban neighborhoods” (Oliver, 2000b). 
One of the largest issues for the organizations was that they had become 
“housing-centric” – they had relied, for the most part, heavily on the City’s operating 
support combined with developer fees from their housing efforts to stay afloat – and 
had not diversified their activities enough to be able to adapt to the dramatic changes 
that were occurring in the real estate market (NPF, 1994; McLennan interview: 9). In 
some cases, other programs were compromised by the focus on housing and 
development (Dursch interview: 8; Pequeño interview: 11). This focus on housing was 
in part due to Portland’s funding structures that emphasized housing development and 
did not encourage broader economic development activities (NPF, 1994; McLennan 
interview: 9; McNamara interview: 9). As a result of this focus, CDCs increased their 
capacity on the development side to meet these opportunities; however, as the 
opportunities and funding began to recede, what CDCs experienced was a feeling of 
desperation (Neil Mayer & Associates, 1998). Jaki Walker responded by taking on 
development opportunities that were ultimately not very successful and 
“entrepreneurial” endeavors that proved farfetched (Rudman interview: 8; Rubenstein, 
1999). HOF, Sabin CDC, and Franciscan chose to cooperate with the Collaborative’s 
suggestions, as the Collaborative required each organization to submit a work plan that 
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detailed how they would achieve a series of fiscal and organizational benchmarks that 
were required for renewed funding (NPF et al, 1999). 
The Collaborative Approach Action Plan was initiated in October 1999 
(Neureuther, 1999). 91 The intended outcome of this plan would be that PNDSC would 
fund no more than 2-3 of these CDCs, so that the rest would have to merge 
(Neureuther, 1999). The Collaborative’s initial “suggestion” that organizations 
consider sharing resources evolved into a “suggestion” that organizations merge – 
financial incentives were offered to those groups that were interested. This was the 
result of PNDSC audits and analyses of organizations that sought to establish a series 
of performance benchmarks in an effort to establish and maintain quantitative 
performance criteria (NPF, et al, 1999).  In December 1999, CDC representatives 
gathered to discuss “mergers and other service changes” with consultant Joan Brown-
Kline (Neureuther, 1999; Loving, 2001b); however, no CDCs “responded to the 
invitation to explore merging” (Farnum, 2003:10). The chairs of each board began to 
meet regularly to examine how best to streamline their operations so that they would 
not be in competition with each other and their services would not overlap. These 
chairs chose a 2nd member of their respective boards to join the discussions for a total 
of 6 representatives at the table (Farnum, 2003:12). This group spent six months 
developing a “shared services agreement”, per the recommendation of a consultant 
who had been hired by the Collaborative to facilitate the discussions (Sohl interview: 
11). The organizations proposed a “Housing Federation”, a “concept that did not meet 
our (PNDSC’s) stated objectives”: nothing less than a merged organization 
                                                
91 The original five participants were NECDC, Franciscan Enterprise, HOF, Sabin CDC, and PCRI.  
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(Neureuther, et al, 2000; Farnum, 2003: 11). As a result, the Collaborative staff then 
“insisted” that four CDCs in Inner North/Northeast Portland enter into merger 
discussions (Farnum, 2003:11). At this point, CDC leaders felt that they had been 
misled about the expectations of the Collaborative, especially since their consultant 
had encouraged them to proceed with the shared services agreement (The Skanner, 
2001; Sohl interview: 11). This miscommunication was the first of many missteps in 
the merger process and indicative of the power struggles that were ongoing, not only 
between the organizations, but also between the organizations and the funders. It left 
all parties exasperated, and the process stalled after 12 months of negotiations 
(Farnum, 2003:12). 
The evolution from the Collaborative’s suggestion to merge to its requirement 
that the organizations merge coincided with the end of the second round of NCDI 
funding and the realization that it  “wasn’t going to go on forever” (Andrews 
interview: 8). Further constraints on funding meant that the honeymoon phase was 
over for CDCs in Inner N/NE Portland: the Collaborative was requiring a new level of 
accountability for funding, and the CDCs as a group were not strong enough to 
overcome these measures (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 44).  
PCRI was the only CDC that was in a sound enough fiscal and managerial 
position to decline the Collaborative’s requirement, and they quickly dropped out of 
the discussions; Maxine Fitzpatrick realized that her organization had a very different 
asset base, and “we weren’t reliant as much on public subsidy” because of the fact that 
PCRI’s housing stock had been acquired for a relatively low cost and all at once (The 
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Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999; 
Fitzpatrick interview: 7). They had made excellent progress on their loan repayment to 
USBank and had enough units of housing to pay for the staffing required to ensure its 
proper management. Also, PNDSC’s funding of PCRI was $70,000 – a drop in the 
bucket for its overall budget of $1.2 million (PNDSC Staff, 1998). PCRI’s board 
approved withdrawing from the discussions, but the City “came back and said  …why 
don’t you just do it anyway?” Fitzpatrick sat in on the conversations for a few months 
but withdrew as soon as possible, as she saw no positive outcome for her organization 
(Oliver, 2000b; Fitzpatrick interview: 7). 
The first round of merger talks resulted in the following steps taken: NECDC, 
HOF, and Sabin CDC proposed to establish a joint venture “Community Housing 
Partnership”, Sabin and NECDC would discuss merging their organizations, and all 
three organizations would share office space and divide up tasks that would benefit all 
three, as Franciscan Enterprise had withdrawn from the merger process at this time 
(Neureuther, 2000b). Karen Voiss, Franciscan’s Executive Director, had written a 
letter to her board that criticized Housing Our Families because of a conflict over the 
community policing grant that HOF, Franciscan, and Sabin shared. This letter became 
public, and both HOF and Sabin refused to meet further with Voiss and Franciscan 
(Sohl interview: 11). Franciscan Enterprise withdrew from the merger discussions, As 
a result of her actions, Voiss was forced to resign, and Franciscan, risking the loss of 
its PNDSC support, withdrew from the merger talks, publicly citing financial struggles 
and a redefinition of its mission (Oliver, 2000a, Neureuther, 2000a; PNDSC, 2000). 
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The PNDSC Board approved the establishment of the Community Housing 
Partnership; the organizations had until January 1, 2001 to complete this endeavor 
(Neureuther, 2000b). The boards of the three organizations worked through their 
individual issues and returned to the negotiations (Farnum, 2003: 13).  
 In April 2000, “new information regarding the financial situation of NECDC 
caused both the Collaborative and Sabin and HOF to reconsider whether a structural 
arrangement or merger with NECDC was viable” (McLennan, 2000). This information 
included the discovery of “substantial unsecured short-term and long-term debt” 
(Neureuther, 2000a). This debt was the result of Executive Director Jaki Walker’s 
leading the organization down a very unconventional path. The negotiations for the 
sawmill in Zambia had cost the organization dearly both financially and politically.  
When Walker entered into the merger discussions on behalf of NECDC, the other 
groups had little confidence in their ability to negotiate with her, given her headstrong 
and defiant personality and NECDC’s insolvency (Fitzpatrick interview: 7; PNDSC, 
2000; Sohl interview: 11). After Walker’s departure from the organization, NECDC 
foundered, as  an ambitious, for-profit homeownership project  (Historic Riverpointe) 
encountered insurmountable difficulties. While the Collaborative released the 
“remainder of NECDC’s FY 1999-2000 funding early”, they refused to fund NECDC 
for FY 2001-2003, citing its lack of a clear business plan (Neureuther, 2000a; Oliver, 
2000; PNDSC, 2000). NECDC had been so reliant on the City’s support that this was 
the final stranglehold – NECDC closed its doors 2 months later, amid neighborhood 
gossip that the City had been looking for an excuse to shut it down (Sohl interview: 2). 
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In spite of the fact that it had “been a line item on the City’s budget” and had received 
more operating support than any other organization in Portland, NECDC had liabilities 
of $1.7 million, including an unsecured loan from Fannie Mae for $250,000. Its total 
liabilities outweighed its remaining assets: 11 unsold houses for low-income families 
that were returned to the lenders (Oliver, 2000b). Steve Rudman remembers his 
exasperation: he “pulled the plug” in May of 2000 when the negotiations for the saw 
mill deal fell through, and Walker, ever defiant, insisted on continuing (Rudman 
interview: 8). 
NECDC’s withdrawal from the merger discussions, and subsequent demise, 
left HOF and Sabin CDC to forge an agreement between themselves. These CDCs, 
along with Franciscan Enterprise, “were performing at a lower level financially and 
managerially than the other CDCs in Portland”(Farnum, 2003:11). Recognizing that 
they needed to cooperate, HOF and Sabin CDC had hired a personnel consultant to 
“explore ways that the staff of their organizations could collaborate around the shared 
services concept” for the two organizations (Farnum, 2003:16). In the meantime, 
Collaborative staff coaxed Sabin and HOF into allowing Franciscan back into the 
merger talks after Voiss’ resignation in August 2000, with the proviso that a new 
consultant would be hired to facilitate the process from this point forward (Oliver, 
2000b; Sohl interview: 11). However, this consultant continued to work with HOF and 
Sabin staff after the decision for the three way merger was resumed; when this fact 
came to light, it created a conflict with the staff of Franciscan, as they “felt actively 
misinformed about the decisions their respective boards had made” (Farnum, 
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2003:16). The conflict also created more friction with the development of the new 
organization’s overall staffing plan as each board “had a strong commitment to its 
staff”, and the staff of the individual organizations were already concerned about the 
future of their jobs (Farnum, 2003:14 &19). The level of communication, or lack 
thereof, between the three boards reflected an underlying desire of each organization 
to maintain some semblance of autonomy, in spite of the fact that some members of 
the Collaborative were under the impression that the organizations would value their 
missions first and foremost, rather than the livelihoods of their respective 
organizations (McLennan interview: 10; Warner interview: 17). 
The three groups agreed on the formation of the new organization’s board of 
directors, and the Collaborative gave them a six-month time frame (until May 2001) in 
which to complete the merger process (Farnum, 2003:14-15). Well-respected local 
consultant Kay Sohl of Technical Assistance for Community Service (TACS), came 
on board as the lead facilitator at this point to officiate the “shotgun wedding” that 
would lead to the creation of the new organization in time to participate in the 
Collaborative’s funding cycle – and if the organizations failed to merge, then no one 
would be eligible for funding (Sohl interview: 12; Farnum, 2003:14). Two board 
members from each of the three organizations sat down to “create a program plan, 
develop a comprehensive budget, and initiate a funding strategy” in only six months – 
nowhere near enough time to complete the necessary comprehensive due diligence 
activities (Sohl interview: 11; Farnum, 2003:14).  
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At last, and in spite of the compressed timeline, the new board had clear steps: 
establish a new identity for the merged organization, establish the common values and 
mission that would guide the organization, and bring the assets of the two 
organizations under one umbrella. As a first step in establishing the new 
organization’s identity, the new board chose a name for the new organization. Board 
members well understood the meaning of the new name, both to themselves and the 
surrounding communities. Given the fact that each of the organizations, especially 
HOF, had encountered difficulties with its neighbors, finding a name that symbolized 
a unification of the organizations and a fresh approach to community development 
was important. One board member described the new organization as a “reflection of 
the community, not a corporate arm of the city” (Farnum, 2003: 17).  Ideas included 
an amalgamation of the different names, when Mike Purcell, from Franciscan 
Enterprise, suggested the name “Albina Community Development Corporation” as a 
way to integrate both the ideas and the missions of the different groups (Purcell 
interview: 12; Farnum, 2003: 17). 
The establishment of common values and a common mission were more 
difficult, and, in many ways, never occurred. Different perceptions abounded – what 
had been officially recorded as the mission statement was so broad that it included the 
diverse goals of the organizations, but “created conflict”, as some board members 
wanted to focus on community relations, while others were focused on the process of 
merging three sets of finances that were in various states of disarray (Purcell 
interview: 3). In hindsight, Sohl regrets the decision to lead the process because of the 
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various states of the finances: Sabin was well documented and on firm ground, but 
HOF had not had an audit in 2 years “they had no records – it was garbage,” and while 
Franciscan “had had at one time very good accounting,” that was no longer the case 
(Sohl interview: 12).  This complicated the next task of communicating with lenders 
about the capacity and viability of the new organization, so that the work necessary to 
create the new organization was not truly completed by the date of merge and 
ultimately caused a number of headaches for the new organization (Farnum, 2003: 17; 
Sohl interview: 12) 
While the original three-step merger process had been sidetracked months 
earlier, it was cast aside completely when lawyers for Albina CDC came to the 
conclusion that it would be far less costly for the groups to reach a “resolution to 
merge” and “have one corporation (act as a shell to) begin handling all the operations” 
(Sohl interview: 12). Because of the fact that Sabin was still fairly sound, and both 
HOF and Franciscan were in more precarious financial situations, the choice between 
using HOF and Franciscan was a difficult one because of the symbolism associated 
with being the first organization to lose its identity. One board member noted, “we 
must know now that this is the end of our organization.  ...The merged organization 
will not be this organization. ...it can’t be and it shouldn’t be. ... we must do this and 
we must accept that the end of what we began has come” (Farnum, 2003:13). The 
Albina board chose to use Franciscan Enterprise as the shell and to fold HOF’s and 
Sabin’s assets into it. This meant that Franciscan would essentially dissolve first, and 
HOF and Sabin, both membership organizations, would have their respective 
 228 
memberships vote on the resolution to merge. With that vote, the decision-making 
power of the membership would be rescinded, and a board of directors would govern 
the new organization exclusively (Farnum, 2003: 22, Purcell interview: 2). 
The boards diligently worked together to create this resolution, along with the 
creation of a new mission, funding and staffing plans. Because of the sensitive nature 
of these discussions, the six board members signed, at the behest of the Collaborative, 
a “confidentiality agreement” that limited the information that they could share with 
their individual organizations and the community (Loving, 2001b). There had already 
been ineffective levels of communication between the Albina Board and the boards of 
the HOF, Sabin CDC, and Franciscan, and this document magnified and reinforced the 
levels of miscommunication throughout the community (Farnum, 2003:13).  
Given the already difficult situation that the groups had encountered with their 
previous conflicts concerning personnel strategies, the creation of a staffing plan for 
Albina CDC presented the most problematic part of this aspect of the merger. The 
Albina board made the decision to hire an Executive Director prior to the completion 
of the merger, but did not have the time to allow their candidates to have input on the 
hiring of staff. Neither Joan Miggins Executive Director of HOF nor Felicia Allender-
Brant of Sabin was considered a strong candidate to lead the new organization. 
Miggins had floundered as HOF’s Executive Director, and Allender-Brant’s interests 
and strengths lay outside of housing and finance (Purcell interview: 13; Sohl 
interview: 10). The Albina board formed a screening committee to interview 
additional candidates and chose to introduce their two finalist candidates (both from 
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out of town) to the community at an “informal breakfast meeting” (Farnum, 2003:21; 
The Skanner, 2001). Breakfast attendees were able to complete comment cards and 
share their thoughts with the screening committee who ultimately decided to hire an 
outsider, Shelley Earley a mental health professional originally from Texas, much to 
the chagrin of some local housing advocates who felt that she was neither qualified for 
the position, and that hiring someone not from Portland was detrimental for the new 
organization (Benjamin interview: 8). The hiring of an out-of-towner for the position 
did introduce a new set of complications to the process: on one hand a fresh set of eyes 
had the potential to invigorate the organization, but, on the other, there was a 
significant learning curve for the new Director to accomplish in a very short period of 
time.  
 The hiring of staff for the new organization was made more problematic 
because of the sequence of the hiring of the Executive Director prior to the hiring of 
staff. No then-current staff from each organization was guaranteed a position in Albina 
CDC, although they were encouraged to apply; each Executive Director was asked to 
write letters of recommendation for their respective employees. As the Executive 
Directors were no longer candidates for the new leadership position, this was a 
particularly awkward situation for all involved. According to the hiring committee, 
these letters did not paint a truthful picture of staff skills, and, as a result, Albina 
CDC’s initial staff did not have a suitable set of skills for the positions for which they 
were hired (Farnum, 2003:23). This may have been in part due to the confidentiality 
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agreement – whereby the communication between the Albina board and the existing 
organization staff was so minimal that misunderstandings were bound to happen.  
The timing of the staffing of the Albina CDC came at a critical point in the 
merger process. Both Sabin CDC and HOF staffs were bitter about the uncertainty of 
their positions (Farnum, 2003: 21; Loving, 2001b). Because both HOF and Sabin were 
membership organizations, their by-laws required a vote of their membership to 
approve a resolution that would extinguish individual membership rights (Farnum, 
2003: 22; Fondren interview: 6). The HOF membership passed the resolution with no 
fanfare, but staff at Sabin CDC, who were angry about the lack of communication 
with the Albina board and the inevitability that many of them would lose their jobs, 
saw this as an opportunity to break away from the discussions because they were 
“orchestrated from downtown and not from the community” (Fondren interview: 7; 
Loving, 2001b).  
Because Sabin’s membership rolls were not in good order, a new membership 
list was created in order to establish who could vote on the resolution (Farnum, 2003: 
23). Sabin called a meeting of this revised membership 3 weeks before the merger was 
supposed to be approved. Twenty percent of the total membership turned out for an 
evening meeting on June 22, 2001 (Loving, 2001b). The membership unanimously 
“rejected the merger that its board of directors had endorsed” (Oliver, 2001; Fondren 
interview: 7).92 Alberta St developer and Sabin member Roslyn Hill cited her reasons 
                                                
92 There was much unsubstantiated speculation in the CDC community that Sabin staff had “stacked” 
the meeting because of the uneasiness with the merger, and their realization that they were on much 
firmer financial ground than the other organizations and would have nothing to gain from the merged 
organization (Andrews interview: 11). 
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for rejecting the resolution as Albina CDCs lack of clear mission and lack of 
neighborhood presence (Loving, 2001b). Sabin’s rejection of the merger had profound 
implications for both Sabin CDC and Albina CDC. In addition to the emotional blow 
to the board members who had spent two years working on the merger process, 
Sabin’s withdrawal created a logistical nightmare for Albina CDC in order to meet the 
July 1 deadline for funding from the Collaborative. Sabin, too, was subsequently 
“penalized by the Collaborative – no more funding”, (Fondren interview: 7; Loving, 
2001b; Oliver, 2001; White interview: 9).   
In a flurry of activity, all of the necessary steps were completed for HOF and 
Franciscan to merge, although with much less diligence because of the extreme time 
crunch, and Albina CDC was formed using Franciscan Enterprise as the shell. With 
Sabin’s withdrawal, though, members of Franciscan’s board questioned the wisdom of 
the merger and voted to delay the merger (Loving, 2001b). Mike Purcell was 
Franciscan’s board chair and played a pivotal role in the creation of Albina CDC. His 
leadership helped to break the deadlock on June 29th and the merger proceeded on 
schedule (Farnum, 2003:24).  
 
Albina Community Development Corporation 
Albina CDC officially opened its doors on July 2, 2001 with Shelley Earley at 
its helm (The Skanner, 2001).93 The decision had been made to occupy the former 
HOF offices in the Betty Campbell building and to remodel them to accommodate the 
                                                
93 The previous deadline of May 1, 2001 had been revised to July 1, the day that PNDSC contracts 
commence, as the organizations encountered several difficulties in garnering the necessary 
documentation to complete the process (Albina CDC Board, 2001). 
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new staff. Earley faced a difficult task with the oversight of a staff that she had no 
input on hiring, the looming transfer of properties, and the salvaging of HOF’s 
financial reports and updating its compliance status on several properties (Albina 
Community Development Corporation, 2001; Purcell interview: 2). Mike Andrews, 
formerly of the Enterprise Foundation and a key participant on the funder side of the 
discussions, likened the early operations of Albina CDC to those of driving your car 
down the street while you are trying to fix it, a situation that generally ends badly 
(Andrews interview: 12). 
In short order, much of the staff at Albina CDC were found to be unqualified 
for their positions. By the end of the first year of operations, “more than half of the 
remaining staff were not part of the initial group transition from the merger partners” 
(Farnum, 2003:27; Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001 & 2002). The 
staff turnover was a blow to the organization, as it consumed much of the Executive 
Director’s time and energy and detracted from her attention to finances and 
fundraising (Farnum, 2003: 24). The initial staff total was 15, with duties divided 
between operations, property management, and asset management (Austin, undated). 
Earley hired a Fiscal Manager, because her strength did not lie in finances, to oversee 
the completion of the transfer of the books from Franciscan and HOF to Albina CDC, 
the completion of audits, and the set-up of a financial system for the new organization 
(Farnum, 2003:25). This process did no go smoothly, as the fiscal manager “turned out 
to be incompetent”, further compromising the organization’s stability (Purcell 
interview: 3). 
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In spite of the fact that several of HOF’s small development projects were to 
be continued under Albina CDC, there was no mention of these development activities 
– “it was totally about trying to figure out the finances and trying to establish our 
survival in where we were going” (Purcell interview: 3; Albina Community 
Development Corporation, 2001).  Without any development income, Albina CDC 
was completely dependent on the Collaborative, in particular a grant from the 
SURDNA Foundation that NPF had won to facilitate the process (Farnum, 2003: 25).  
The lack of additional outside grant support (see Figure 9-1) was a result of the 
weakness of the organization and the lack of focus on the future of the organization –  
Figure 9-1 
Albina CDC Organizational Support 2001-2005 
 
Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2002-2006. 
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as Earley, the board and staff were focusing on the immediate needs of the 
organization, they lost sight of the need for ongoing support (Albina Community 
Development Corporation, 2001-2003). 
Most of HOF’s assets were finally folded into the new organization by 2002. 
Albina CDC’s rental revenues increased, due to the inclusion of the revenue from all 
of HOF’s properties, while its grant support declined (compare Figure 9-1 and 9-2), 
but its overall income was still negative, in part due to the excessive and ongoing 
consultant expenses that were needed to clean up HOF’s finances (Albina Community 
Development Corporation, 2002-2003). At this point, most of the property 
management responsibilities had been contracted out (and reduced the organization’s 
rental income), a decision that the board had made during the merger process, in order 
to focus, ironically, on the financial health of the organization (Farnum, 2003: 30; 
Purcell interview: 4).  
The final transfer of properties from HOF to Albina CDC, though, proved to 
be especially problematic and was not completed until 2003.94 Because of the number 
and type of properties, recent management problems, and a lack of attention to Single 
Asset Entity (SAE) operations, lenders “used the merger as an opportunity to take the 
organization to task on all of the ways they had not met their agreements” (Brown, 
                                                
94 Because Albina CDC had been created from Franciscan’s EIN, their properties transferred with little 
problem. HOF’s properties, in general, were larger and more numerous. The financing of these 
properties had relied on multiple lenders, some public and some private. Each lender had to sign off on 
each property in order for the property to transfer from HOF to Albina CDC (Farnum, 2003: 24; Albina 
Community Development Corporation, 2001). 
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Garrison, and Glass, 2004; Farnum, 2003: 24).95  The time required to secure lender 
approval for the transfer and to sort through the associated property insurance was 
Figure 9-2  
Albina CDC Gross Revenue 2001-2005 
 
Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006. 
 
damaging to the organization both in terms of finances and morale, as the lenders and 
insurance companies used the opportunity to reassess the health and terms of each deal 
(Farnum, 2003: 24).  
One of the Franciscan SAE properties, Avenue Plaza Apartments, was the 
source of additional drama during the early days of Albina CDC. Mike Dolan, a 
                                                
95 The SAE properties included the LIHPRHA properties, 20-100 unit apartment complexes acquired 
from private owners whose tax credits were expiring. See the HOF Case Study and the Franciscan Case 
Study for details in the acquisition of the properties. 
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former Franciscan board member, had assumed control of the SAE and succeeded in 
severing its relationship with Albina CDC because of his adamant disagreement with 
the merger process. He also launched an email campaign against the City to criticize 
the merger process (Loving, 2001b; Farnum, 2003:26). Avenue Plaza is a 22 unit 
apartment complex and was Franciscan’s largest apartment complex, so that the loss 
of these units, while mostly symbolic in terms of finances, was very time consuming 
for the board and executive director. Dolan oversaw the management of the 
apartments personally for a number of years before transferring the fiscal agent 
responsibility, ironically, to Sabin CDC (Rudman interview: 8; Sabin CDC, 2009).  
 HOF’s properties, especially its SAE’s, were no less fraught with difficulties. 
Former staff member Janet Bauer remembers that Earley was “terrorized by HUD on a 
regular basis it seemed” regarding these properties (Bauer interview: 15). Because of 
the previous lax oversight of the SAE’s and the again-deplorable condition of the 
Maya Angelou, HUD had stepped in and put the organization on notice that it would 
have to meet certain deadlines or risk cessation of funding (Albina CDC SAE Boards, 
May 2004). In one case, the Martha Wells Apartments’ finances had been so neglected 
that HUD denied Albina CDC a rent increase that was necessary in order to make 
repairs on the buildings (HUD Staff, 2004; Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004c).96  In 
spite of the chaos surrounding property management, Earley did succeed in overseeing 
                                                
96 While the income had been steady, neither the capital reserves nor the operating reserves had been 
fully capitalized, so that the funds were basically frozen until HUD could determine their proper 
allocation, a process that took approximately 3 months. Rental increases can only be requested every 2 
years.  
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a renovation of the Maya Angelou Apartments and brought the property back up to a 
reasonable condition (Bauer interview: 10).  
Earley left Albina CDC in March 2003 (Farnum, 2003:30). Her tenure had 
been laden with difficulty: she took on huge internal and external issues without the 
resources that she needed to accomplish them (Andrews interview: 12). Staff 
remember that “the problems of the organization sort of overtook the good stuff what 
she was able to start” (Bauer interview: 10). In spite of Earley’s best efforts, though, 
the Albina CDC board felt let down after her departure and questioned whether hiring 
her was a good idea in the first place (Purcell interview: 13). Earley’s departure forced 
the board to make some tough decisions about the future of the organization. Albina 
CDC had not coalesced as an organization; the time and energy of its professional 
staff had been consumed by meeting immediate regulatory and fiscal demands, while 
its tenant and community organizing staff floundered with the lack of direction and 
disconnect from the neighborhoods in which it operated.  
  In June 2003, the board laid off the remaining staff and hired Nanita 
McIlhattan as temporary Executive Director (Albina Community Development 
Corporation, 2004). McIlhattan was a financial person; her forté lay in sorting out 
finances and figuring out a way for the organization to operate in the black once again 
(Purcell interview:  3).  At this point, neighborhood and tenant outreach activities 
ceased, and all remaining property management was contracted out; the complete 
focus of the new Director was to sort out the finances and establish effective asset 
management (Farnum; 2003: 32).  The chaos from the merger had only grown worse: 
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finances were more entangled, neighborhood relationships were adversarial at best, 
and revenue had declined so that the organization was operating in the red (Albina 
Community Development Corporation, 2004; Figure 9-4). It was a do or die situation: 
either Albina CDC would get its house in order, or the Board of Directors would have 
to consider a different course of action. Issues that they had to grapple with included a 
housing stock that had suffered from deferred maintenance, either from a lack of 
attention, tenant abuse, or lack of earlier effective rehab or construction (White 
interview: 2).  
 In October and November 2003, Albina CDC divested itself of eight properties 
to raise operating capital and cover debt service for the organization (Albina 
Community Development Corporation, 2004). These eight properties had a total of 15 
units of housing and came primarily from Franciscan Enterprise’s portfolio.97 These 
15 units were sold at the height of the real estate market, as primarily rental units: by 
removing these 15 units from affordable status, Albina CDC, like Sabin CDC, 
inadvertently contributed to the increasing dearth of affordable housing in 
North/Northeast Portland.  
 It was the sale of these properties that signaled the beginning of the closure of 
Albina CDC. At this point, too, Albina CDC’s leadership was exhausted. Albina 
CDC’s Board was composed, for the most part, of the individuals who had seen 
Franciscan and HOF through the merger and had served on their respective boards for 
several years prior. Mike Purcell remembers that “there was about a five year period 
                                                
97 One of these units at 833 NE Wygant was flipped by its new owner for a profit of $100,000 less than 
six months later (www.portlandmaps.com).  
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of time when I would say that all I did was talk about mergers, philosophy, and 
finances; it had nothing to do with our mission, we did nothing, and it was the most 
grueling, unrewarding experience I could ever be involved with. We had attorneys 
Figure 9-3  
Albina CDC Asset to Debt Ratio 2001-2005 
 
Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006 
 
 
and accountants, and that’s all it was about”; given this experience, it is no surprise 
that the group was not able to attract any new board members to reinvigorate the 
organization (Purcell interview: 12, 3). 
In early 2004, it became clear that the organization was not going to be able to 
continue. It had been limping along and surviving on operating support from the 
Collaborative and had no development or programmatic opportunities. All of the 
properties had finally been transferred to Albina CDC from HOF, and their audits 
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completed. The group finally had a picture of where the organization stood financially. 
It had been operating in the red since the SURDNA grant money had been exhausted. 
When the finances were clarified, the outlook was not positive (Figure 9-4). Because 
of this bleak outlook, the Board made the decision to transfer Albina CDC’s assets to 
another CDC. It considered REACH and NW Housing Alternatives, but chose PCRI 
because it was an organization that was familiar with the history of N/NE 
neighborhoods, was committed to providing decent housing to low income families 
and had a history of effective scattered site property management, and was a familiar 
name to many of Albina CDC’s tenants (McIlhattan, 2005; Purcell interview: 4). 
Albina CDC and PCRI entered into negotiations for the terms of the transfer – a 
process that would take more than two years to complete.   
Figure 9-4 
Albina CDC Net Income 2001-2005 
 
Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006 
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As a part of this transfer, many of Albina CDC’s properties were renovated and their 
debt restructured, so that when PCRI took possession of the properties on March 31, 
2006, they were in good physical condition and had a positive cash flow, but had some 
unanticipated debt and lender restrictions (McIlhattan, 2003; McGee, 2005; 
Fitzpatrick, 2010; McIlhattan, 2005). While Albina CDC officially dissolved on April 
28, 2005, the transfer of 360 properties took an additional 11 months, but there was no 
fanfare. There were no newspaper articles, just a blip on the radar of the assessor’s 
office (See Chapter 8 for more details of the property transfer).  
The differing views about the purpose and needs of the CDCs of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland came to light during and after the merger process. The 
Enterprise Foundation saw the organizations as a “means to an end (neighborhood 
revitalization), and not the end” (Andrews interview: 8). Given that Portland’s CDCs, 
for the most part, “did not grow from strong community activism and protest”, their 
direction was very much governed by the goals and directives of their funders (Rohe, 
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 25). In its providing the groundwork for organizational 
development, NPF sought to “create an industry” thinking that it would be self-
sufficient within five years (NPF, 1994; McNamara interview: 5). BHCD encouraged 
the development of as many organizations as possible because of what staff members 
felt was an unending problem of vacant properties, crime, and blight in Inner 
North/NE Portland (McLennan interview: 1). Subsequently, after its formation, 
PNDSC focused its funding on fewer organizations, in an effort to make the best use 
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of its funding that had diminished by the late 1990s (NPF, 1994; Neil Mayer and 
Associates, 1998). The inevitable contraction of CDCs was a very painful, time 
consuming, and costly process – the depth of which stakeholders did not anticipate 
(McLennan interview: 10). 
The lessons learned from the merger process were many, and depended on 
which organization you consider. Neither Maxine Fitzpatrick of PCRI nor Craig 
Fondren of Sabin CDC has any qualms about their withdrawing from the process – the 
fact that both organizations still exist and Albina CDC does not is testimony in and of 
itself that the merger process was a failure (Fitzpatrick interview: 11; Fondren 
interview: 11). Mike Purcell, Franciscan board member who was involved in the 
merger and demise of Albina CDC, felt that Franciscan had been railroaded into 
participating and regrets that they ever participated. He wishes it had just downsized in 
1999, so that the organization could have continued its original mission of charitable 
works (Purcell interview: 13).  
One of the critical failures in the merger process is related to the sequence of 
events and the uneven timing. Initially, groups spent almost 2 years discussing options 
and creating shared development plans. When those outcomes did not meet the 
expectations of the funders who were driving the merger process, the time frame for 
completing a merger was compressed unrealistically to six months for three 
independent groups, who had been consciously differentiating themselves from one 
another, to create an organization that merged all of their missions, values, assets and 
staff. Had the organizations been on equal footing with clear financial statements and 
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audits and each board member seen the merger with positive outcomes, the process 
would have gone more smoothly. The Collaborative’s “hurry up and get organized” 
approach erased any trust that some board members had in them. One board member’s 
statement, “the Collaborative was more on the business side than the heartfelt side” 
describes of the divide between the funders and the organizations, as the funders 
sought to rationalize the CDC industry that it had aggressively initiated 10 years prior 
(Farnum, 2003:10; Neil Mayer and Associates, 1998). 
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CHAPTER 10.  
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The intent of this chapter is to tie the individual cases together and to relate 
them to broader contextual and organizational issues by answering the questions 
posited in Chapter 2. Much has been written about CDC growth and neighborhood 
change, but prior to the late 1990s and early 2000s, we have not had the opportunity 
to examine CDC growth and change in the context of a gentrifying neighborhood. 
Because of the geographic and temporal concentration of revitalization efforts in the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, the development of five 
organizations in a small area allowed such a longitudinal study. The previously 
symbiotic relationship between the organizations and their context morphed into a 
more disparate one, as organizational and neighborhood priorities diverged. Emerging 
at the tail end of a period of disinvestment, the five CDCs began as agents of 
revitalization; they matured into more professional development institutions that were 
often at odds with market forces; and, finally, they have settled into a role of low-
income housing stewardship. 
 The emergence, growth, and attrition of CDCs in Inner North/Northeast 
Portland gives a unique perspective on how Portland, both its residents and 
institutions, have dealt with and continue to deal with issues of race and racism and 
demonstrates the ability of a city government to mobilize and focus resources on a 
particular issue, in this case, housing problems. In the early 1990s, Portland was a 
medium sized city. It was one of the more affordable cities on the West Coast whose 
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economy was transitioning from resource based to hi-tech. Between 1990 and 1996, 
the city’s housing prices increased by 50%, while its wages did not keep pace with 
those increases. Hence, Portland went from being one of the most affordable places to 
live on the West Coast, to one of the least (Bole, 1996). This sling shot effect was felt 
most deeply in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, where property 
values had been depressed and rose more steeply than the rest of the city (Appendix 
H). This phenomenon is attributable to both localized gentrification, as well as the 
larger housing market forces that drove the economy until the end of 2008.  
 Through the framework established by the research questions, listed below, I 
have developed a critical comparison of organizations to each other and an 
understanding of their maturation process in a particular social, political, and 
economic context.  
3. How did the Albina CDCs evolve? 
A. What were the roots of these organizations? 
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational 
 development trajectories? 
4. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to 
 social and economic changes within their neighborhoods? As 
 neighborhood revitalization became apparent, how did the organizations 
 respond to it? 
 
With Hoover and Vernon (1959) and Clay’s (1979) periodization of 
neighborhood development/decline/redevelopment in mind, I created a chart that listed 
the key events for each organization to better understand the relationships between the 
organizations (See Appendix J: Timelines). From the organizational and context-
related events, four distinct phases of organizational development became clear: the 
Early Years – Industry Formation, the Middle Years – Industry Growth and 
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Complexity, the Merger Years – Industry Accountability, and the Mature Years – 
Industry Contraction.  The different periods were typified by similar development 
activities and organizational changes, funding and resource opportunities that occurred 
or were available for limited intervals. These periods correspond to the increasing 
complexity of the organizations, their responsibilities to their funders, and their 
relationships to their constituents and to the neighborhoods themselves.  
 The factors key to understanding these changing relationships are the social, 
economic, and physical resources that the organizations began with, the speed at 
which the organizations developed properties and their ability to manage them, and 
how the organizations reacted to interactions between themselves and their new and 
old neighbors. Each group’s initial resources varied greatly, from a workforce of 300 
church volunteers to boards composed of neighborhood leaders, to a housing portfolio 
of 350 units acquired with assistance from City Commissioners at rock-bottom prices. 
The speed at which the organizations developed housing was an indicator of 
organizational growth, in both size and breadth of responsibility – and a potential 
contributor to organizational downfall, as housing development is not a fully 
sustainable endeavor. The potential danger in this haste is twofold:  organizations may 
not have the capacity to manage the properties that they have developed and the 
responsibilities of property management separate an organization from its initial 
mission and intent. CDCs establish relationships with their neighborhoods early on; 
however, neither organizations nor neighborhoods are static entities, so that they are in 
a constant state of negotiation, a dance of leadership and accommodation.  
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Discussion of Research Questions 
 Organizational evolution can be viewed on a number of different levels. In the 
case of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland, aspects of organizational 
expansion, property development success and/or failure, and relevance to the 
neighborhoods in which they operate are three aspects that address the social, 
economic, and political sides of each organization.  
The Early Years – Industry Formation (1991-1995). In the Early Years, organizations 
were relatively well funded, had ample development opportunities, enjoyed fairly 
positive relationships with their neighbors, and experienced rapid growth in terms of 
their annual budgets and staff sizes. Most of the operating funding came from limited 
number of sources: the Neighborhood Partnership Fund and the City of Portland’s 
Bureau of Housing and Community Development. NECDC was the exception to this 
rule, though, because the organization had already won a Nehemiah Grant from HUD 
and intended to produce over 200 units of housing.  
 It was “the goal of NPF’s programs to ensure that all of Portland’s low-income 
neighborhoods are served by effective CDCs” (NPF, 1994: 1).  The process that NPF 
established to legitimize Portland’s CDCs steered the organizations into the field of 
housing development and initiated the professionalization of the organizations, a step 
that NECDC, Franciscan Enterprise, and HOF reluctantly followed for different 
reasons (McNamara interview: 5; Schleiger interview: 3; Sohl interview: 5). Sabin 
CDC readily participated, as Diane Meisenhelter had been actively recruited by NPF 
to establish and lead the organization (Meisenhelter interview: 1). The carrot of 
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operational funding for the organizations was very tempting, though, and ultimately, 
all of the boards of the Albina area CDCs participated in the NPF trainings and 
received their funding.  This initial steering of the groups into housing development 
and the catalyzing of their growth by infusing them with operating support, that in 
some cases went against the grain of the organizational objectives, represented a 
certain level of intervention and control that altered the organizations’ evolution and 
strongly encouraged a housing-centric CDC industry.  
 One of the great challenges for the community-based organizations was 
melding the local knowledge and connections of community members with the 
complex financial responsibilities of the development and management of affordable 
housing. It was often incumbent on the Executive Director to bridge these divides, and 
organizations that had strong consistent leadership and a commitment to broad based 
participation proved more successful at this endeavor than those that were swayed by 
the promise of development money. In the case of HOF, a group that prided itself on 
its full participation, some members noted that a board meeting vote could be 
determined by where one sat (Pequeño interview: 11; Smock interview: 3). NECDC’s 
Board was composed exclusively of professionals, so it was a non-issue (Northeast 
Community Development Corporation, 1997-2000; State of Oregon, 1998-2001). 
Sabin CDC’s Board members all resided in the neighborhood, at least in the early 
days, and represented diverse groups within the community. Board members generally 
served for several years, but after Sabin’s withdrawal from the merger process, the 
board shrank to 5 members, many of whom resided outside of the Sabin neighborhood 
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(Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2002-2003). This shift accompanied 
Sabin’s “go-it-alone” approach to organizational priorities and contradicted the public 
view that the organization was a neighborhood membership based organization.  
 One of the most divisive issues associated with the revitalization of the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland is that of race. For a city that prides 
itself on transparent and inclusive public processes, Portland has struggled with racial 
relations. Driven by what some interviewees referred to as the “Portland Nice”, where 
public officials’ actions in minority neighborhoods were driven by a sense of guilt and 
a fear of confrontation, City policy was punctuated by gaffs by public officials that 
fueled tensions between black and white (Rudman interview: 10; Mayer, 1989; Oliver, 
1989; Stewart interview: 2). Portland’s race relations have historically been 
downplayed because of the small size of the black population, and politicians, 
organizations, and funders approached the issues of racial strife, poverty and 
disinvestment as if they were housing problems, in part because much of the available 
money was targeted for housing, when in fact, it was more of an income problem.  
 The evolution of CDCs was entwined with race relations, as NECDC was born 
out of a group of black community leaders’ efforts to provide job training to 
underserved youth. Ron Herndon was by far the most outspoken of these leaders and 
had a profound influence on the direction of decisions. Herndon, in speaking as a 
member of the North/North East Development Task Force about the inclusion level of 
Portland’s black community in the Albina Community Planning process, noted, 
“neighborhood associations have never been used by blacks as a primary vehicle to 
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bring about change” and fought for structural changes (Ames, 1989; Carlin, 1990).
 While the Albina neighborhoods had been the targets of policies of real estate 
steering and subsequent disinvestment and redlining that were associated with racial 
discrimination and segregation, they also represented the heart of Portland’s small, but 
tightly knit black community. Census data (Appendix D) shows that in 1980, the 
census tracts analyzed were between 32% Black and 70% Black. As a result of 
revitalization, and a subsequent demographic shift, Portland’s black community is no 
longer centralized in Inner North/Northeast Portland; institutions like the Urban 
League no longer focus their efforts in a specific geographic area. However, key 
indicators like household income, and homeownership rates that signify economic 
stability show that Portland’s black community has not benefited to the extent that 
whites have in the past 10 years (Guerrero, 2004; www. census.gov).98 According to 
these indicators,  CDCs contributed to the physical revitalization of their 
neighborhoods, but did little to change the more insidious part of the problem: 
education, empowerment, and economic development.  
  In addition to race relations, the role of gender relations stood out as an 
important factor in the evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland. The 
most obvious relationship was between organizations and funders: men primarily were 
in the positions of financial power, while women were the local leaders of 
organizations and neighborhood efforts. These relationships reinforced traditional 
models and behaviors and placed the organizations into different camps: those who 
                                                
98 The American Community Survey Data Sets differ from those of the Census, but was the only data 
available since 2000. The closest comparisons occur in the Income Data Sets and the Housing Tenure 
Data Set.  
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worked with the system and those who did not (Malloy interview: 15; Sohl interview: 
11). Gretchen Dursch, HOF’s Executive Director, was a model for establishing 
relationships and figuring out how to accomplish her tasks without perceptibly going 
against the system. Jaki Walker, NECDC’s Executive Director, on the other hand, 
“was a force of nature” (Talton interview: 4). Her willingness to ruffle feathers was 
legendary, as she alienated those who were supporting her organization, but, at the 
same time she felt, were hindering its true potential (Mahoney, 1992; Sohl interview: 
3; Lane, 1992). Ultimately, though, Walker instituted greater neighborhood change by 
forcing the established system of funders to work with her, but at tremendous personal 
costs. 
 CDC board composition played a significant role in the early years of each 
organization. NECDC’s board was composed of elites from the black community, men 
and women whose financial acumen and political skills drew attention to the 
conditions of the neighborhood. Franciscan Enterprise’s early board was composed of 
volunteers from the churches that formed the group. They were committed to 
maintaining the volunteer model with little neighborhood representation, an example 
of a top-down approach to community development. HOF’s board equally represented 
community women and professional women. While this model worked well initially, 
the board composition did not serve the fiscal management side of the organization 
well in the long run, as the balance of skills was not even. Sabin CDC’s board was 
initially composed of neighborhood residents who were not necessarily low-income. 
The broad geographic base ensured that board members were committed to the health 
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of the entire neighborhood, and part of the organization’s longevity can be attributed 
to the fact that Board members were recruited continuously from within the 
neighborhood as it gentrified (Fondren interview). PCRI’s board, on the other hand, 
was composed of bankers, lawyers, and professional developers. While the idea for the 
organization may have come from the community, the structure and intent of the 
organization, at least initially, in no way reflected the composition of the community. 
The early board compositions reflected the early scale of development that each 
organization was able to attain, based on not only mission and intent, but also 
resources.  
 By 1994, the smaller CDCs, Franciscan, HOF, and Sabin CDC, were on 
similar trajectories: they were (re)developing single family houses and small 
apartment complexes. HOF and Sabin CDC, though, were actively organizing their 
neighbors, while Franciscan was struggling with what to do with fourteen donated 
houses – an example a development opportunity exceeding the organizational capacity 
and overwhelming the health of the organization in the long run. Franciscan had an 
additional struggle as it professionalized its housing production: its volunteer model 
was no longer the centerpiece of the organization, so that, as a result, the organization 
drifted from its original mission. 
 The issue of trust between organization and neighborhoods was a key 
challenge, especially for the smaller CDCs in the Early Years. Sabin CDC, Franciscan, 
and HOF struggled with this issue more so than NECDC or PCRI because it was more 
important to organizations with more incremental development approaches than to 
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those with politically supported ones. HOF worked diligently to build neighborhood 
trust as it embarked on the renovation of the Maya Angelou, but lost it over time, as 
both HOF and the neighborhood residents changed. Sabin CDC, on the other hand, 
was involved with residents on many different levels, from economic development 
along Alberta to tenant services, to youth programs, to board development that 
included new residents. It was the resultant level of trust that allowed the organization 
to operate transitional housing programs with minimal cries of “NIMBY!” 
(Meisenhelter interview: 6). The issue of neighborhood trust was more critical to the 
smaller, less well-funded organizations, as they relied on developing relationships at 
all levels in order to establish themselves as key leaders in their neighborhoods.  
  NECDC and PCRI were operating at different levels from the smaller CDCs. 
NECDC, having won the Nehemiah grant in 1989, suffered politically from the 
expectations that it would actually produce housing units in a relatively short period of 
time. The reality was that there was a lag time of almost three years between the 
winning of the grant and the completion of the first house (NECDC, 1990; Rollins, 
1992a). This did not bode well for the organization’s continued success and continued 
to be a problem for NECDC99. PCRI had begun the process of renovating its housing 
stock, but was hindered by its lack of capacity and the scale of the renovations needed. 
As a result, it suffered political consequences on the neighborhood level, but still had 
strong support from downtown. Reflecting back on Glickman and Servon’s model of 
                                                
99 The lag time between project initiation and completion became more significant for all of the 
organizations as projects grew in both size and funding complexity.  
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integrated capacities, this lack of consistency across organizations assured an uneven 
distribution of social capital. 
 All of the organizations stabilized properties and revitalized whole city blocks 
through their housing development efforts and created an atmosphere of tremendous 
change in the early and mid- 1990s. Most of the activities of each organization were 
associated with housing, although groups were still able to distinguish themselves 
because of their particular approach to development, the populations they served, and 
the broader impacts their developments had. NECDC’s Nehemiah development, in 
spite of its mortgage lending issues, created entire new blocks of housing that became 
a national model. Franciscan Enterprise housed very low income families; HOF’s 
women-centered model was admired for its inclusiveness; and Sabin CDC 
incorporated many facets of community development, not just housing, under its 
umbrella. 
 CDC investment in the Albina neighborhoods was significant in the early 
1990s – the five organizations built or acquired more than 700 units of housing before 
1996 in an area with roughly 11,600 households total (Office of Neighborhood 
Involvement, 1991). While important physical indicators of gentrification include a 
neighborhood with a historic housing stock and good metro access, the process occurs 
when the area has had a modicum of investment, along the lines of these CDC housing 
development efforts (Turner and Snow, 2000). According to anecdotal evidence, 
neighbors did improve their structures as CDCs renovated and built houses and 
apartment complexes (Kelley interview: 3; Purcell interview: 2). With the Nehemiah 
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houses, Jaki Walker and NECDC effectively transformed lending policies in Inner 
North/Northeast Portland, neighborhoods where homeowners had been denied 
mortgages for decades, so that there was access to credit (Kafoury, 1992; Lane, 1992c; 
Frater interview: 4). 
The Middle Years (1996-1998).  This time period was the most complex part of the 
evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland. A time of tumult and a 
greater definition of political and financial boundaries, these years were characterized 
by a demand for greater accountability from funders, limited but more complex 
development opportunities, early stages of neighborhood gentrification, and new 
property management realities. The greatest impact on organizations, though, at this 
time was the decision by the City of Portland, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund, 
and the Enterprise Foundation to streamline their funding and reporting processes into 
one source, the Portland Neighborhood Development Support Collaborative 
(PNDSC), in an effort to rationalize CDC funding. In doing so, these three separate 
entities exerted greater control over their grantees and created a political bottleneck: 
organizations were in an all-or-nothing position now for access to operating funding. 
This new roadmap would certainly cause some organizations to die out – the fact that 
both federal and philanthropic money were diminishing at that time caused many 
entities to rethink their position on the funding of community organizations.100  This 
change in policy was seen by the organizations as a rather abrupt change of priorities, 
                                                
100 NCDI and Living Cities funding was diminishing as the large foundations (Ford, MacArthur, 
Hewlitt, Casey) were shifting their priorities and interests (Allen & Luckett interview: 13; Hoereth, 
2002:22).  
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one that changed the power dynamics and generated mistrust between CDCs and their 
funders (Farnum, 2003: 16).  
A twist in project development funding, too, occurred at this time, as the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit became a greater source of project capital, and as HOME 
funds were targeted for lower income project development. In order to make projects 
“pencil” with Tax Credits, developers would have to access multiple sources of 
funding and develop larger projects (generally 8 units or more). Because of their size, 
these projects tended to have higher profiles and greater impacts on their surroundings 
– and pushed CDCs into a different position. They were no longer renovating a couple 
of houses; they were sophisticated developers (and landlords) with burgeoning 
portfolios of rental housing.  
 In addition to the shift in funding opportunities, development opportunities 
were diminishing. The neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland had begun to 
improve, and house prices were rising. There were fewer delinquencies and tax 
foreclosed properties, and the CDCs were competing with each other and private 
developers for a limited number of properties. As a result, NECDC developed a mid-
size apartment complex on an ill-chosen site; Franciscan Enterprise accessed new 
funding by working on special needs housing; HOF partnered with an experienced 
developer on a larger senior housing project; Sabin CDC began to shift towards 
economic development and youth education work; and PCRI accessed HUD’s 
program to integrate in-home childcare with affordable housing development. Each 
organization, leery of competition, sought to establish a particular niche for itself. 
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 As the organizations developed their niches and became more established, the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland began to change. While one of the 
issues associated with neighborhood revitalization is who benefits from the 
development, one should also consider who defines the neighborhood, old or new 
residents. In the case of the Albina neighborhoods, long time residents and new 
residents did not always have the same priorities (Lane, 1990b). Long time residents 
remembered the long history of broken promises, while newer (and often younger) 
residents saw many opportunities within the neighborhoods. Long time storeowners 
refused PDC money for storefront redevelopment and watched as new businesses 
came on to their streets to cater to the area’s new residents (Fondren interview: 18; 
Long interview: 9; Pequeño interview: 16). Many of the Albina CDCs had uneasy 
relationships with the neighborhoods, as there was a perception that these 
organizations had access to money that some neighborhood association members 
thought should have been allocated to them (Smock interview: 11; Stewart interview: 
35). The CDCs were in a state of limbo – they did not have the history in the 
neighborhoods needed to call themselves old-timers, and because of their missions to 
house low-income people, newer residents did not often see the neighborhood benefit 
of the organizations. HOF and Sabin established trust with their neighborhoods early 
on and for a short period of time, but these efforts were quickly erased by 
organizational shortcomings and the arrival of new neighbors who did not know about 
the good work that these organizations had done. As a result, HOF became an 
outsider, and Sabin CDC fell into obscurity. 
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 Also at this time, the Low Income Housing Preservation and Residential 
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) was introduced in Portland to preserve a large 
number of apartment complexes that had been developed in the 1970s as affordable 
housing units whose tax credits were expiring for their owners. The three smaller 
organizations (Franciscan Enterprise, HOF, and Sabin CDC) participated in the 
LIHPRHA program and added significant numbers of units to their portfolios as a 
result. 
 While much of an organization’s success was based on the number of units that 
it developed because it is a quantifiable and tangible asset that serves as both a 
financial and political bellwether, there are two problems with this emphasis. The first 
problem stems from the fact that, at least in the case of the CDCs that acquired 
LIHPRHA properties, the unit counts were hollow and contributed to an expectation 
that the organizations were more stable financially than they really were. For HOF, 
Franciscan, and Sabin, the LIHPRHA properties were of a different scale than they 
had previously developed and caused a slanted view of the overall portfolio. The 
second problem stems from the overemphasis on unit counts as a measure of success. 
This is in many ways more detrimental to an organization because it does not address, 
especially for younger and financially vulnerable organizations, their ability to manage 
the units in the longer term, and the broader implications for solid financing. The 
PDC, from whom most organizations sought project financing, often focused on the 
number of units, rather than the quality of renovation or the need for substantial 
reserve accounts to be built in to the financing, because of the nature of its institutional 
 259 
practices: loan repayment superceded the ongoing needs of the project and the 
organization that sponsored it. (Krause interview: 9; McLennan interview: 11). In 
doing so, PDC pressured organizations to develop as many units as possible for as 
little money as possible. This model would eventually backfire, as properties required 
substantial maintenance capital, and, in some cases, substantial renovation sooner than 
either the CDC or PDC had planned on (McLennan interview: 10, Kelley interview: 
9).   
 One of the positive outcomes of PDC’s demands was the formation of a 
consortium of CDC construction managers and directors, who came together to share 
information, commiserate, and to collectively try to influence PDC’s policies. As the 
CDCs began to amass small housing portfolios in the mid 1990s, Executive Directors 
and Construction Managers began to meet to discuss some of the common obstacles 
that each was encountering. The Rehab Work Group was a collective organization that 
groups used to object to policy and funding issues without fear of reprisal (Kraus 
interview: 14). This advocacy group expanded its scope and in 1995 became the 
Community Development Network, and has taken on the role of statewide advocate 
for housing policy and funding. The most visible actions of the CDN are now 
associated with asset management and lobbying at the state level for a real estate 
transfer tax to create a stable funding source for affordable housing development (Sten 
interview: 14). 
 The Middle Years were also a time of transitions for both the organizations and 
politicians. Levels of organizational competency were changing, as new staff were 
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required to have skill sets that previous staff did not. Several former staff members 
recall that their level of experience was far short of what was required for their 
positions, and that “while I was not qualified to do my job when I started, I was when 
it came time for me to leave” (Kelley interview: 2). Part of the reason for hiring under-
qualified staff was financial (salaries were very low, and often VISTA volunteers were 
utilized for organizing and outreach positions). The other reason was organizations’ 
efforts to hire from within the neighborhood: the skill sets of many early 
neighborhood residents did not often match those required for the job, but it was more 
important for the organizations to incorporate neighborhood residents into the 
organization than to have a highly skilled workforce (Dursch interview: 24). 
 Between 1996 and 1998, each Albina CDC experienced growing pains 
associated with their relatively intense expansions. These pains, or adversity, can be 
defined as a number of occurrences: a development project that went awry, the 
departure of key staff, board indecision or neighborhood resistance. It is not whether 
an organization will encounter adversity, but when it will and how it recovers from the 
adversity (Guajardo, 2009a, 2009c; McLennan interview: 10). Franciscan, Sabin, and 
HOF experienced a change in leadership. On the development side, NECDC 
completed its Nehemiah grant, PCRI maxed out its line of credit with Bank of 
America that it had used to gradually renovate its housing stock, and HOF developed 
the Betty Campbell Building, an unsuccessful project that riled its neighbors and 
funders.  For Franciscan, Sabin, and HOF, the change in leadership meant a shift in 
focus for the organization. Access to resources changed, and, in the case of HOF, 
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embezzlement of funds was discovered which compromised the organization’s 
credibility with local funders and HUD, who imposed additional restrictions on 
existing projects. 
 For HOF, recovering from the change in leadership and embezzlement was 
further complicated by the fact that the poor quality construction of its early 
development efforts was coming to light. The Maya Angelou Apartment complex, first 
renovated in 1993, was in need of a full renovation by 1997, due to the limited scope 
and the cosmetic nature of the first renovation, both magnified by HOF’s ineffective 
property management and eviction policies. The cosmetic nature of the renovation can 
be traced back to PDC’s refusal to pay for the full replacement of systems and the lack 
of replacement reserves set aside to deal with ongoing maintenance issues (Purcell 
interview: 6; White interview: 9). As Sabin CDC and Franciscan had initially worked 
on smaller projects and did not complete projects of more than 10-14 units, the scale 
of their renovation quality issues did not come close to HOF’s. 
 While Sabin, HOF, and Franciscan were coping with internal and property 
management issues, NECDC and PCRI were faced with finding new sources of 
funding for project development.  NECDC’s completion of its Nehemiah grant meant 
that it would have to explore other development opportunities – at a time when 
competition for projects was fierce, and homeownership programs had taken a back 
seat to rental projects because of the cost of and funding for developing individual 
units. As a result, Jaki Walker had to shift the focus of the organization to pursue 
different kinds of projects. The 55-unit Gladys McCoy Terrace was family housing 
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located on a major thoroughfare. From the start, the project was problematic; cost 
over-runs, high vacancy rates, and poor quality construction plagued the complex and 
further soured NECDC’s relationships with city leaders and, in hindsight, assured the 
organization’s demise. Historic Riverpointe, the up-market single family house 
development in NE Portland that was supposed to make money for the organization, 
lost money due to an extended development timeline; this was the first of NECDC’s 
increasingly far fetched ideas to sustain the organization.  
 PCRI’s line of credit with Bank of America had been its mainstay of funding 
to renovate many of the nearly uninhabitable houses that it inherited from Dominion 
Capital. By 1997, the credit line had been “maxed out”, and 80 housing units had 
undergone either moderate or major renovations so that building code violations were 
remedied and the organization was not in a “triage” mode where every week tenants 
would report new problems with plumbing, electrical, heating, etc (Kelley interview: 
4). Shifting from triage mode to longer-term management mode forced Maxine 
Fitzpatrick to pursue new types of funds to renovate the remaining housing stock. 
PCRI would now be competing directly with the other organizations for dwindling 
HOME and CDBG funds – an added pressure for both PCRI and other CDCs because 
of PCRI’s size and political support. 
 At this point, too, the composition of Portland’s City Council began to shift. 
City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury, champion of affordable housing and CDCs, 
resigned after 6 years in office. Her former aide Erik Sten, who had been a driving 
force in the creation of PCRI and had been elected to the Council in 1996, took over 
 263 
the leadership of BHCD. His efforts to continue Kafoury’s focus on affordable 
housing development were sidetracked by debacles with other bureaus that he 
headed.101 As a result, CDCs lost their affordable housing champion on City Council 
and some of the clout that they had previously enjoyed.  
 While organizations were undergoing their individual growing pains, the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland were experiencing some dramatic 
changes as well. Property values had increased on average 25% since 1994, and the 
area was undergoing the social and economic changes that accompany gentrification 
(Barnett and Suo, 1996). A small artistic community had established itself on Alberta 
Street and Mississippi Avenue to take advantage of cheap rents. Soon, consistent with 
artistic gentrification models, a couple of small galleries established themselves: 
TidBit and RIGGA Studio on Mississippi and the Onda and Guardino Galleries on 
Alberta (Fondren interview: 21). In addition, gallery owners on Alberta Street 
established a Last Thursday Art Walk to showcase their wares and assumed part of the 
responsibility for organizing the yearly street fair.102 These actions left Sabin CDC, the 
group originally responsible for the events, with a much less significant role, as the 
celebrations, like much of the development that surrounded them, took on lives of 
their own. This is consistent with Zielenbach’s assertion that while community 
                                                
101 Sten’s distractions included a billing debacle with the Water Bureau, where a new computer system 
failed to bill customers for 6-8 months and caused a strain on cash flow for the agency, his efforts to 
block Enron’s purchase of local utility Portland General Electric, and his effort “to force AT&T to open 
its local broadband cable networks to competing ISPs” (Gubbins, 2003). 
102 Last Thursday is a play on the more established First Thursday art exhibits in Portland’s Pearl 
District located near downtown.  
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organizations cannot single-handedly revitalize their neighborhood, they can influence 
the outcome.  
 The Merger Years (1999-2001). This time period was characterized by 
organizational internal focus, as each group struggled with its role in the PNDSC-
initiated merger discussions.  At this stage, organization priorities and those of the 
neighborhoods in which they operated truly diverged, as the organizations had become 
synonymous with affordable housing and little else.  It had been ten years since the 
Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Force (1988) noted the concentration of derelict 
buildings in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, and Portland’s 
housing market was heating up, like many others in the country. With the internal 
focus, many of the tenuous relationships with neighbors were neglected, and the 
necessary balance of organizational priorities was skewed.  
 The most dramatic example of this divergence, and subsequent imbalance, 
occurred in the Boise Neighborhood, as HOF contributed to activation of the political 
voice of neighborhood residents. When drug dealing and violence associated with 
HOF’s properties became the focus of a neighborhood organization that was coming 
together, HOF became the lightning rod around which the neighborhood organized. A 
stronger neighborhood association resulted. The Boise Neighborhood Association 
(BNA) had ongoing disputes with HOF regarding drug deals at its properties. HOF did 
not acknowledge the BNA’s grievances; while the BNA did not understand the 
constraints that HOF was under as managers of low-income housing developed with 
public dollars (Bauer interview: 12: Cross interview: 18). This mutual mistrust was 
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rooted in the absence of institutional memory on the neighborhood’s side and the 
feeling of helplessness on HOF’s side that paralyzed the staff, and prohibited the 
organization from overcoming their differences with BNA. Organizing against a 
perceived threat is a particularly effective way of galvanizing a group that would not 
otherwise come together. In this case, neighbors have continued to participate in the 
Boise Neighborhood Association since being brought together by HOF’s troubles, and 
they continue to cite this relationship many years later (BNA, 2007). 
 The timing of PNDSC’s initiation of discussions for organizational 
streamlining in 1998 could not have been worse in terms of CDC/neighborhood 
relationships. CDCs’ priorities were diverging from goals of (newer) neighborhood 
residents, and by forcing the organizations to focus on themselves and the merger 
discussions, PNDSC effectively marginalized them from fully participating in the 
revitalized neighborhoods. Each organization responded differently to this pressure to 
work together: HOF and Franciscan, both financially vulnerable organizations, entered 
the discussions as a result of PNDSC’s pressure, while PCRI, NECDC, and Sabin 
withdrew from the merger discussions at different stages. PCRI withdrew early on 
because it was not reliant on PNDSC for operating funds, and had a stable housing 
portfolio and cash flow.  NECDC had begun to pursue the development of a sawmill 
in Africa and had exhausted all of the proceeds from the sales of the Nehemiah 
houses, so that it was forced to withdraw from the merger to close down their 
operations. Sabin’s withdrawal, though, was controversial. According to some 
residents and staff, it reflected the organization’s connection to its membership and its 
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desire to continue its organizing work (Fondren interview; Loving, 2001b).  On the 
other hand, PNDSC members felt that it was a direct challenge to their authority, one 
that was countered with a cessation of all operating money (Fondren interview: 7; 
McLennan interview: 10; White interview: 9). Regardless of whether the organizations 
joined the streamlining process that evolved into the merger process, their individual 
relationships with their surrounding neighborhoods were altered by the rationalization 
demanded by the funders. The divergence with neighborhood goals included larger 
scale development and the emphasis on housing for very low-income individuals and 
families, two types of development that assured cries of NIMBY in areas where 
property values were skyrocketing.   
 The other point about the merger is that it exhausted both time and money 
resources when support for public investment in affordable housing and programs that 
benefited low-income individuals and families in the neighborhood was waning. It had 
been eclipsed by support for and concern with private investment in upscale housing 
and retail opportunities that were occurring. As a result, the organization that emerged 
from the other end of the merger process (Albina Community Development 
Corporation) was doomed to fail. All of the interviewees who had been connected to 
the merger process noted, in hindsight, that it was both ill conceived and poorly 
executed. 
Mature Years/Attrition (2002-2006). In 2001, with the completion of the merger of 
Franciscan Enterprise and Housing Our Families and the closure of NECDC, the three 
organizations operating in Inner North/Northeast Portland, PCRI, Sabin CDC, and 
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Albina CDC were faced not only with the effects of gentrification, but also a depletion 
of funds from the various sources they had enjoyed. Labeled Mature Years/Attrition, 
this time period was characterized by little new development, smaller organizational 
staffs, and a focus on tenant services and efficient property management (PAMWG, 
2007).103  With smaller staffs and with fewer office hours and open doors, the 
organizations’ visibility in their neighborhoods was reduced; the socio-economic 
distance between the organizations and their thriving neighborhoods grew. 
 The depletion of public and philanthropic financial resources that contributed 
to the need for a merger was both the result of timing and a shift in focus away from 
neighborhood revitalization (Andrews interview: 8). The unfortunate timing piece was 
associated with federal policy shifts. As a result of the events of 9/11, housing funding 
was shifted to military efforts in Afghanistan and then Iraq, and, by 2002, HUD’s 
budget authority had decreased by 40% relative to where it had been in 1976 (Powell, 
2004). This depletion of federal resources was concurrent with the decline of 
philanthropic funding. Living Cities, a collaborative of 20 foundations whose 
allocations were managed by Enterprise and LISC, was diminishing its funding of 
CDCs and housing development (Hecht, 2008; Andrews interview: 1). What had been 
an allotment of $800,000/ year for several years dropped by half as the individual 
contributors to the fund developed their own specific interests and projects (Allen and 
Luckett interview: 13, Walker, 2002: 32). 
                                                
103 The Housing Development Center’s Property and Asset Management Working Group  (PAMWG) 
was created in 2001. It was an effort to share information among CDCs regarding property management 
challenges, reporting requirements, and ongoing relationships with funders.  
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 At this time, too, local public policy changed with the implementation of the 
10 Year Plan to End Homelessness in 2004. While public funding had been 
increasingly more competitive since the mid 1990s, it was the City Council’s 
prioritization of the 10 Year Plan that ensured that new housing development would 
serve formerly homeless, and very low-income individuals and families, in areas other 
than the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland. This shift in focus away 
from North/Northeast Portland further increased the competition among CDCs and 
required that they adapt their development models to acquire that funding (Walsh 
interview: 5).  
 Concurrently, property values rose dramatically in the Albina neighborhoods, 
and the main sources of project finance were the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) and commercial loans, as credit became easier to access (Walker, 2002: 25). 
When using the LIHTC, a minimum of eight units was necessary in order to make a 
project feasible. Sites that large simply were no longer available in Inner 
North/Northeast, and development shifted further east where populations were now 
poorer, property values were lower and more land was available. As a result, the 
combined housing production numbers for the Albina CDCs dropped from 187 units 
in 1998 to 23 units in 1999 (Appendix G). 
 The result of the contraction of funding and development opportunities was a 
contraction of the visibility of the organizations within their neighborhoods. 
Construction and development projects created organizational visibility within their 
neighborhoods and contributed to their networking capacity both positively and 
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negatively. In earlier years, the organizations had been able to parlay the good 
publicity into additional opportunities. Negative publicity surrounded the 
organizations in the middle and later years. As the construction projects waned, 
though, the CDCs have tended to fade into the background of their neighborhoods.  
 Whether or not a CDC was a grassroots community organization and had 
positive connections to its neighborhood had little bearing on whether it was able to 
survive, because the neighborhoods in which they operated changed so dramatically in 
the period studied. Of the two surviving organizations, PCRI and Sabin CDC, one was 
created for the expressed purpose of managing a troubled housing portfolio and one 
was community based. Hence, the attrition rate of the more community based 
organizations was higher in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (two 
“community based” organizations no longer exist, and one “outsider” organization no 
longer exists), and the role of community roots in the longevity of an organization 
diminished over time as a factor in defining the success and/or longevity of an 
organization as the surrounding neighborhood demographics changed. Because “new 
residents were not necessarily supportive of a community development agenda aimed 
at lower income households”, a different kind of networking would be necessary in 
order to garner the kind of support previously enjoyed (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 
2003b). This new approach was not part of the agenda of NECDC or Franciscan 
Enterprise, and, in the case of HOF, contributed directly to its weakness (Swart & 
Wolf, 2002). On the other hand, Sabin CDC prides itself on its ongoing community 
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relations, while PCRI’s well-tended properties are its most visible effort to maintain 
positive broader community ties.  
 In part because of the contraction of funding for construction activities, the 
organizations were effectively marginalized from participating in their neighborhoods’ 
physical revitalization dialogues as private sector investment overtook public and non-
profit investment. While all of the groups developed housing and renovated existing 
houses and apartments, they generally directly served a lower income population so 
that their contribution to neighborhood revitalization was limited to low and moderate 
income housing development.104 This lack of breadth was often due to constraints on 
funding (that it was focused on housing that served lower-income residents), 
something that assured that these organizations would not be embedded in a wealthier 
neighborhood as conditions changed. Nevertheless, as the organizations matured, they 
were not perceived as holistic neighborhood development organizations (Fondren 
interview: 4; Morgan interview: 12; Walsh interview: 5).  
 The amount of time that CDCs have intervened in the neighborhoods of 
Inner North/Northeast Portland and the amount of impact that they have had is very 
small compared to the duration of decline and the amount of private capital that has 
been invested (and lost).  A study completed by The Oregonian stated,  “In five 
years, a booming real estate market has done for Albina what 50 years of 
government and social programs alone could not” (Barnett and Suo, 1996). The 
maps in Appendix I show the locations of CDC developed affordable housing units 
                                                
104 Sabin CDC was an exception to this rule, given their organizing and economic development efforts 
associated with the Alberta Street Corridor Plan. 
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against a background of neighborhood property value increases. The increased 
property values can be seen with the transition of the background from brown to 
yellow with an encroachment of blue that represents even higher property  
Figure 10-1 
CDC Housing Development and Portland Metro Median Home 
Prices 1987-2006 
 
Sources: RMLS, 1993-2006; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1994, 1995, 1997-2000; McGee, 2005; 
Merrick and Al-Hamid; 1998, Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a and 2006a; Sohl, 
1995; Sabin CDC 1995-1997; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006; Tupper, 2007  
 
valuations. What is clear from these maps and Figure 10-1 is that property values 
increased in the neighborhoods as CDC housing production declined, so that the 
overall impact of CDC housing did not mitigate the property value increases 
dramatically. In many cases, the efforts of CDCs have failed to preserve housing 
for long time residents: the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland produced a 
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total of 1,139 units of housing that is designated “affordable” and constitutes less 
than 10% of the total housing units in the Albina Neighborhood (Office of 
Neighborhood Involvement, 1991). 
 While housing development is only one part of a CDCs mission to “reshape 
distressed communities”, it is also its most visible component (Glickman & Servon, 
1998; Vidal, 1996). As organizations grow and develop capacity, they strike a 
balance between resources and the components of capacity. The bulk of the 
resources available were for housing development: “it was a place based impetus, it 
was about physical revitalization” (Andrews interview: 5); hence, these CDCs were 
susceptible to the market conditions of their locale. As a result, as the market 
conditions became more competitive and housing prices increased, the 
organizations that were dependent on the development of new properties to support 
their operations on an ongoing basis were priced out of the market in their 
immediate neighborhoods. In the late 1990s, Construction Managers for PCRI who 
had worked with neighborhood contractors to help them build capacity and 
business skills now found that they were competing with private developers and 
homeowners for the services of those contractors (Kelley interview: 4; Loving, 
2001a).  
 Each organization had lost what made them distinctive (DelSavio interview: 
4; McLennan interview: 9). In the case of Portland’s CDCs, there was little 
flexibility that would allow “CDCs to change focus and direction in response to 
shifts in the environment in which they work” (Glickman and Servon, 1998); hence, 
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as their options grew more limited, the organizations lost both their uniqueness and 
their ability to adapt to a changing neighborhood. The organizations responded to 
the funding limitations by focusing their resources on their particular tenantry, and 
not as much on the neighborhood as a whole. In doing so, the organizations either 
alienated the neighborhood as HOF did, or became relatively invisible to the 
broader neighborhood as Sabin and PCRI did. This was a key point in the evolution 
of the Albina CDCs. Because they could not control the neighborhood change, how 
and where they posited themselves in response to it would be crucial to their 
longevity and ongoing contributions to neighborhood vitality. There are two 
possible approaches to self-preservation in these circumstances: they needed either 
to develop new ideas and new programs to fund themselves that addressed micro 
rather than macro issues, as Sabin CDC and PCRI did, or to broaden their 
geographic boundaries – an impossibility as their service areas were already 
overlapping to a great extent.  
  By 1998, the Boise Neighborhood Association and the group Art on 
Alberta enjoyed powerful voices and thriving commercial areas. It is ironic that the 
revitalization of both the Mississippi Avenue and the Alberta Street commercial 
strips were helped by CDCs that were eventually pushed aside: Housing Our 
Families (Mississippi Target Area project) and Sabin CDC (Alberta St Corridor) 
respectively. While Sabin maintained a small presence in the creation of the Alberta 
St Corridor Plan and in subsequent groups, Art on Alberta and the Alberta Street 
Fair, by 1997, the organization ceded its role in the Alberta Street Fair. On the other 
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hand, HOF, and later Albina CDC, had little if any role in the Mississippi Target 
Area Plan and the Boise Neighborhood events after 1997 (Bauer interview: 5). 
Each street developed into a thriving center for creative retail endeavors, art 
galleries, and restaurants, the “boutiquefication” or commercial gentrification that 
often accompanies the residential gentrification (Lees, Wyly, Slater, 2008: 131). 
  While many CDC staff and neighborhood activists had voiced their fears about 
gentrification as far back as the early 1990s, their cries fell on deaf ears until it was 
clear that the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland were no longer 
affordable and were experiencing a transition from poorer, mostly black, 
neighborhoods to wealthier, whiter neighborhoods (Dursch interview: 18; Fondren 
interview: 2; Lane, 1990b; Morgan interview: 10; Schleiger interview: 7). In Inner 
North/Northeast Portland early transformations (that included larger new construction 
projects) were associated with non-profits that focused on services for lower income 
neighborhood residents: the construction of the Boys and Girls Club in 1994 adjacent 
to the new NE Police Precinct and NECDC’s Nehemiah housing on NE Roselawn and 
the construction of a new building for Self Enhancement Inc, a local non-profit aimed 
at “helping at-risk African American urban youth” on the western half of Unthank 
Park in 1997 (www.selfenhancement.org). Later developments were private and 
catered to higher income groups: the renovation of the abandoned Kennedy School on 
NE 33rd in 1997 into a brew pub and hotel, the relocation of the Rebuilding Center to 
N. Mississippi Avenue in 2000, and the opening of a high end grocery store in the  
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abandoned Sentry Market location on NE 33rd in 2001.105 Each of these developments 
served a new population and both signified neighborhood transformation and 
contributed to its further gentrifying by attracting people who would not otherwise 
have moved to the neighborhoods.  
 In the early 1990s, the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland took on the 
role of keepers of institutional memory, as the displacement of older residents and 
neighborhood based African American institutions was occurring. Several churches 
relocated further east to follow their congregations, jazz clubs that had once lined 
Williams Avenue were shuttered, and small shops and restaurants that had weathered 
the neighborhood’s decline were not able to compete during its ascendance (Long 
interview: 21; Sharpe interview: 5; Simmons interview: 1). PCRI completed its new 
offices in 2005, the renovation of a large historic home on Martin Luther King Jr. 
Boulevard, in its effort to preserve both its mission and a part of neighborhood history 
(Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2005a). Sabin CDC staff has 
preserved many of the photographs and documentation of the events that made the 
neighborhood what it is today. This role as keeper of institutional memories, though, 
has transitioned, too. The Boise Neighborhood Association has undertaken projects 
like the Boise Voices Oral History project. Neighborhood children conducted 
interviews with older residents and compiled their stories on a CD in order to “connect 
                                                
105 There was one full service grocery store, a Safeway, in between I-5 and NE 33rd and NE Knott and 
NE Columbia Boulevard since the Sentry Market had closed in 1990. The Rebuilding Center of Our 
United Villages is a nonprofit that specializes in re-using cast off building materials from cabinetry to 
windows, doors and trim, plumbing fixtures and tile. It supports the gentle deconstruction and re-use of 
older homes and is a tremendous resource for those remodeling older homes 
(www.rebuildingcenter.org) . 
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young people with their history in a way that is both vivid and memorable” (Yanke, 
2009). In doing so, the history of the CDCs did not appear in the transcript.   
 Neighborhood demographics had shifted. In 1990, neighborhood incomes 
hovered around the poverty line, while the proportion of those with higher education 
degrees was between 10% and 20% in the census tracts noted (Appendix D). In 2000, 
incomes in those same census tracts were between 50% to 80% higher and much 
closer to the City of Portland median. Educational attainment generally more than 
doubled as well. Poverty rates that had increased between 1980 and 1990 significantly 
declined. The racial transition of the neighborhood was also obvious: census tracts that 
had been between 30% and 75% black in 1980 had become increasingly white. While 
initially the gentrification of the Albina neighborhoods was signified by the 
displacement of the poor and primarily black populations, its subsequent stages have 
more closely reflected the displacement associated with class, as many of the earlier 
gentrifiers have become concerned with their own displacement (Morgan interview: 
12). This is consistent with Clay’s stages of gentrification.  
 In 2004, it became clear to the Board of Directors of Albina CDC that the 
organization was no longer viable and had little opportunity to contribute to the 
revitalized neighborhoods. Albina CDC was not solvent, it did not have a positive 
relationship with the neighborhoods in which it operated, and it had one staff 
person. At this point, the Board of Directors entered into negotiations with Maxine 
Fitzpatrick and the Board Members of PCRI for the transfer of Albina’s assets to 
PCRI. When this transaction was completed on March 31, 2006, Fitzpatrick and her 
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staff were consumed by the fiscal and structural challenges of incorporating 
Albina’s portfolio into PCRI’s.  
 Within the context of neighborhood gentrification and depleted resources, 
the surviving CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland struggled to preserve their 
role as advocates for the remaining low-income residents. By 2005, both Sabin 
CDC and PCRI had cut their staff sizes: PCRI went from 18 in 2000 to 10 in 2006, 
and Sabin went from 8 in 2000 to 3 in 2006 (Portland Community Reinvestment 
Initiatives, 2000; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2006 Sabin 
Community Development Corporation, 2000; Personal Observation, 2006). With 
smaller staffs, narrower community participation, and, for PCRI, large logistical 
problems, the visibility of the CDCs in their neighborhoods was almost nil.  
 
Explication of the Theoretical Model 
 According to the model set out in Chapter 2, each organization had a certain 
initial level of “embeddedness”, or relevance, with the neighborhoods in which they 
operated. This model, whose resolution is a potential topic for future research, seeks to 
establish a clearer understanding of the relationship between CDC and surrounding 
neighborhoods. The neighborhood lifecycle literature tells us that neighborhoods are 
not static entities and can change dramatically over time, in this case from decline to 
revitalization. This transformation takes on both social and economic characteristics 
and shifts the relationship the neighborhood has with local CDCs, whose priorities are 
often rooted in an era of neighborhood decline. A neighborhood’s lifecycle can be 
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graphed according to the levels of investment that are associated with each stage of 
development. From the words that describe the stages of development, one can infer 
its graph looks like a trough plotted along the axes of time and money (Figure 10-2). 
To determine the level of CDC “embeddedness”, it is necessary to overlay the activity 
level of the CDC and its connectivity to the surrounding neighborhood, based on its 
housing production, levels of income, levels of service, etc, on the neighborhood 
lifecycle.  The Albina area CDCs first established relationships with their surrounding 
neighborhoods when they were at or near their nadir (depressed property values, high 
rates of crime and derelict buildings). Hence, their organizational models, when there  
 
Figure 10-2 
Model of Neighborhood Lifecycle and CDC Changes in the Albina 
 Neighborhoods 
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was very little if any private investment, addressed issues of blight to meet the needs 
of the low-income residents.  Organizational priorities and neighborhood priorities 
were in sync, as residents were eager for investment that would stabilize their   
neighborhoods. 
 In the early 1990s, poverty levels in the Albina neighborhoods exceeded 30% 
(see Appendix D). The work of the Albina area CDCs was relevant to the 
neighborhood residents, many of whom benefited directly from these activities in the 
form of jobs and housing, so that there was a symbiotic relationship between 
organization and neighborhood. The factors most closely associated with the idea of 
embeddedness, in addition to economic capital, included the number of board and staff 
drawn from the immediate community, efforts made to utilize local businesses, and 
levels of outreach that included organizing activities and efforts to foster self-
improvement in the neighborhoods and the relationships that resulted from these 
endeavors; in short, the amount of social capital organizations had inherently or built 
up within their communities. Organizational transformation takes on both social and 
economic characteristics and shifts the relationship of the organization, and its fixed 
assets and development processes, with its surroundings. Each organization had a 
different trajectory of development, and that trajectory dictated the relationship, and 
relevance, of the organization to the neighborhood at a particular point in time, 
whether it was converging, parallel, or diverging. 
 The Albina area CDCs built up very little social capital because of the speed at 
which the organizations grew, and the subsequent speed at which the neighborhood 
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changed around them. NECDC had the most social capital initially, but that 
diminished as the neighborhood changed, and the organization branched out beyond 
its Nehemiah development model, where it developed very low-income rental 
apartments and market rate single-family houses in a neighborhood located further 
north from its initial service area. Its volunteer model and its ties to churches outside 
of the neighborhood limited Franciscan Enterprise’s social capital. HOF was plagued 
by the neighborhood perception that it was an organization of white women initially, 
and then by its failure to listen to neighborhood concerns. Sabin CDC initially 
represented a segment of the neighborhood, but lost its relevance when its activity 
level diminished due to reduced funding after the merger withdrawal. PCRI never had 
a significant amount of neighborhood involvement, or social capital, because the 
nature and size of its portfolio did not require it to.  
 Some of the organizational trajectories indicate greater resiliency in the face of 
increased competition, higher development and operational costs, shifts in funding and 
financing, while others show downward trends. Because of the gentrifying 
neighborhoods, any organizational setback was more costly, especially when 
associated with housing development. Because of the housing-centric nature of the 
organizations, new development was the only readily available solution to any 
problems incurred. The organizations that experienced setbacks due to housing 
development projects that went awry and cost the organization money were not able to 
recover from these setbacks for different reasons. HOF, Franciscan, and NECDC all 
experienced development projects that drained the organization of energy, social 
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capital and working capital. Because there was not an opportunity to recapture some 
of that capital with an impending development project, the organizations’ reputations 
inside and outside of the neighborhoods were tarnished, and they were not able to 
recover.  
 The trajectory lines of the organizations crossed the neighborhood lifecycle 
trajectory when the goals of the neighborhood residents no longer complemented the 
missions and actions of the individual organizations. Concurrent with Guajuardo’s 
(2009) model of CDC organizational development, it is not whether the organization 
will no longer be in sync with its neighborhood priorities, but when it will be and how 
it reacts to this event. In the case of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland, some 
organizations floundered (NECDC and Albina CDC), while others contracted (Sabin 
CDC) or became more introverted (PCRI). In the early 2000s, when gentrification was 
taking hold, and the voices of neighborhood residents had grown stronger, the Albina 
area CDCs did not have enough housing units to have attained “scale” and relied on 
neighborhood political support for their efforts. Once an organization experienced a 
setback in these circumstances, it was not able to recover. NECDC, Franciscan, and 
HOF all experienced these setbacks. Albina CDC never had the chance to reverse the 
cumulative downward trajectory of HOF and Franciscan – it had inherited too many 
internal and external obstacles to surmount. Sabin CDC has contracted their services 
to such an extent that the organization is barely visible. PCRI’s trajectory, on the other 
hand, was bolstered by the acquisition of a large apartment complex and Albina CDCs 
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portfolio, so that it has attained the scale necessary to operate independently of 
neighborhood residents’ goals and priorities.  
 
Conclusions 
 Existing models of CDC growth, change, and decline have considered a host of 
organizational factors including board and staff participation, organizational mission, 
community involvement, network, and funding issues; contextual issues of federal 
policy, the role of national intermediaries and local support systems, and the impact of 
local market conditions have also been a critical part of the analysis of CDCs (Rohe, 
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a). CDC evolution in the context of gentrification is a more 
recent and less thoroughly documented avenue of the literature (Newman and Wyly, 
2010: 566). In the case of the Albina CDCs, the critical points of the existing literature 
that this study contributes to are the Role of CDC as Neighborhood Revitalizer, 
Developer and Organizer, Organization Capacity Building, and Measures of Success.  
 In their role as neighborhood revitalizers, developers, and organizers, the 
Albina CDCs were closely tied to housing development efforts. Their main role was as 
developers of affordable housing, it waned as neighborhoods improved, and 
development opportunities dropped off. Zielenbach (2000) doubts the ability of CDCs 
to single handedly revitalize neighborhoods, but, in this case, the saturation of CDCs 
at the very least laid the groundwork for gentrification. The focus on housing 
development, too, limited other potential interventions that may have had a more 
lasting impact on issues of poverty. The role of organizing for the Albina CDCs was 
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rarely at the forefront of the organizations; there was little money for the endeavor, 
and when it was available, it was in conjunction with a housing development effort.  
 The Components of Organizational Capacity as defined by Glickman and 
Servon look beyond housing production to analyze the concurrent relationships that 
CDCs build. According to this model, few of the Albina CDCs were or are balanced 
and sustainable organizations. The housing-centric nature of most organizations has 
separated them from their neighborhoods and made them too reliant on their 
relationships with policy makers and funders.  
 The Measures of Success is the aspect of the literature where this study 
contributed most. Gittell and Wilder define success as improvement in the lives of 
neighborhood residents, while Twelvetrees defines organizational success as survival 
and the ability to meet its own goals. Under strong market conditions with constrained 
funding sources, success is defined somewhat differently. What defines success for the 
Albina area CDCs and in the Albina neighborhoods is very different and represents the 
distinction between people-based development and place-based development. The 
Albina area CDCs had been led to believe, according to NPF’s initial goals, that their 
role in the neighborhoods was more or less permanent (NPF, 1994); however, the 
implementation of the NPF goals introduced a set of measures that was not consistent 
with these initial goals. The politics surrounding the initial goals emphasized 
neighborhood improvement (and the stimulation of outside investment) rather than 
organizational longevity, so that the balance sheets of the organizations were 
tantamount to the work that they were doing. This difference in perspectives and 
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values was one reason why the merger process failed so miserably. In addition, city 
policies at this time shifted to serve lower income populations, a niche that was not 
possible for smaller CDCs to achieve readily. Because of this shift, funding for 
projects that were of a familiar type and scale (single family house and small 
apartment complex renovation and/or development), if they still existed in the 
neighborhoods, was basically eliminated. Hence, the organizations that survived (and 
could be considered successful) were the ones that did not depend on new 
development projects for revenue.  
 The City of Portland as a political entity was the biggest winner in the 
revitalization of the Albina neighborhoods with a realization of increased property 
values, new businesses, and private development activity. For its relatively modest 
investment in the organizations, their community activities, and property development, 
the City of Portland’s return was unexpectedly prompt and prodigious. The 
revitalization efforts became a national model as we began to understand the positive 
and negative effects of gentrification.  
 Were the neighborhoods successful? While the lives of neighborhood residents 
may have been improved with stable, affordable housing, only those who were lucky 
enough to be living in a CDC-owned dwelling were directly affected. Other low-
income residents, though, can no longer afford to live in the Albina neighborhoods and 
have relocated. The version of success defined by improvement in residents’ lives in a 
gentrified neighborhood is a limited one. This polarization reflects the national trend 
of the growing gap between rich and poor 
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 Most of the organizations that contributed to the revitalization of the Albina 
neighborhoods have failed, but they did develop housing, organize neighbors, and 
open doors to more equitable lending practices. The assets of the failed organizations 
have been protected, so that their most visible community development contributions 
continue. The victory of organizations in a gentrified neighborhood can be seen as 
pyrrhic.  
 The roles of local government and foundation funders both catalyzed and 
constrained the organizational growth of the Albina CDCs. The speed at which the 
Albina CDCs developed housing was an indicator of organizational growth in both 
size and breadth of responsibility. The Albina CDCs acquired and developed almost 
70% of their housing units prior to 1997, when most of the organizations were not 
more than five years old (Appendix G). This catalyzed growth had mixed results. The 
benefit to the low-income community was clear: more than 1100 units of affordable 
housing have been retained, while much of the rest of the housing stock was improved 
and the neighborhood gentrified. In hindsight, policy makers longed for greater 
housing production, as low-income residents bore the costs of gentrification and were 
displaced. Two pitfalls associated with this haste were that organizations, in some 
cases, did not have the capacity to manage the properties that they developed, and that 
the sophistication required to develop and manage multiple properties separated 
organizations from their original missions and intent. 
 The goals of funders limited the autonomy of the organizations – and limited 
needed flexibility, given the changing goals of neighborhood residents. Given the fact 
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that CDC supporters had the express goal of neighborhood revitalization and strong 
housing development agendas that precluded organizational flexibility in achieving 
that goal, the fact that the organizations that failed lasted as long as they did is 
testament to their fortitude. From inception to merger to closure, each phase of 
organizational development was defined by associated housing development. This 
lack of diversification ensured that not all organizations would survive, a finding 
consistent with Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ (2003a) recommendations that resulted from 
their research. This lack of diversification concurs, too, with Rusk’s (1999) description 
of CDC efforts to help poor families run up the down escalator. CDC efforts did little 
to resolve overarching issues of poverty in Inner North/Northeast Portland. 
 While revitalization has been a welcome phenomenon in the Albina 
neighborhoods, it has come at a cost to low-income residents who were forced to 
relocate. In response to Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ (2003a: 69) question about the 
impact of strong market conditions on CDCs, the answer in the case of Inner 
North/Northeast Portland is that strong market conditions prevented CDCs from 
continuing their housing development activities and reduced their visibility within the 
neighborhood. By 2006, physical blight had been remediated. Remediation of poverty, 
though, was much less clear, as long-standing arguments of people-based v. place-
based development recalls the Bratt-Stoecker (1997) debate about the purpose of 
CDCs. While the original intent of some of the organizations was to alleviate poverty 
and promote empowerment, this intent changed as the organizations matured and were 
held to a level of accountability by both neighbors and funders that did not allow them 
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to address these issues. The mistakes and setbacks that organizations encountered in 
housing development cost them both financial and political capital, and set them on a 
downward, or at least divergent, trajectory. Consequently, the organizations chose to 
focus on sustaining themselves; at this point, CDCs began acting more like small 
businesses than community organizations, as balance sheets and revenue superceded 
engagement activities (Galster, et al, 2005). This lack of balance, necessary to 
maintain equilibrium between the components of organizational capacity, resulted in 
the isolation of the organizations from neighborhood activities (Glickman and Servon, 
1998). While they were preservers of affordable housing, tenant services and 
empowerment, they had become disconnected from the rest of the neighborhood.  
 Key stakeholders, with the benefit of hindsight, have called for planning efforts 
to address gentrification proactively. In order to do so, it is necessary for community 
organizations to manage conflict between existing and emerging neighborhood 
institutions (Van Meter, 2007). Therefore, organizations need access to flexible 
funding to provide a balance of services, especially those that stress inclusion of 
residents old and new. 
 
Future Research 
 There are several opportunities to further delineate and expand upon this 
research. The opportunities for delineation include the incorporation of 2010 census 
data information to determine what stage of gentrification the neighborhood is 
currently in, and how CDCs can best operate, whether to effect change or empower 
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their tenantry. This research would entail an examination of demographic data and 
housing data, within the context of current housing policies and opportunities.  
 A second opportunity for additional research addresses the role of CDCs in the 
neighborhood gentrification process. Because CDCs act as both catalysts for 
neighborhood revitalization, yet buffers against wholesale gentrification and the 
displacement of poor residents, they have a dual political role as advocates for low-
income residents and mediators between the gentrifiers and lower-income, often long 
term, residents. Their dilemma calls into play the debate of whether these 
organizations are intended to serve people in a certain geography, or those of a certain 
socio-economic condition, the debate of investment in people or in place. This 
dilemma could be more precisely explicated by an elaboration of the conceptual model 
of the relationship between neighborhood change and CDC evolution. Solidifying the 
model would entail the creation of measures of neighborhood evolution based on 
investment and real and perceived viability (based on Clay’s descriptions). Then, 
organizational growth and change based on capacity, development success, and 
measures of neighborhood integration would be overlaid to help identify the relevance 
of the organization to the surrounding geographic area, and where its current and 
future emphasis should lay.  This study would be most effective as a comparative case 
study of organizations in different cities because of the potentially different policies, 
public priorities, and specific economic conditions.  
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Postscript 
 Long after gentrification had changed the faces in the Albina 
neighborhoods, the City of Portland sponsored a series of public meetings 
beginning in 2007 to discuss neighborhood gentrification. These meetings evolved 
into the Restorative Listening Project, now under the auspices of the City’s Office 
of Neighborhood Involvement. The first session at the AME Baptist Church was 
led by former City Gang Enforcement Staff Member John Canda and facilitated by 
Judith Mowry. The vast majority of the attendees appeared to be white, middle 
class people, while several small groups of black people sat on the periphery – a 
metaphor for what had happened in the neighborhoods. As the meeting progressed, 
it appeared to be a way for new residents to assuage their guilt, until an African 
American woman stood up and spoke about “the gentrification”  – and how white 
people were the problem. Her disgust was unmistakable, as her voice, growing 
more robust with each word, silenced all of those in attendance. Perhaps it was the 
first time that new residents were called out as being “the problem”, rather than 
contributing to the solution. No one said a word for several minutes after she 
finished talking. Whether this woman’s words had a lasting effect on those in 
attendance is unknown; the project continues, but the only tangible policies 
currently in effect to mediate the tide of gentrification are associated with minority 
homeownership opportunities (Housing and Community Development 
Commission, 2004). 
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Appendix A 
List of Acronyms 
 
Initials Full Term 
ACDC 
 
Albina Community Development 
Corporation 
AOCDO Association of Oregon Community 
Development Organizations 
BHCD 
 
Bureau of Housing and Community 
Development 
BNA Boise Neighborhood Association 
BSRC Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation 
CDBG 
 
Community Development Block Grant 
CDC Community Development Corporation 
CDN Community Development Network 
CHDO Community Housing Development 
Organization 
CRA Community Reinvestment Act of 1977  
ESIC Enterprise Social Investment 
Corporation 
FE 
 
Franciscan Enterprise 
HAP 
 
Housing Authority of Portland 
HDC Housing Development Center 
HMDA Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 
HOPE Home Ownership and Opportunity for 
People Everywhere 
HOF 
 
Housing Our Families 
HOME 
 
Home Investment Partnerships. Funding 
category from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. 
HUD US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
LIHTC Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
LISC Local Incentives Support Corporation 
NAHA 
 
National Affordable Housing Act of 
1992, otherwise known for the names of 
its sponsors, Cranston Gonzalez Act 
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NCDI National Community Development 
Initiative 
NCNW National Congress of Neighborhood 
Women 
NECDC 
 
Northeast Community Development 
Corporation 
NIMBY Not in My Back Yard 
NNC Neighborhood Network Center 
NOAH Network of Affordable Housing 
NPF Neighborhood Partnership Fund 
OCF Oregon Community Foundation 
PAMWG Property and Asset Management 
Working Group 
PCRI 
 
Portland Community Reinvestment 
Initiatives 
PDC 
 
Portland Development Commission 
PNDSC Portland Neighborhood Development 
Support Collaborative 
REACH CDC Recreation, Education, Access, 
Commerce and Housing 
ROSE CDC Rebuilding Outer South East 
SAE Single Asset Entity 
TACS Technical Assistance for Community 
Service 
UDAG Urban Development Action Grant 
VISTA Volunteers in Service to America 
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Appendix B 
List of Interviewees 
 
Name Position Organization Date of 
Interview 
Kate Allen Director Enterprise Community 
Partners 
August 10, 2007 
Mike Andrews Director The Enterprise 
Foundation, Housing 
Authority of Portland 
August 4, 2008 
Janet Bauer Project Manager Housing Our Families, 
Mississippi Target 
Area Project 
September 19, 
2007 
Tom Benjamin Board Member PCRI September 7, 
2007 
Sam Chase Director The Community 
Development Network 
October 7, 2007 
Chris Cross Construction 
Manager 
Housing Our Families March 2, 2009 
Tom Del Savio Executive 
Director 
Franciscan Enterprise March 12, and 
March 17, 2009 
Gretchen Dursch Executive 
Director 
Housing Our Families October 16, 2007 
Jane Ediger Project Manager, 
Board Member, 
Executive 
Director 
PCRI, Housing Our 
Families, Sabin CDC 
October 16, 2007 
Susan Emmons Chair Housing and 
Community 
Development 
Commission 
July 20, 2010 
Maxine 
Fitzpatrick  
Executive 
Director 
PCRI September 28, 
2007 
Craig Fondren Program 
Manager 
Sabin CDC September 21, 
2007 
Janice Frater Community 
Reinvestment 
Officer, Member 
First Interstate Bank, 
Wells Fargo Bank, 
Housing and 
Community 
Development 
Commission 
October 9, 2007 
Sheila Holden President N/NE Economic 
Development Alliance 
September 22, 
2009 
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Appendix B  
List of Interviewees (continued) 
 
Name Position Organization Date of Interview 
Gretchen Kafoury City 
Commissioner 
City of Portland September 20, 
2007 
Craig Kelley Construction 
Manager, 
Program 
Manager 
PCRI, Housing 
Development Center 
October 5, 2007 
Bill Kowalczyk Construction 
Manager 
Franciscan 
Enterprise, Portland 
Youth Builders 
September 6, 
2007 
Kevin Kraus Construction 
Manager 
REACH CDC September 25, 
2007 
Keith Lokan Housing 
Construction 
Review Staff 
Portland 
Development 
Commission 
August 13, 2007 
Linda Grear Long Founder, Staff 
Member, 
Neighborhood 
Resident 
Housing Our 
Families, Sabin 
CDC, Boise 
Neighborhood 
August 21, 2007 
Cynthia Luckett Staff Member NECDC, Enterprise 
Community Partners 
August 10, 2007 
Peg Malloy Executive 
Director, 
Member 
Portland Housing 
Center, Housing and 
Community 
Development 
Commission 
September 12, 
2007 
Martha McLennan Program 
Manager, 
Executive 
Director 
Bureau of Housing 
and Community 
Development, NW 
Housing Alternatives 
September 11, 
2007 
Ed McNamara Executive 
Director 
REACH CDC, The 
Neighborhood 
Partnership Fund 
September 14, 
2007 
Diane 
Meisenhelter 
Executive 
Director, 
Neighborhood 
Resident 
Sabin CDC, Sabin 
Neighborhood 
January 21, 2008 
Gloria Lupin 
Morgan 
Neighborhood 
Activist 
Boise Neighborhood December 16, 
2007 
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List of Interviewees (continued) 
 
Name Position Organization Date of 
Interview 
Kathleen 
Pequeño 
Community 
Organizer, 
Neighborhood 
Resident 
Housing Our 
Families, Eliot 
Neighborhood 
August 23, 2007 
Mike Purcell Founding Board 
Member 
Franciscan 
Enterprise, Albina 
CDC 
September 11, 
2007 
Betsy Radigan Neighborhood 
Activist 
Piedmont 
Neighborhood 
Association 
August 16, 2007 
Steve Rudman Director Bureau of Housing 
and Community 
Development 
September 10, 
2007 
Nick Sauvie Executive Director ROSE CDC September 4, 
2007 
Carmen 
Schleiger 
Founding Board 
Member, 
Construction 
Manager 
Housing Our 
Families 
September 11, 
2007 
Sumner Sharpe Neighborhood 
Resident, Planner 
Alberta Street 
Corridor Project 
November 26, 
2008 
Alberta 
Simmons 
Neighborhood 
Resident, Board 
Member 
Franciscan 
Enterprise, Housing 
Our Families 
September 7, 
2007 
Kristina Smock Community 
Organizer 
Housing Our 
Families 
August 16, 2007  
Kay Sohl CDC Consultant Technical Assistance 
for Community 
Services (TACS) 
November 29, 
2007 
Erik Sten City 
Commissioner 
City of Portland August 8, 2007 
Fred Stewart Neighborhood 
Activist 
King Neighborhood 
Association 
October 25, 2007 
David Sweet Derelict Building 
Inspection 
Supervisor 
Bureau of Buildings, 
City of Portland 
September 13, 
2007 
Carl Talton Founding Board 
Member 
NECDC September 9, 
2009 
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Appendix B  
List of Interviewees (continued) 
 
Name Position Organization Date of Interview 
HC Tupper Program Manager  Affordable Housing 
Development 
Program, Multnomah 
County 
October 11, 2007 
Dee Walsh Executive Director REACH CDC September 7, 
2007 
Dorene Warner Program Manager Franciscan Enterprise July 10, 2009 
Will White Executive Director Housing 
Development Center 
September 11, 
2007 
Andy Wilch Director Housing Department, 
Portland 
Development 
Commission 
September 20, 
2007 
Peter Wilcox Executive Director Portland Community 
Design 
August 15, 2007 
Barbara Willer Founding Board 
Member, Interim 
Executive Director 
Housing Our 
Families 
August 28, 2007 
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Appendix C - Sample Interview Questions 
 
For CDC staff/board members: 
 
1. What is your affiliation with (your CDC)? 
2. How long were you/have you been in that position? 
3. How many staff did the organization have when you arrived? When you left (if 
applicable)? Currently (if applicable)? 
4. What is the primary purpose of this organization? 
5. How does the organization fulfill that purpose? 
6. Do you feel that your CDC has adhered to its original purpose? Or has it 
branched out to fulfill a larger variety of needs? 
7. How many and what kind of housing units were produced during your tenure 
at your CDC? For PCRI, when did you start to augment the Dominion Capital 
housing stock with other construction projects? 
8. Do you consider your CDC to be primarily a housing provider or a community 
development corporation? What do you consider to be the differences between 
these two monikers? 
9. What are the different programs that your CDC sponsors (ed)? 
10. Do you feel that the City of Portland has supported your CDC? In what ways? 
To what do you owe this particular support/lack of support? 
11. What sources of funding did your CDC use for the different programs? 
12. How has this changed over time? Are you relying on greater or fewer sources? 
More government or philanthropic sources? 
13. What are your thoughts on the appropriate development scale for your 
organization, given the sources of funding and the constraints of the target 
area? 
14. How has your CDC adapted to the market changes over the last 10 years? 
15. What were/are the inherent strengths of your CDC? 
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For CDC staff/board members (continued) 
 
16. Has your organization faced any of the following “ethical dilemmas” in your 
tenure? If so, how? 
a. Becoming out of touch with community residents, as development has 
become more complex. 
b. Conflict between the original objectives of the agency as expressed by 
the first board, and the goals of newcomers. 
c. Maintaining a community and tenant orientation while functioning as a 
developer and landlord. Meeting the “double bottom line”. 
d. Developing housing with inadequate budgets, so that it is doomed to 
failure. 
17. Have there been specific organizational challenges in your tenure with your 
CDC? 
18. Have there been specific staffing challenges during your tenure with your 
CDC? 
19. How has the changing neighborhood affected your CDC? 
20. What role did your CDC play previously? 
21. What role does your CDC play now? 
22. What is the neighborhood perception of your CDC? 
23. What are the primary programs that you currently administer for your CDC? 
24. Has this emphasis changed over time? How and why? 
25. What populations does your CDC serve? 
26. How has this changed over time? 
27. Since 1990, the neighborhoods that you serve have changed racially. Describe 
the racial tensions both then and now.  
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For funding and philanthropic institution representatives: 
1. What is your affiliation with (your institution)? 
2. How long were you/have you been in that position? 
3. What is the history of your institution’s funding of low-income housing or 
community development corporations? 
4. What were your criteria for grant approval?  
5. In your opinion, how has the CDC community in Inner North/Northeast 
Portland changed over time? Have they become more sophisticated? Has the 
attrition of CDCs been helpful to the neighborhoods as a whole? What are 
some of the drawbacks? 
6. For lending institutions: How many loans had you made 1980-1990? 1990-
1995? 1995-2000? 2000-2005?  
7. For lending institutions: How many of these loans were commercial? 
Residential? For existing structures? New construction? To minority 
applicants? 
8. For philanthropic institutions: What was your role with the funding of CDCs in 
Inner North/Northeast Portland? 
9. For philanthropic institutions: did you offer start-up and/or operating grants? 
10. For lending and philanthropic institutions: What are your thoughts on the 
gentrification and racial of the neighborhoods?  
11. For lending and philanthropic institutions: Did the work of the CDCs in the 
early 1990s help to change your institution’s perspective of the neighborhoods 
of Inner North/Northeast Portland?  
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For public officials: 
1. What is your affiliation with (your government organization)? 
2. How long were you/have you been in that position? 
3. What was your role in the initial development of CDCs in Inner 
North/Northeast Portland? 
4. How would you characterize their evolution? 
5. What was your role in the initial funding of CDCs? Ongoing funding? 
6. What was your role in the creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development 
Collaborative? Do you think that this was a reasonable response to the issue of 
overlap and competition between CDCs? 
7. What was your role in encouraging the merger of several CDCs? 
8. Do you think that the merger process had the best outcome? 
9. How did Sabin CDC survive without Collaborative funding? 
10. What has been the reason for PCRI’s stability? 
11. What are your thoughts on the gentrification of the neighborhood? Was it 
inevitable?  
12. What role do you think that race has played in the gentrification of the 
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland? 
13. Do you think that neighborhood support/disdain for CDCs has changed? 
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Appendix D – Selected Census Data  
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1980 
  
 1980 Census Data             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
              
Population Characteristics             
              
Median Income $10,900  $8,962  $8,800  $8,355  $12,346  $17,437  
  PDX Median: $14,782             
Poverty Rates 25.10% 33.50% 32.70% 42.20% 17.30% 11.30% 
Education             
  HS Grad or Higher 57.00% 55.00% 56.90% 52.60% 59.60% 77.70% 
  Bachelor's + 8.60% 6.60% 10.90% 5.90% 10.10% 20.80% 
Race             
  White 810 814 849 374 1814 1644 
  Black 1802 1883 2300 2167 2063 842 
  Asian 68 30 28 29 96 72 
              
  Total Populations 2872 2939 3334 2957 4246 2643 
              
  Percentages             
  White 28.20% 27.70% 25.46% 12.65% 42.72% 62.20% 
  Black 62.74% 64.07% 68.99% 73.28% 48.59% 31.86% 
  Asian 2.37% 1.02% 0.84% 0.98% 2.26% 2.72% 
Age             
0-19 years 1145 1148 1190 1254 1554 898 
20-24 years 280 255 342 249 343 178 
25-44 years 732 760 822 703 1191 837 
45-64 years 454 456 595 460 678 419 
65+ years 261 320 385 291 480 311 
Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01, 
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated         
0-19 years 37.8% 
20-24 years 8.6% 
25-44 years 26.5% 
45-64 years 16.1% 
65+ years 10.7% 
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Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1980 (continued) 
 
1980 Census Data             
Housing Characteristics             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
Homeownership Rates             
  Owner-Occupied Units 495 523 568 400 961 572 
  % of total units 50.10% 52.60% 45.00% 40.90% 63.10% 63.98% 
Ownership of units by Race             
 White Homeowners 199 187 169 73 540 482 
 Black Homeowners 279 321 389 319 386 163 
 Asian Homeowners 5 6 1 3 12 11 
Percentage of Homeownership by 
Race             
 White Homeowners 40.20% 35.80% 29.80% 18.30% 56.20% 72.70% 
  Black Homeowners 56.40% 61.40% 68.50% 79.80% 40.20% 24.60% 
 Asian Homeowners 1.00% 1.10% 0.20% 0.80% 1.20% 1.70% 
Property Values             
  PDX Median: $56,200 $34,400  $32,800  $38,000  $31,600  $36,900  $48,500  
Median Rents             
  PDX Median: $358 $182  $175  $158  $167  $197  $156  
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Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1990 
 
1990 Census Data             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
Population Characteristics             
              
Median Income $16,766  $18,464  $15,054  $14,625  $20,771  $30,273  
  PDX Median: $25,592             
Poverty Rates 40.10% 34.90% 43.10% 43.90% 33.90% 16.40% 
Education             
  HS Grad or Higher 69.70% 67.30% 66.40% 62.10% 72.10% 75.10% 
  Bachelor's + 6.90% 10.40% 9.40% 7.30% 10.10% 18.80% 
Race             
  White 786 939 719 561 1357 1297 
  Black 1601 1472 1952 1693 2556 999 
  Asian 45 27 47 38 107 23 
  Total Populations 2538 2545 2832 2411 4148 2443 
  Percentages of Total Population             
  White 30.97% 36.90% 25.39% 23.27% 32.71% 53.09% 
  Black 63.08% 57.84% 68.93% 70.22% 61.62% 40.89% 
  Asian 1.77% 1.06% 1.66% 1.58% 2.58% 0.94% 
Age             
0-17 years 879 839 861 816 1349 664 
18-24 years 263 295 328 282 436 265 
25-39 years 615 677 688 573 1017 582 
40-64 years 541 491 603 440 901 653 
65+ years 240 243 352 300 445 279 
Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01, 
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated         
0-17 years 32.0% 
18-24 years 11.0% 
25-39 years 24.5% 
40-64 years 21.5% 
65+ years 11.0% 
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Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1990 (continued) 
 
1990 Census Data             
Housing Characteristics             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
Homeownership Rates             
  Owner-Occ Units 354 419 418 327 752 572 
  % of total units 42.50% 47.67% 38.70% 39.45% 49.15% 63.98% 
Ownership of units by Race             
 White Homeowners 109 152 84 186 531 399 
 Black Homeowners 242 245 309 225 417 189 
 Asian Homeowners 22 0 5 6 6 11 
Percentage of Homeownership by 
Race             
 White Homeowners 28.90% 38.20% 41.30% 42.20% 51.90% 63.10% 
 Black Homeowners 64.30% 61.70% 47.10% 51.00% 40.70% 29.90% 
 Asian Homeowners 5.80% 0.00% 3.10% 1.40% 0.60% 1.70% 
Property Values             
  PDX Median: $72,300 $33,300  $32,400  $37,100  $33,200  $37,100  $48,900  
Median Rents             
  PDX Median: $375 $275  $287  $242  $258  $325  $368  
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Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 2000 
 
2000 Census Data             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
Population Characteristics             
Median Income $24,915  $29,191  $35,774  $25,598  $38,313  $47,772  
  PDX Median: $40,146             
Poverty Rates  32.79%  20.18%  23.73%  31.09% 22.14%  16.68%  
Education             
  HS Grad or Higher 70.20% 82.80% 72.60% 72.20% 76.20% 85.50% 
  Bachelor's + 18.60% 30.60% 16.90% 25.20% 19.20% 33.70% 
Race             
  White 986 1142 1154 950 1757 1292 
  Black 1586 937 1592 1282 2298 740 
  Asian 41 37 48 51 107 60 
  Total Populations 3233 2494 3309 2770 4537 2285 
  Percentages             
  White 30.50% 45.79% 34.87% 34.30% 38.73% 56.54% 
  Black 49.06% 37.57% 48.11% 46.28% 50.65% 32.39% 
  Asian 1.27% 1.48% 1.45% 1.84% 2.36% 2.63% 
Age             
0-17 years 998 630 926 758 1346 504 
18-24 years 336 265 324 339 415 173 
25-39 years 952 832 940 820 1269 599 
40-64 years 741 597 817 608 1154 821 
65+ years 196 170 302 245 353 188 
Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01, 
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated         
0-17 years 27.7% 
18-24 years 9.9% 
25-39 years 29.1% 
40-64 years 25.4% 
65+ years 7.8% 
326
Appendix D – Selected Census Data  
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 2000 (continued) 
 
2000 Census Data             
Housing Characteristics             
Census Tracts 33.01 33.02 34.01 34.02 36.01 37.02 
Homeownership Rates             
  Owner-Occ Units 526 575 578 441 1024 632 
  % of total units 46.38% 57.85% 47.07% 42.86% 61.35% 69.60% 
Ownership of units by Race             
 White Homeowners 213 366 239 186 531 399 
 Black Homeowners 246 184 272 225 417 189 
 Asian Homeowners 17 8 18 6 6 11 
Percentage of Homeownership by 
Race             
 White Homeowners 40.50% 63.70% 41.30% 42.20% 51.90% 63.10% 
 Black Homeowners 46.80% 32.00% 47.10% 51.00% 40.70% 29.90% 
 Asian Homeowners 3.20% 1.40% 3.10% 1.40% 0.60% 1.70% 
Property Values             
  PDX Median: $166,000 $121,800  $130,700  $127,800  $112,800  $114,900  $151,300  
Median Rents             
  PDX Median: $562 $579  $657  $494  $540  $613  $552  
 
Source: United States Census, calculations by author 
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Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison) 
 
Name of 
Organization 
NECDC 
1986-2000 
Franciscan  
Enterprises (Later 
Albina CDC) 
1987-2001 
Housing Our 
Families (Later 
Albina CDC) 
1993-2001 
Sabin CDC  
1992- present 
PCRI  
1993-present 
Board Structure Founding Board: skill 
based, neighborhood 
based. 
 
Founding Board: skill 
based. 
 
Founding Board: 
All women. Some 
neighborhood 
representation. 
Founding Board: 
neighborhood based, 
and organization was 
membership based. 
 
Founding Board: Skill 
based, some tenant 
representation later. 
 
Board 
Membership 
Founding Board: 
Black professionals 
 
 
 
Later Boards:  
Black professionals 
 
Founding Board: 
Professional, no 
neighborhood 
representation 
 
Later Boards: 
Some neighborhood 
representation, few 
tenants 
Founding Board:  
All women 
50% neighborhood 
based 
 
Later Boards:  
Mostly women 
Of color 
 
Founding Board:  
All neighborhood 
representation 
 
 
Later Boards: fewer 
neighborhood 
representatives, more 
professionals 
 
 
Founding Board: 
Professional, no 
neighborhood 
representation 
Later Boards: 
Professionals, 1 tenant 
max 
 
Executive 
Director Tenure 
Don Neureuther: 
1988-1991 
Jaki Walker: 1991-
1999 
Sondra Price: 1999-
2000 
 
Fr. Matt Tumulty: 
1987-1993 
Jerry Lindsay & Tom 
DelSavio: 1993-1996 
Karen Voiss: 1997-
2000 
Fran Ayaribil, 2000-
2001 
Shelley Earley 2001-
2003 
Nanita McIlhatten- 
2003-2006 
Gretchen Dursch: 
1993-1997 
Barbara Willer: 1997-
1998 
Joan Miggins: 1998-
2001 
 
 
Shelley Earley 2001-
2003 
Nanita McIlhatten- 
2003-2006 
Diane Meisenhelter, 
1992- 1997 
Jane Ediger: 1993-
1998 
Topaz Faulkner: 
1997-1998 
Felicia Allender-
Brant: 1998-2006 
Pasquale Jenkins: 
2007- present 
Maxine Fitzpatrick, 
1994- present 
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 Northeast CDC Franciscan Enterprise HOF, Albina CDC Sabin CDC PCRI 
Mission 
Statement 
NECDC’s mission is 
to improve the quality 
of life for the 
culturally diverse 
population of Inner 
North/Northeast 
Portland through 
community 
development 
activities.  
Franciscan Enterprise of 
Oregon, Inc. is committed 
to building community in 
the spirit of St. Francis. 
To this purpose, 
Franciscan enterprise: 
Engages volunteers to 
assist in renovating 
vacant and abandoned 
properties in inner 
North/Northeast Portland. 
Works to ensure 
availability of quality 
affordable housing for 
inner North/Northeast 
Portland households. 
Manages Franciscan 
Enterprise properties to 
assist tenants and their 
neighbors in maintaining 
vital, stable, and secure 
communities. Fosters 
partnerships with 
individuals, churches, and 
other community groups 
in order to support 
resident initiatives and 
economic development 
activities in 
North/Northeast Portland. 
Empowering 
women. Developing 
partnerships. 
Providing housing. 
To stabilize and 
improve the livability 
of culturally diverse 
Portland 
neighborhoods by 
assuring the 
availability of long-
term affordable 
housing for its low 
and moderate income 
residents, and by 
encouraging 
community 
partnerships for local 
economic 
development, self-
help projects, and 
youth and senior 
programs 
Preserve, expand 
and manage 
affordable housing 
in the City of 
Portland and 
provide access to 
and advocacy for 
services for our 
residents. PCRI 
will preserve and 
manage affordable, 
high quality, 
scattered site, 
single family 
homes; expand and 
manage our 
portfolio of small 
multiplexes; and 
acquire/develop 
multi-family 
housing to preserve 
affordable housing 
choices in our 
community. 
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Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison) 
 
 NECDC Franciscan Enterprise HOF, Albina CDC Sabin CDC PCRI 
Assets Initial: 200 properties 
from City of Portland, 
Federal Nehemiah 
Grant 1989 
Initial: Donated Houses 
Renovated by Weekend 
Volunteer Work Parties 
Later: 14 Vacant houses 
donated by Fred Meyer,  
 
Initial: 0 units 
Later: 360 housing 
units, assets 
transferred to PCRI 
Initial: 0 housing 
units 
At present: 128 
rental units and 
land trust houses 
Initial: 354 houses 
from City of Portland 
and Dominion Capital 
At present:+ 350 
housing units from 
Albina CDC  
Type of 
Organization 
Board Run Church Based Membership  Membership  Politically created 
Target Market 50-80% of median inc. 
homebuyers, especially 
those living in 
neighborhood already 
Very low income renters Low & very low 
income renters, focus 
on single women 
with families 
Low and moderate 
income renters, for 
sale housing 
through a Land 
Trust 
Low and Moderate-
Income Homebuyers, 
Low-Income Renters 
Housing Units 
Developed per 
CDN 
Rental: 55 
For Sale: 206 units 
Rental: 120 
For Sale: 0 
Rental: 268 
For Sale: 20 
Rental: 128 
For Sale: 25 
Rental: 282 
For Sale: 70 initially 
Funding Sources 
 
Operating Support: 
City of Portland, Meyer 
Memorial Trust 
Development Support: 
Nehemiah Grant 
Operating Support: City 
and Grant funded 
Development Support: 
PDC, grants, loans, Nun 
money 
Operating Support: 
City and Grant 
funded 
Development 
Support: PDC, grants, 
loans 
 
Operating Support: 
City and Grant 
funded 
Development 
Support: PDC, 
grants, loans 
 
Operating Support: 
Grant funded 
Development Support: 
US Bank Line of 
Credit 
Timetables for 
housing 
production/ 
acquisition 
See Appendix G 
Relationship to 
Neighborhood 
Organizations 
Positives: Cleared 
blight 
Negatives: Not 
communicative 
Positives: Affiliation 
with St Andrews Church 
Negatives: Slow 
development processes 
hampered image 
Positives: 50% of board 
was neighborhood based 
Negatives: Trust never 
solidified; poor 
management soured 
relationships 
Positives: initially 
neighborhood based 
Negatives: invisibility to 
neighbors as 
organization shrank in 
size 
Positives: 
Improvement 
of Housing 
Stock 
Negatives: 
Perception of 
being City 
Agency 
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Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison) 
 
 
 NECDC Franciscan Enterprise HOF, Albina CDC Sabin CDC PCRI 
Relationship to 
other CDCs 
Positives: 
Negatives: other orgs. 
thought NECDC got 
preferential treatment 
Positives: worked with 
HOF and Sabin on joint 
programs 
Negatives: ED bad-
mouthed HOF in public 
Positives: worked with 
Sabin and Franciscan on 
joint programs 
Negatives: poor unit 
management made org a 
lightening rod for NA 
Positives: worked well 
with HOF and 
Franciscan on joint 
programs 
Negatives: withdrew 
from merger at 11th hour 
Positives: worked well 
with larger CDCs 
Negatives: was so 
much bigger than 
other CDCs that there 
was not much 
interaction 
Relationship to 
Enterprise 
Foundation 
Not a major funding 
concern 
Not a major funding 
concern 
Good initial relationship; 
property management 
concerns pushed merger 
talks 
Withdrawal from merger 
soured relationship 
Proponent of childcare 
programs, green 
construction 
Relationship to 
BHCD 
Walker at odds with 
Bureau. Kafoury 
mediated solution. Very 
reluctant relationship. 
Good relationship until 
Maggie Gibson project 
stalled. 
Very good relationship 
until merger talks 
intiated. 
Good relationship until 
shift away from housing 
development and  
withdrawal from merger 
Respect for ED’s 
ability to manage 
scattered site portfolio. 
Rental Policies Section 8 at Gladys 
McCoy 
Very lax – caused 
problems with unit 
turnover 
Forewent police and 
background checks – led 
to tenant problems 
Outsourced most 
property management 
All property 
management in house. 
Very stringent.  
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Appendix F   Literature Matrix (Summary of Current Literature Regarding CDC success and failure) 
 
Matrix of Contextual and Organizational Factors that contribute to CDC success or failure 
Author 
Gittell & Wilder Glickman & 
Servon 
Rohe, Bratt, & 
Biswas 
Rohe, Cowan, & 
Baku 
Twelvetrees Vidal (1996) 
Research 
Topics 
Programmatic 
and 
Organizational 
Attributes & 
Factors that 
Influence Success 
Components of 
Capacity 
Challenging 
factors -
Contextual and 
Organizational 
Factors 
influencing 
performance - 
measures of 
efficiency (total 
resources divided 
by staff 
compensation) 
3 levels of 
success 
Factors for 
success for 
Mature CDCs 
  Resources   Staff 
compensation 
Stay in business Size (budget & 
staff), expansion 
rate 
      Average cost of 
activities 
Attain objectives 
efficiently 
Prioritization of 
activities, scale 
of housing 
development 
  Programmatic 
Capacity 
     Programmatic 
and project 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational 
Factors 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
Organizational 
Competency 
Organizational 
strengths- Staff & 
Board 
Lack of board or 
staff capacity                       
Internal 
management 
problems 
Tenure of ED & 
staff,
Age of 
Organization, 
Trainings offered 
 Stable leadership  Leadership 
stability - Board 
and ED 
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Gittell & Wilder Glickman & 
Servon 
Rohe, Bratt, & 
Biswas 
Rohe, Cowan, & 
Baku 
Twelvetrees Vidal (1996) 
Mission   Breadth of 
mission 
      
   Over-reliance on 
single source of 
funding 
      
Organizational 
Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
    Communication 
problems 
      
 
 
 
  Lack of 
community 
support 
      
    Changes in local 
housing 
market/neigh. 
      
    Growth in the # 
of CDCs 
      
Political Capital, 
Funding 
Political 
Strengths 
Intermediaries 
and funders 
have pressured 
CDCs to make 
certain choices, 
federal policies 
& programs 
      
  Networking 
abilities 
Lack of local 
support groups 
& systems 
      
Contextual 
Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
    Level of trust 
among actors 
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Appendix G 
CDC Housing Development Data 
 
Total Housing Unit Development 
Name of 
CDC 
Emerging Years 
(497 units) 
Middle Years 
(394 units) 
Merger Years 
(213 units) 
Mature Years 
(54 units) 
Total 
Units  
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
NECDC 3 1 1 0 1 9 14 31 40 66 80 12 6 6             270 
Franciscan 
Enterprise 1 2 0 2 2 8 2 13 28 43 0 5 0 0             106 
Housing 
Our 
Families           4 44 0 12 106 4 14 72 15 2           273 
Sabin CDC             3 10 21 39 28 10 10 2 1 2 0 1 0 1 128 
PCRI             244 1 0 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 0 2 24 370 
Albina 
CDC                                   4     4 
                                          1151 
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Appendix H RMLS Data  
Area Home Prices (in dollars), 1993-2006 
 
 
North 
PDX NE PDX SE PDX 
Hillsb’ro 
Forest 
Grove 
Gresh’m 
Trout 
Milwauk 
Clack.  
Oregon 
City/ 
Canby 
Lake 
Oswego/ 
West Linn 
West 
Portland 
Beavert’n 
Aloha 
Tigard/ 
Wilsnv’lle 
NW 
Wash 
County 
Portland 
Median 
‘93 59,000 84,000 79,900  97,900  
 
110,000  
 
116,000   109,000   170,000   138,900  111,000   137,000  150,000  107,000 
‘94 68,000 92,000 87,500 
 
112,500  
 
121,500  
 
122,500   125,000   189,500   152,500   120,000   147,500  
 
165,000  117,000 
‘95 80,000 107,000 99,500 
 
125,000  128,500  
 
134,500   136,500   208,100   170,500  132,000   130,000  
 
175,000  128,000 
‘96 89,200 119,000 112,500 
 
139,900  139,500  
 
149,100   145,000   220,000   185,000  142,500   165,000  
 
192,000  139,900 
‘97 102,000 130,000 123,000 
 
149,500  146,500  
 
156,300   153,900   235,000   205,000   150,000   171,300  
 
215,000  150,000 
‘98 113,000 139,000 129,900 
 
152,500  
 
153,000  
 
168,500   167,900   240,000   212,800   156,000   175,000  
 
212,100  156,900 
‘99 117,000 144,000 135,000 
 
153,000  
 
158,000  
 
167,300   173,000   249,900   211,200   159,000   188,300  
 
227,300  160,200 
‘00 119,900 149,000 140,000 
 
159,400  160,500  
 
170,900   171,900   260,000   229,900   163,000   189,600  
 
230,000  166,000 
‘01 129,200 157,500 146,000 
 
165,000  161,000  
 
173,100   175,200   252,000   227,000   167,000   190,500  
 
232,500  169,900 
‘02 138,000 168,800 153,400 
 
174,900  
 
164,500  
 
180,200  185,000   265,000   247,800   172,500   204,000  
 
244,000  176,900 
‘03 150,600 182,000 162,500 
 
178,800  
 
170,000  
 
189,900   199,900   287,300   262,500  176,300   224,000  259,900  185,500 
‘04 165,000 198,400 175,000 
 
189,000  
 
185,000  214,900  215,000   333,000   289,900   191,000   240,000  
 
285,900  204,500 
‘05 197,000 231,000 200,000 
 
223,500  
 
214,500  255,000   255,000   370,700   339,000   220,000   290,000  
 
334,600  237,500 
‘06 235,500 265,000 234,500 
 
260,000  
 
248,000  
 
307,200   286,000   443,800   378,100   251,000   322,000  
 
359,000  270,500 
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Appendix H RMLS Data 
Home Prices as a Percentage of Median, 1993-2006 
 
Year 
North 
Portland 
SE 
Portland 
NE 
Portland 
Hillsboro/ 
Forest 
Grove 
Gresham 
Troutdale 
Beavert’n 
Aloha 
Oregon 
City/ 
Canby 
Milwaukie 
Clackamas 
Tigard 
Wilsonville 
West 
Portland 
NW 
Wash 
County 
Lake 
Oswego/ 
West Linn 
‘93 55.1% 74.7% 78.5% 91.5% 102.8% 103.7% 101.9% 108.4% 128.0% 129.8% 140.2% 158.9% 
‘94 58.1% 74.8% 78.6% 96.2% 103.8% 102.6% 106.8% 104.7% 126.1% 130.3% 141.0% 162.0% 
‘95 62.5% 77.7% 83.6% 97.7% 100.4% 103.1% 106.6% 105.1% 101.6% 133.2% 136.7% 162.6% 
‘96 63.8% 80.4% 85.1% 100.0% 99.7% 101.9% 103.6% 106.6% 117.9% 132.2% 137.2% 157.3% 
‘97 68.0% 82.0% 86.7% 99.7% 97.7% 100.0% 102.6% 104.2% 114.2% 136.7% 143.3% 156.7% 
‘98 72.0% 82.8% 88.6% 97.2% 97.5% 99.4% 107.0% 107.4% 111.5% 135.6% 135.2% 153.0% 
‘99 73.0% 84.3% 89.9% 95.5% 98.6% 99.3% 108.0% 104.4% 117.5% 131.8% 141.9% 156.0% 
‘00 72.2% 84.3% 89.8% 96.0% 96.7% 98.2% 103.6% 103.0% 114.2% 138.5% 138.6% 156.6% 
‘01 76.0% 85.9% 92.7% 97.1% 94.8% 98.3% 103.1% 101.9% 112.1% 133.6% 136.8% 148.3% 
‘02 78.0% 86.7% 95.4% 98.9% 93.0% 97.5% 104.6% 101.9% 115.3% 140.1% 137.9% 149.8% 
‘03 81.2% 87.6% 98.1% 96.4% 91.6% 95.0% 107.8% 102.4% 120.8% 141.5% 140.1% 154.9% 
‘04 80.7% 85.6% 97.0% 92.4% 90.5% 93.4% 105.1% 105.1% 117.4% 141.8% 139.8% 162.8% 
‘05 82.9% 84.2% 97.3% 94.1% 90.3% 92.6% 107.4% 107.4% 122.1% 142.7% 140.9% 156.1% 
‘06 87.1% 86.7% 98.0% 96.1% 91.7% 92.8% 105.7% 113.6% 119.0% 139.8% 132.7% 164.1% 
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Appendix I 
Maps 
 
Housing Development  
Allocated by Neighborhood 
  NECDC 
Franciscan 
Enterprise 
Housing 
Our 
Families 
Sabin 
CDC PCRI Totals 
              
Boise 36 7 90 2 10 145 
Eliot 2 14 79 0 31 126 
Humboldt 32 7 13 0 119 171 
King 162 63 14 19 52 310 
Vernon 29 3 3 50 25 110 
Sabin 1 0 0 16 17 34 
Piedmont 0 0 74 0 24 98 
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1995 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
CDCs (1986-1995)
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PIEDMONT
WOODLAWN
CONCORDIA
ALAMEDA
SABIN-IRVINGTON
SABIN
VERNON
KING
HUMBOLDT
BOISE
PIEDMONT
OVERLOOK
ARBOR LODGE
ELIOT
IRVINGTON
2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
All CDCs
348 2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
NECDC
349 2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
Franciscan CDC
350 2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
Housing Our Families CDC
351 2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
Sabin CDC
352 2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
 < -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
 > 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
PCRI
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 Appendix J – Timeline of Events 
 Emerging Years – Industry Formation 
 Well funded, Ample Development Opportunities, Neighborhoods still blighted, accepting of CDCs, Growth Phase for Organizations 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Federal 
Leadership   
Clinton elected President, 
Cisneros Secretary of HUD 
  
Shift in Congress to Republican 
majority: Gingrich's Class of '94   
Federal Policy     HOPE VI approved by Congress   
Welfare Reform: TANF 
Introduced w/ 5 year limits on 
benefits. Parts of CRA curbed. 
CDBG diminishes. Section 8 
zeroed out for next 5 years. 
Local Public 
Policy 
Albina Community Plan 
Adopted 
Kafoury Aide Sten comes up 
with idea to buy Dominion 
Capital properties and form 
CDC 
  
Kafoury introduces idea of creating 
Housing Trust Fund with $30 million 
from General Fund moneys 
  
Local Public 
Leadership   
Katz elected mayor, Kafoury, 
defeating Bogle, is elected to 
City Council, leads BHCD, 
Hales elected to City Council 
    
Portland Rehab Network 
becomes Community 
Development Network of 
Multnomah County and is 
granted non-profit status 
Philanthropic 
Policy   
1st round of NPF-led training 
sessions for CDCs 
2nd round of NPF-led training 
sessions for CDCs 
McNamara leaves, Neureuther hired 
as Director, Meyer Trust funds CDC 
operating support 
Enterprise Foundation 
establishes an office in Portland, 
Mike Andrews hired to lead 
Neighborhood 
Issues 
Neil Kelly Showroom 
opens at N. Alberta and 
N. Albina 
Neil Kelly donates building to 
N/NE Community Mental 
Health 
Body found under FE Fred 
Meyer house 
1st Boise Neighborhood Cleanup, 
Boys and Girls Club opens at NE 
Police Precinct 
Housing prices in Portland rise 
by 25% 
Northeast 
Community 
Development 
Corporation 
(NECDC) 
Jaki Walker hired to 
implement Nehemiah 
Grant, 1st extension 
granted 
Multnomah County balks at 130 
property donations, redlining 
issues stall financing packages 
NECDC completes 1st 
Nehemiah house   
2nd extension on Nehemiah 
Grant granted 
Franciscan 
Enterprise 
(FE) 
  FE participates in NPF trainings FE acquires 14 houses from Fred Meyer 
DelSavio and Lindsey hired as co-
directors, Kowalczyk hired as const. 
manager 
  
Sabin CDC Sabin CDC formed from Sabin Community Assoc Sabin completes 1st rehab 
Sabin gains 501C3 status, 
participates in NPF trainings, 
Meisenhelter hired as ED 
Ediger hired as co-ED to develop 
housing, Beene hired to run Alberta 
St organizing effort 
Fondren hired as Economic 
Development Director, Sabin 
initiates Alberta St Corridor 
Project 
Housing our 
Families 
(HOF) 
HOF acquires 501C3 
status HOF completes first rehab 
HOF completes NPF training, 
hires Dursch as ED, Smock as 
Community Organizer 
HOF acquires Colonial Park, starts 
Maya Angelou rehab 
HOF wins Rudy Bruner Award, 
beats out NECDC 
Portland 
Community 
Reinvestment 
Initiatives  
(PCRI) 
  
PCRI created to assume 354 
Dominion Capital Properties, 
entire year's worth of tax credits 
set aside to facilitate 
Interim Director Alverson, 
assisted by Ediger, seek to 
straighten out 70+ land sale 
contracts 
Fitzpatrick hired as ED, land sale 
contracts cleared, renovation of 
properties begins, Kelley hired for 
construction 
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  Appendix J – Timeline of Events 
 
  Middle  Years – Industry Growth and Complexity 
  
Greater Accountability from Funders, Limited and More Complex Development Opportunities, Gentrification Happening, CDCs become Stewards of 
Multiple Housing Units and Advocates for Poorer Residents 
        
  1996 1997 1998 
Federal 
Leadership 
Bill Clinton re-elected President, Andrew 
Cuomo Secretary of HUD     
Federal Policy  Welfare Reform Act     
Local Public 
Policy 
PNDSC formed - single source of funding for 
CDCs from City and Local Foundations     
Local Public 
Leadership 
Vera Katz re-elected mayor, Mike Lindberg 
and Earl Blumenauer resign, Erik Sten elected 
City Commissioner 
  
Kafoury resigns as City Commissioner, Sten takes over 
leadership of  BHCD, Jim Francesconi elected 
Commissioner 
Philanthropic 
Policy BHCD, NPF, & Enterprise form PNDSC 
Tax Credits becoming main source of project 
equity for low-income housing NCDI money runs out 
Neighborhood 
Issues   
1st Alberta Street Fair, McMenamin Brothers 
renovate Kennedy School into Brew Pub and 
Hotel, Self Enhancement Inc moves to Unthank 
Park 
Art on Alberta takes over street fair, Last Thursday art 
walk created 
NECDC   NECDC completes final Nehemiah house, 167 units completed 
NECDC enters into agreement with The One Company 
to develop the Gladys McCoy apartments 
Franciscan 
Enterprise 
FE acquires 3 LIHPRHA properties, Lindsey 
and DelSavio leave, Karen Voiss hired as 
Director, Maggie Gibson development begins 
  Entire FE staff quits, citing Voiss’ lack of leadership 
Sabin CDC Sabin acquires 3 LIHPRHA properties Sabin completes Otesha Place Diane Meisenhelter and Jane Ediger leave, Felicia Allender-Brant hired as Director 
Housing our 
Families 
Alberta Simmons Plaza developed, HOF 
acquires 4 LIHPRHA properties, Smock 
leaves 
Betty Campbell Building built   on N. Mississippi 
Dursch, after returning from maternity leave, asked to 
leave for good, Willer finds embezzlement, Bauer hired 
to work on MTA 
PCRI   Line of Credit max'd out, Construction Manager Kelley leaves, childcare programs initiated   
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  Appendix J – Timeline of Events 
 
  Merger Years – Industry Accountability 
  
Little or No New Development, Gentrification Process fully in Place, CDCs become Synonymous with Low Income Housing, Sabin gets out of the Housing 
Business, Franciscan and HOF Merge, NECDC closes its doors 
        
  1999 2000 2001 
Federal 
Leadership   
George W Bush elected President, Mel Martinez 
Secretary of HUD   
Federal Policy Dow Jones tops 10,000   9/11 Attacks. Invasion of Afghanistan. Housing Funds cut more.  
Local Public 
Policy       
Local Public 
Leadership Dan Saltzman elected City Commissioner     
Philanthropic 
Policy 
PNDSC suggests that N/NE groups discuss 
overlapping services/service areas 
PNDSC demands that groups (NECDC, PCRI, 
HOF, FE, and Sabin) merge - or lose funding   
Neighborhood 
Issues 
BNA torpedoes HOF rental project with Tom 
Walsh,Battle of Boise in Willamette Week 
NE Passage documents BNA strife with HOF, 
Rebuilding Center opens on N. Mississippi Ave 
Mississippi Ave St Fair begins, New Seasons Market 
opens on NE 33rd Ave 
NECDC 
NECDC forms Geo Development, a for-profit 
venture, explores idea of saw mills in Zambia, 
Jaki Walker resigns 
NECDC withdraws from merger talks, closes its 
doors, and turns 12 unsold houses back to bank   
Franciscan 
Enterprise   
Maggie Gibson completed, Karen Voiss resigns in 
August after sending letter regarding HOF. Fran 
Ayaribil hired as interim Director. FE withdraws 
from merger talks for 3 months.  
FE merges with HOF to become ACDC July 1. New 
Board led by FE members 
Sabin CDC   8 Land Trust houses completed and sold Sabin withdraws from merger in June and forgoes funding 
Housing our 
Families 
HUD scrutinizes finances, Miggins hired as 
Director, BNA torpedoes rental housing 
development with Tom Walsh 
HUD scrutiny continues, no audit completed. HOF 
in talks with FE and Sabin. 
HOF mergers with FE to become ACDC, Shelley 
Earley hired as Director, new staff found to be under 
qualified, finances 
PCRI Park Terrace (88 units) acquired PCRI declines entry into merger talks, forgoes funding   
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  Appendix J – Timeline of Events 
 
  Mature Years/Attrition – Industry Contraction 
  
Little or no New Development, N/NE Portland becomes so expensive, even the Original Gentrifiers can no longer afford it, Alberta and Mississippi 
become the new Commercial Districts, Sabin goes Dormant, ACDC decides to close its doors, PCRI attempts Minority Homeownership Programs 
            
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Federal 
Leadership     
George W Bush re-elected 
President, Alphonso Jackson 
Secretary of HUD 
    
Federal Policy 
HUD budget authority 
decreased by 40% since 
1976 (Powell, 2004). 
  Interest Rates drop to new lows. Homeownership rates increase.     
Local Public 
Policy     
10 Year Plan to End 
Homelessness enacted - priority 
for housing for 0-30% of MFI 
  HIF budget $12 million. 
Local Public 
Leadership 
Randy Leonard elected City 
Commissioner   
Tom Potter, defeating Jim 
Francesconi, elected mayor, 
Sam Adams elected City 
Commissioner 
    
Philanthropic 
Policy     
Enterprise Foundation revamps 
into Enterprise Community 
Partners 
    
Neighborhood 
Issues 
Renovation of PCC Cascade 
Campus     No Alberta St Fair 
BNA torpedoes MAL due to 
design issues, cites BC 
building as poor example 
NECDC           
Franciscan 
Enterprise           
Sabin CDC Sabin completes a land trust house   
Sabin completes a land trust 
house   
Sabin's 15th Anniversary 
Party, Allender-Brant goes on 
indefinite leave.  
Housing our 
Families/ Albina 
Community 
Development 
ACDC completes new 
const. project on NE 10th, 
CFO fired for incompetance 
Earley leaves after 20 
months, McIlhatten hired 
as turn-around director 
ACDC enters into discussions 
with PCRI for dissolution 
ACDC refinances all 
properties 
ACDC properties transferred 
to PCRI March 31 
PCRI     PCRI enters into discussions with ACDC 
Minority Homeownership 
Programs initiated, OC 
Trotter Office Building 
completed 
ACDC properties transferred 
to PCRI March 31 
 
